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Let’s start with some hope. There is very little to be had. 
 
On June 9th, 2016, Judge Sichinga1 of the Kabwe High Court ruled in favor of 
Geofrey Mithi, the husband and widower of District Commissioner Beatrice Mithi 
(Kabwe High Court, 2016). The judge found that Mopani Copper Mine breached their 
duty of care by emitting, into a residential neighborhood, over 14 times more sulfur 
dioxide than legally allowed. Killing her. Hers was not the first death in Kankoyo caused 
by Mopani’s toxic emissions. Nor was it the last. But Geofrey Mithi was the first 
defendant to win a case against Mopani for wrongful death due to their pollution. 
 
Three years earlier, on December 31, 2013, District Commissioner Beatrice Mithi 
entered a Kankoyo church, Chawama Hall, to celebrate the new year.2 An honored guest, 
she was asked to give a short sermon. As she preached, congregants saw blue fumes 
leaking into the church. The fumes came through the windows, doors, and even, 
ironically, the air vents. Sitting down, Mithi complained to her friend, Mirriam Mwale, 
about the scent of sulfur in the air. Mwale testified that she, too, had seen “there was a 
bluish smoke that filled the church” and felt a familiar itch. Congregants started 
 
1 When names are a matter of public record (as this Court case is) I do not use pseudonyms. All other 
names throughout the dissertation are anonymous, as I will go into further detail about later. 
2 All of the quotes and details in this section are from the Kabwe High Court case, 2016. 
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“screaming for air”. Coughing. Covering their mouths. “Shouting they were dying”. 
Jenipher Lwanga remembers personally feeling “heat in her chest”. Because Mithi had an 
influential political post, congregants pled with her to take this up with Mopani Copper 
Mines, the emitter of the fumes. This was, after all, a common occurrence here in 
Kankoyo. It was not even the first time Mithi suffered an asthma attack from Mopani’s 
fumes while visiting. But maybe, this time, Mithi would believe them. 
Sitting in church Mithi started wheezing. She requested water. Then, she asked to 
go outside for air. I can’t breathe, people heard her say. Mwale recounted escaping to her 
car together. A few others followed them out, searching for air. Opening her own car 
door, Mwale heard Mithi scream. I am dying. In the chaos of a suffocating church, Mithi 
had forgotten her keys. An usher rushed to collect them for her, but by the time he 
returned Mithi had collapsed in the vehicle. Her friends tried but couldn’t administer her 
inhaler. She was unresponsive. Lwanga remembers holding Mithi in her arms as Mwale 
rushed to the hospital. 
 
Lwaba Mubikayi, the doctor who autopsied Mithi, told the court she had 
suffocated within five minutes of choking. He examined her organs microscopically and 
said most of them appeared normal, with heart and lung tissue showing “cardiac arrest” 
resulting from “acute respiratory failure due to inhalation of toxic fumes”. The 
irregularities he found, called Emphysema, were consistent with asthmatic patients when 
exposed to irritants. She did not, he said, die from diabetes because “a diabetic patient 
would [have fallen into a coma and] not have died in the way [Mithi] died”. 
“Exhaustion,” Mubikayi said, was also “not likely to cause an asthma attack”. 
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Cliff Ngwata, an inspector at the Zambia Environmental Management Agency 
(ZEMA) said during the night in question Mopani’s emissions were not compliant with 
Zambian law. In fact, Ngwata said, one of the emissions tables in evidence showed 
Mopani-reported emissions that were “70 times above statutory limits”. Further, he 
conceded, “emission[s] at Mufulira were always above limits” but yet they had “never 
been fined but [only] cautioned through letters” because of Development Agreements 
between the government and Mopani that are said to offer Mopani environmental 
indemnity. Three years later, Ngwata claims, they are still not compliant and yet have 
still never been fined. In the end, says Ngwata, ZEMA has “failed the people of 
Mufulira”. 
In their defense, Mopani paid two additional doctors to testify on their behalf. The 
first, the head of the laboratory at the University Teaching Hospital, never even requested 
to see Mithi’s body or tissue samples. Instead he admitted to relying solely on 
information supplied by Mopani. With this, he quibbled with Mubikayi’s report. He 
implied the autopsy was not done with the right kind of equipment—as he did not notice 
it included microscopic analysis. Maybe, he proposed, Mithi died from smoking. One 
toxic fume in place of another. Mopani’s second doctor reported Mithi had visited his 
hospital for gall stones eight months prior to death and “the big ones could be fatal”. He 
refused to submit health records showing the size of her gall stones, however, citing 
doctor-patient confidentiality.  
Mopani further dazzled the court with details of their metallurgical engineering 
and said that as of June 2014, six months after Mithi’s death, “the smelter can now 
capture 97% of Sulphur dioxide”. Further, Mopani claimed statutory limits were 
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irrelevant because of the Development Agreements. This must be true, said Mopani’s 
environmental engineer, because they had never before been sanctioned. Besides, there is 
another mine only 30km away. Maybe Chambeshi produced the deadly emissions. 
And anyway, claimed their metallurgic engineer Kennedy Chitundu, he worked 
that night and the smelter was running as expected, at 100%. They had even made 700 to 
800 tons of acid. They had data for every millisecond of their operations. Reports were 
sent to ZEMA. Stacks were 70 meters high. Monitors were online. Managers were 
notified of any malfunctions so they could shut down the equipment. Everything was 
normal. 
Yes, he admitted in cross examination, when Mopani makes more acid, they also 
have higher emissions. Of course, he admitted, sulfur dioxide can turn into a weak acid 
haze in high humidity. And sure, “dust, arsenic, cadmium, copper and lead were also 
released into the atmosphere”—but the amount released, he said, “depended on analysis”. 
He denied their emissions were 70 times the statutory limit that night, claiming they were 
only 14.3 times higher. Certainly, other equipment produced sulfur dioxide but “to a 
lesser extent”. Insignificant, apparently. There was “nothing unusual about the 
emissions” that night, concluded their environmental engineer, because they did not have 
to meet statutory limits as long as they captured a certain percentage. This wasn’t 
egregious, it was ordinary. 
Geofrey Mithi’s council, Haimbe, argued that Mopani was so “reckless” no 




Mopani has appealed citing “procedural irregularities” and “misinterpret[ation of] 
evidence”. The case remains ongoing. 
 
* * * 
 
In Zambian mining cities, ecological disasters, such as the one above, punctuate 
ongoing industrial pollution in a landscape with a legacy of toxicity. But these events can 
overshadow the daily, relentless pollution that perpetrates a violence that is slow and 
rather ordinary—yet every bit as deadly (Berlant 2011; Nixon 2011; Povinelli 2011). 
This violence is quasi-eventful3 and unbound by time. In Chowa, Kabwe, lead has been 
poisoning for decades—since at least the 1970s, according to a report commissioned by 
the Kabwe division of the nationally-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 
(ZCCM). Yet Yabe et al. (2015) show no difference in lead poisoning between the period 
of active mining and 20 years after the mine closed. In Kankoyo, Mufulira, residents have 
been suffering from senta, a local term for sulfur dioxide and other air pollutants, since 
1937. But residents all agree the senta has worsened in the past decade. It now chokes 
and burns “like tear gas”4 in your lungs. A few kilometers away in Butondo, Mufulira, 
residents complain about health impacts from exposure to acid mist from Mopani’s heap 
leaching, which began over a decade ago. Daily they are subjected to acid seeping into 
 
3 Povinelli (2011). I define this later in the chapter. 
4 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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their bodies. In these Townships, stories of deaths, disease, and debility saturate everyday 
conversation, stark testimonies of routine afflictions in polluted landscapes. 
In this dissertation, I explore the claim by one Mopani insider, Edson Nawa, that 
“there are no facts”5 about the environment here—only stories, rumors, disputed 
scientific evidence and accusations of politicking. Claims about the extent of pollution—
indeed, whether there is pollution at all—are highly contested. In Kabwe, one might 
question whether the presence of lead is even pollution, if it is, as many contend, a 
natural part of the geology. In Mufulira, Mopani submits self-monitored environmental 
reports recording emissions within their license or below national standards.6 While some 
Mopani insiders claimed, “there is no pollution [anymore]”7, others revealed Mopani’s 
environmental data ranges from “filtered”8 to “entirely false”.9 Those in ZEMA, 
meanwhile, admit to having suspicions but claim they are hamstrung by the industry’s 
self-reported data. Residents say their claims are dismissed: “We used to argue [with 
Mopani] every day and their reasoning was that they were using International Standards 
and we were just ordinary people”.10 Those in power argue that residents are biased, 
rumormongering, and simply seeking unwarranted compensation from an industry they 
perceive as monied. 
 
5 Interview with Nawa [Pseudonym], Mopani insider, 2016. 
6 As I discuss in chapter 3, regarding air emissions from their smelter Mopani submits they are within the 
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) in the Development Agreements. Regarding their heap leaching 
operation, they claim to be under the national statutory limits. 
7 Interview with Banda [Pseudonym], Mopani insider, 2016. 
8 Interview with Nawa [Pseudonym], Mopani insider, 2016. 
9 Interview with Soko [Pseudonym], Mopani insider, 2016. 
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In Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon (2011) 
delivers a rousing call to learn how to portray these simmering disasters. Toxic buildup 
falls by the wayside when media—and, I would add, social scientists—focus on the 
“spectacular”, immediate, and eventful happenings of the day (Nixon 2011:3). How, he 
asks, do you “devise arresting stories” (ibid) when the star players go underground? How 
can we account for the “long emergencies” (ibid) of environmental toxicity in the 
timeframe of a dissertation? Nixon argues we must learn how, despite the “formidable 
imaginative difficulties” (ibid:10). To “confront slow violence” we must “plot and give 
figurative shape to formless threats whose fatal repercussions are dispersed across space 
and time” (ibid). Through this dissertation, I venture just that.   
Research Questions and Argument 
 
 This dissertation is founded upon three sets of research questions that are 
associated with three conceptual moments. First, how does deadly pollution continue to 
occur despite growing environmental concern about mining locally and worldwide, 
Zambia’s environmental regulations, and periodic public health crises? And how is 
nobody held to account? These puzzles led me to investigate how the mining industry 
(Mopani and ZCCM) and the Zambian government (as an institution11) conspire to 
manufacture ignorance and frame environmental knowledge. This, in turn, compels 
residents of these mining Townships to wait amidst toxicity, thereby causing “debility” 
(Puar 2017) and “slow death” (Berlant 2007). This summons my second question: How is 
 
11 Throughout I will speak of ‘the government’ as a monolith not because government representatives and 
employees are homogenous or even that all participate in the pollution or cover-ups. When I say “the 
government” I mean it as an institution, not the individuals, many of whom are fighting for healthy 
environments. 
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life in the meantime experienced? And what can this kind of waiting do? Intervening in 
work on the politics of time (Auyero 2011, 2012; Chailleux 2018; Gupta 2012; Jeffrey 
2010; Olson 2015; Verdery 1996), I expand on their ideas of what it means to wait, 
arguing there is agency even in waiting. Third, I ask, while waiting, what kinds of 
knowledge do residents acquire about pollution and toxicity? And more specifically, how 
does their knowledge challenge or unsettle more traditionally academic ways of 
knowing?  
Taken together, I argue state and corporate actors evade responsibility for—and 
even profit upon—industrial waste through creating and reifying an abstract regulatory 
apparatus, a particular way of framing, measuring, and legitimizing knowledge about the 
environment. Meanwhile, residents are left in a constant state of waiting, despite their 
valiant efforts. While waiting—for relocation, compensation, or even acknowledgement 
of pollution—residents acquire an embodied knowledge, a way of knowing and claiming 
expertise through a sustained connection between bodies and place. Finally, I argue that 
this knowledge—acquired while enduring the quasi-event of toxicity—has the potential 
to upend the apparatus by questioning its legitimacy. 
Throughout this dissertation, I develop my theoretical conclusions within the 
framework of “doing minor theory”—and acknowledge that this is only possible through 
authentic engagement and building relationships ((Katz 2017), see also Haraway 1988; 
Nagar 2016; Neely and Nguse 2015; Sundberg 2015). Cindi Katz argues that doing minor 
theory is a way of theorizing from the inside out—from the “molecular” to the “molar” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986:219). Doing minor theory means recognizing the “embodied, 
situated, and fluid… productions of knowledge inseparable from—if not completely 
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absorbed in—the mess of everyday life” (Katz 2017:598). Katz’s work on minor theory 
follows from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of minor literature, defined as narrative that 
uses the major tongue to subvert it (1986:16). Because of this “everything in [minor 
literature] is political [and] everything […] takes on a collective value” (ibid:17). Katz 
takes this thesis and elevates the significance of encounter. For Katz, “becoming minor 
sets up an imbricated politics; a way of negotiating and reworking a space of betweenness 
to produce something new (1995:496). As Katz states, 
The ‘space of betweenness’ from which we can produce these more engaged 
accounts of the world emanates precisely from the interstices between 
mental maps and the quest for collective veracity. Embodied, situated, and 
messy, these nonlinear productions of knowledge alter the terrain of theory 
and practice; they pry apart conventional geographies not by dismantling 
‘major theory’, but by situating minor theory in its midst (Katz 1992:498). 
 
In approaching embodied knowledge, I take up Katz’s idea that in doing minor theory 
one must operate in ‘a space of betweenness’. It is defined by process and engagement. It 
is always being done and is never finally finished. 
Ethical engagement also demands acknowledging the situated perspective from 
which I engage with others (Nagar 2016; Neely and Nguse 2015). My positioning in 
geopolitical and global economic systems—systems that advantage those from whence I 
traveled over those in places to which I traveled, and admittedly the very fact that I could 
travel—influenced how these encounters and engagements occurred. Even whether they 
happened at all. As a foreign academic, connections got me in the door at the Ministry of 
Mines and at ZEMA. I received data communities had been fighting to access for years—
all because it was “for academic purposes.” (Of course, most of the data I requested I 
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never got access to—despite faithfully formally requesting the documents in person every 
single week for over six months.)  
There are other ways in which my position influenced this inquiry. I can appear 
non-threatening on approach. I am a woman and—for better or worse—can therefore 
project ignorance about the basics of mining science as an interviewing strategy. I am an 
outsider who is at minimum a curiosity and may have connections with funding agencies 
and am therefore not rushed out the door by justifiably skeptical residents. I also could 
only hear residents’ accounts through translation—though because I was well funded this 
too led to engagements with several outstanding research assistants, in particular Mwelwe 
Musosha. On long drives together to and from Mufulira (we stayed in Kitwe), we could 
review body language, phrasing, and incompatible stories—and also talk about music, 
family life, and the politics of the day. These interactions were invaluable in shaping 
what follows. 
Upon my return—I indeed wrote this from a great distance—I sifted through 
thousands of documents, pages from 29 translated and transcribed focus groups, and 
hundreds of hours of interview tapes to write some things and leave out so many others. 
There are ruthless exclusions. Devastating ones. I have curated these accounts. I hold and 
inhabit a positionality that pervades my encounters, my perspective, and thereby this 
writing. I gaze from somewhere.  
But there is, really, “only partial perspective” (Haraway 1988:583). 
Acknowledging that we all have a partial perspective is, for Donna Haraway, a pre-
condition for producing better knowledge. As Haraway says, “The knowing self is partial 
in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed 
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and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together 
without claiming to be another” (ibid:586). And this is, for Haraway, the point. To see 
together in order to always be producing “better accounts of the world” (ibid: 590).  
The Scene 
 
What follows is inexplicable without at least some understanding of how 
mining—in times of boom and bust, under colonial control and in the colonial present—
is intertwined not only with Zambia’s economy12 but also with its history, national 
identity, and aspirations (Ferguson 1999; Fraser and Larmer 2010; Frederiksen 2010, 
2013; Larmer 2006, 2007, Negi 2014). Mining, as Ferguson (1999) shows, has always 
been a part of how Zambia dreamt of itself and its modern future. Mining is part of its 
“mythology of modernization”, no matter if it is “turned upside down, shaken and 
shattered” (Ferguson, 1999:13) or renewed during another upswing in copper prices. 
After a long history of pre-colonial mining, Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa 
Company (BSAC), arrived in what would later be Northern Rhodesia (and now Zambia) 
in the 1890s and took over the territory. To spur prospecting, BSAC made deals with 
other companies, and gave out mining licenses. Frederiksen shows how some prospectors 
even developed a “scientific” approach to prospecting that involved walking everywhere 
and “systematically visiting every African settlement and offering large rewards for 
anyone who led them to outcrops” (Frederiksen 2013). The BSAC administered Northern 
Rhodesia until the British Colonial Office took over in 1924, leaving the BSAC with 
 
12 Mining is supplying a smaller percentage of GDP, taxes, and employment than previously, though it still 
remains important to the national economy because copper is one of Zambia’s few exports creating a more 
balanced foreign exchange. Ferguson claims copper historically provided for 90% of exports (Ferguson 
1999:7). 
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mineral rights and the British with political control. Even so, mining companies built 
roads, housing, and infrastructure, powerfully reshaping the landscape for their own 
profit (Slinn 1971). 
 In addition to building the urban fabric, the history of mobilization for rights was 
also born out of the mining sector. Strikes in the Copperbelt were common in the 1930s 
to 1950s, as white and black trade unions developed and strengthened—becoming 
“famously powerful” (Fraser 2010:5). African mineworkers were central to Africans 
gaining a modicum of political power in colonial Rhodesia and later in the fight for 
Zambia’s independence (Henderson 1975). Post-independence, mineworkers supported 
independence movements throughout the region and the African National Congress’s 
struggle against apartheid (Larmer 2006, 2007).  
After winning independence from British occupation, Zambia’s first president, 
Kenneth Kaunda, attempted to create an OPEC-style copper cartel to mitigate against the 
kinds of economic booms and busts that happen when relying on one commodity export. 
Kaunda’s plan was hampered by the inability of low-income copper-producing countries 
to stockpile reserves when prices were low. Thwarted, he subsequently nationalized the 
industry, with the Zambian government taking over 51% of the mines (multinational 
companies including Anglo American Corporation owned the other 49%), and later 
merging operations into ZCCM. Now, with the mines controlled by the state, strikes and 
labor organizations were seen as unpatriotic, an affront to national identity and progress. 
But with union support, ZCCM continued to oversee public services in 
mineworker Townships, including water supply, electricity, and housing (Mutale 2004). 
ZCCM added amenities such as education, health care, and food (Fraser 2010:9). They 
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sponsored Zambia’s football teams (Chipande 2016) and provided golf courses, public 
spaces, and green areas in town (Straube 2018). ZCCM not only played a massive role in 
the Zambian economy but also in the day to day life in its small cities. 
But the Zambian economy soon fell victim to rising oil prices and falling copper 
prices throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Steep economic decline led to an immense 
contraction in GNP per capita, and a dramatic increase in poverty and malnutrition 
(Ferguson 1999:6). Urban poverty skyrocketed “from 4 percent in 1975 to just under 50 
percent in 1994” (ibid). Low prices, high costs of imports, and a decline in production 
also resulted in massive debt—Ferguson shows that in 1995 Zambia’s debt was $6.7 
billion USD and debt per capita was almost double GNP per capita (ibid). Swamped in 
debt, Zambia agreed to World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs), including privatizing most of the economy and ZCCM. With 
the first of these policies—eliminating subsidies for bread and basic goods—riots broke 
out across the Copperbelt and for a time Kaunda backed off his SAP commitments. With 
the support of mining unions, Chiluba’s Movement for a Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
won the 1991 election, ending the one-party state. Yet despite union support, Chiluba 
fully committed to liberalization via the SAPs in the 1990s and 2000s. 
ZCCM was split up into several attractive mine ‘packages’ that would be sold to 
investors, while tailings, unwanted waste piles, and other contamination would be 
retained by the Zambian government through the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – 
Investments Holding Corporation (ZCCM-IH). ZCCM-IH would also retain a 10% share 
in the local mines (Mopani, for example, is a Zambian-registered company with 73% 
ownership by Glencore, 10% by ZCCM-IH, and the rest by First Quantum Mines (FQM). 
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ZCCM-IH does not have any shares in Glencore13). During negotiations for the sales of 
the mines, secret Development Agreements (DAs) were signed, giving the private mines 
an “effective tax rate of 0%” (Fraser 2010:15). Many mines were also not required to 
continue contracts with Zambian suppliers and manufacturers, meaning ZCCM’s sale led 
to further losses of business for Zambians. 
 A sense of conspiracy and corruption is mixed together with Zambia’s 
“spectacularly unlucky” (Fraser 2010:2) timing regarding copper prices and the sale of 
the mines. As Fraser points out (see image 5), “soon after independent Zambia 
nationalized the mines in 1974, the global price took a sharp turn for the worse [until, 
after privatization of the mines] the world copper price shot through the roof, and some 
new private owners made huge profits” (ibid). In addition, to meet timelines ordered by 
the international financial community, Zambia had to sell the mines for almost nothing—
rumors are that they sold Konkola Copper Mine for less money than the finished, ready-
to-be-shipped copper stored in its warehouse was worth. But in 2008 when the 
 
13 This is significant because of accusations that Glencore participates in transfer pricing. Transfer pricing 
is defined by one company owning two sibling companies that file taxes in differing countries. The 
company in the higher taxed state sells goods for under market value (operating at a loss) to their sister 
company, which makes large profits in the low-tax haven. This may also mean that ZCCM-IH makes a loss 
in Mopani despite Glencore profiting. 
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government imposed a windfall tax on the mines to reap some of these profits, copper 
prices immediately fell, rebounding only after the windfall tax was repealed. 
 
Finally, the racialized, colonial, and neo-colonial dimensions of extraction have 
faced immense scrutiny by scholars (Butler 2007; Butler 2015; Frederiksen 2013; 
Gregory 2001; Kirsch 2014; Murray and Jackson 2019). In particular, Paula Butler 
demonstrates how Canadian mining companies take up colonial discourses—like 
promoting economic “efficiency” or political “transparency”, or decrying 
“mismanagement”—to make foreign investment appear benign whilst in reality 
continuing colonial, white supremacist extraction practices (124). Amber Murray and 
Nicholas Jackson (2019) offer a poignant decolonial critique of the ways in which 
Image 5: Timeline of world copper prices, Zambian production 
Source: Fraser and Larmer (eds), 2010. Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: boom and bust on the globalized 
Copperbelt. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
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extractive industries use racialized rhetoric as a source of legitimation and blame shifting, 
which they call “racialized localwashing.” The extractive industry and international 
financial institutions have surely done the same in Zambia, in particular relying on the 
discourses that ZCCM mines were “mismanaged”, that Zambia is in need of mining for 
“development”, that environmental harms are due to “corruption”, that local residents are 
“ignorant,” and that white outsiders are “experts.” Further, Frederiksen (2013) has 
explored the ties between science and empire, arguing that knowledge generation has 
been crucial for building and maintaining colonial control. Indeed, he argues that 
colonization must be seen as a scientific endeavor, as well as a political one. Further, he 
argues that when institutions, sciences, and extractive practices are built upon racist aims 
and ideologies, racism continues even while the race of the people involved change. This 
dissertation does not reject their claims but instead builds upon their findings by asking 
different questions about how the ties between science, knowledge, and power are 
maintained, renewed, and reified. 
Sites 
 
The historic mining region of Zambia (see Map 1) is a cluster of several cities in 
the Copperbelt, the city of Kabwe in the Central Province, and, to a lesser extent, a 
smattering of smaller mines in the Northwestern Province, now considered the “new 
Copperbelt” (Negi 2014). This dissertation focuses primarily on two small cities: 
Mufulira (population approximately 300,000) and Kabwe (population approximately 
200,000).14 These are maps 2 and 3. Within these cities, I zoom in on four townships: 
 
14 In choosing Mufulira and Kabwe, I left behind (both in the field and in writing) many Zambian mining 
sites that are also worthy of study. The methods appendix goes into this in greater detail. 
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Kankoyo Township and Butondo Township in Mufulira; and Chowa Township and 
Makululu Township in Kabwe (See table 1). These cities and associated Townships were 
chosen because of the extent of pollution, their mining histories, and the (relative) 
accessibility of information. These two cities also offer a significant foil: the primary 
copper mine in Mufulira is now operated by a multinational corporation, Glencore, after 
being sold by ZCCM during Zambia’s privatization process. Glencore is a commodity 
firm notorious for tax evasion, transfer pricing, and other shady financial practices. The 
lead-zinc Kabwe mine was closed in 1994, while still under government control through 
ZCCM.  
Mufulira and Kabwe were both first built and administered as company mining 
towns. Significantly for this dissertation, the colonial companies—and later ZCCM—
took the local environment and potential contamination into consideration when planning 
Image 6: Welcome to Mufulira, a place of abundance 
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and building the Townships. With the exception of Makululu, an informal area in Kabwe, 
these Townships were planned by the mines to host lower-valued African mineworkers 
(not ‘European’15 workers).  The Townships’ locations were quite intentional; they were 
built close to the mine (for worker accessibility) and in the path of toxic air emissions and 
along waste canals. European workers lived in significantly bigger, better constructed 
houses in separate neighborhoods less impacted by air pollution in the prevailing winds.16 
That people are living amidst toxicity is thus, not an accidental result of geography, nor is 
it the result of haphazard shantytown growth (with the exception of Makululu in Kabwe). 
Toxic inequality has instead been planned into the cities from their beginnings.  
In Mufulira, the Kankoyo Township abuts the mine and was built to house lower-
skilled African workers. The Butondo neighborhood was constructed later in with slightly 
larger houses and more spacious town planning in order to provide incentive for African 
workers to work harder and/or stay in their job longer. In Kabwe, the Chowa settlement 
was built with the slightly bigger, nicer houses to similarly incentivize African workers 
(the lower-income Kasanda was built in the path of air emissions). 
 
15 People we may now refer to as expats were considered ‘European’ instead of ‘African’ workers, though 
this divide was much more about race and class than country of origin. ‘European’ workers were British 
but also American and South African whites. Black South Africans were considered ‘African’ while white 
counterparts were ‘European.’ After independence many of these racial divides continued, though once the 
process of “Zambianization” (Larmer 2010) started in the 1970s, more and more middle management and 
even upper management positions went to Zambians and the Townships became more based on class than 
race. 
16 Interestingly enough, tailings dams (more of a liquid slushy effluent) were built in the European 
neighborhoods because they were thought to be beautiful things to look at and the toxicity of the tailings 
meant mosquitos could not breed in the stagnant water. Europeans searching for something that looked like 
a slow river or a lake seemed to have enjoyed living alongside tailings (“that slag heap never shined so 
beautifully” (Schumaker 2008:835)). Environmentally, this was a drastic oversight of course, and 
especially in Kitwe the wealthier neighborhoods still overlook contaminated, marshy former tailings ponds. 
Because the enriched uranium for the first British atomic weapon was mined and processed near Kitwe, 




Image 7: Kankoyo, Mufulira 
When you first enter the Kankoyo township of Mufulira, you pass a sign welcoming you to 
the “clean and safe place that we have built.” You immediately notice there are suddenly 
few plants and no grass. Two types of trees grow—mango and avocado, both resistant to 
sulfur. Houses are fenced with a strange-looking bush, quite different from the leafy shrubs 
demarcating yards in townships mere kilometers away. According to residents, this is the 
only bush that will grow well in the soil of Kankoyo because of “the acid.” Even if you are 
lucky enough to come during a day Mopani is not releasing fumes, you still immediately 
sense a faint smell of sulfur in the air and your eyes will prickle. After a few hours you will 
likely feel ill. Residents warn you from coming into the neighborhood when Mopani is 
“releasing”, telling stories of visitors past collapsing from respiratory distress, rushed to the 
hospital because they “weren’t used” to the air here.  
 
The ambiguous nausea alerts you: something is suspicious about Mopani’s claim that by 
upgrading the smelter and adding acid plants they have decreased pollution to “infinitesimal 
levels”. 
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During the privatization process, when the Zambian economy was undergoing 
structural adjustment, the mining houses were sold and are now privately owned. 
Kankoyo, Butondo, and Chowa are considered “second class” neighborhoods by the 
Zambian Central Statistics Bureau because they were planned communities with 
infrastructure including electricity, roads, a sewage system, and community piped water. 
However, they currently host lower to lower-middle-class residents, many of whom are 
uncertain of where their next meal may come from. Extreme poverty is higher in 
Kankoyo and many residents said they would prefer living in informal, “third class” 
housing areas farther from the mine and the corresponding environmental impacts but 
they cannot afford to move. City services such as water supply and trash collection are no 
longer executed by the mines and instead are (or, are not) provided via parastatal 
companies—though, as we shall see, separating these systems from mining operations 
has not been fully completed. Kabwe’s Makululu was never a mining township but is an 
informal settlement to the former mine’s west. Makululu is considered “third class” 
because it is unplanned, has no apparent urban design, and the houses lack electricity, 
sewage, and plumbing. 
Sources of contamination 
There are substantial differences between the contamination faced in each of these 
Townships. Because Kankoyo is directly adjacent to the smelter and processing plants, 
most conversation about pollution in Kankoyo centers around senta17—a term locals use  
 
17 Retired mineworkers recounted that the terms senta derived from men explaining the sintering process to 
their wives, who often asked what the pollution was. “Sintering” as a verb was transformed to “senta” as a 
noun, meaning the emissions resulting from sintering. Now it is commonly used to refer to the SO2 







Image 8: Butondo, Mufulira 
 
Butondo Township is a couple kilometers up the road from Kankoyo. Flowers, trees, and 
gardens grow everywhere, demarcating yards and providing shade for roads so potholed it 
would be easier to navigate if they were unpaved. Butondo’s houses are bigger than 
Kankoyo’s and the township offers more spacious plots, treelined streets, and a small 
shopping center. Senta is far enough away to be a nuisance rather than calamity.  
 
When you look to your north, however, huge piles of broken up rock rise past the roofs of 
the last row of houses. Some parts of the heap have rumpled up green tarps but others do 
not. This is the site of Mopani Mine’s heap leach, where an acidic leachate was once 
sprayed, but is now dripped, in an effort to ‘irrigate’ the ore, extracting copper from piles 
of crushed rock. Residents in Butondo speak about diseases from their exposure to the 
acidic solution, ranging from rashes and skin lumps to blindness, respiratory problems, and 
even death. 
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to talk about sulfur dioxide emissions, but often more generally refers to anything emitted 
by the mine into the air, including sulfur trioxide and other gases, fumes, or airborne 
heavy metal particles from the smelter and processing plants. The mine, under all its 
various owners, has been emitting senta since 1937, when the smelter was first built. 
There is widespread agreement that Kankoyo is contaminated; the first thing you see 
walking into the Township is a lack of vegetation. 
Township City History Economics Primary Environmental 
Issue 





Air pollution from 
smelter, converters, 
refinery, and acid plant 
 
Water source is industrial 
water, potential 
contamination through in 
situ leaching process 
 
Butondo Mufulira Formal / 
planned 
Low - mid income 
(former ‘African’ 
worker) 
Acid mist from heap leach 
operation 
 
Water source is industrial 
water, potential 
contamination through in 
situ leaching process 
 
Chowa Kabwe Formal / 
planned 
Low - mid income 
(former ‘African 
worker’) 
Lead pollution in soil, 
from land, former smelter, 
waste canal, and tailings 
 
Makululu Kabwe Informal / 
unplanned 
Lowest income (not 
for mineworkers) 
Lead pollution in soil, 
from former smelter, 




Table 1: Township overview 
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The questions being fought over in Kankoyo are whether the pollution is still 
ongoing, whether it is now worse, and who is (legally) responsible. Long-term 
environmental impacts of mining operations on vegetation, housing, and even health are 
considered legacy issues and any claims that Mopani is not meeting environmental 
standards need to distinguish between the legacy pollution and ongoing pollution. Since 
exposure to SO2 most often produces chronic health issues like asthma and respiratory 
illness, it is difficult for most residents to prove when exactly exposure happened.  
In their complaints about senta worsening, Kankoyo residents describe a ‘bluish 
gas’ (SO2 would be colorless or potentially turn into a white haze), leading to rumors 
about what they could be processing. Mopani would not officially comment, and 
mineworkers I interviewed gave conflicting accounts of what this bluish gas could be. It 
could be due to smelting materials other than copper. For example, emissions from 
Image 9: Lack of vegetation in Kankoyo 
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smelting cobalt often lead to physical symptoms residents report. They could also be 
processing metals found in the slimes—the byproduct of electrowinning—such as gold 
and silver. This could be why Mopani’s Environmental Impact Assessment reports using 
cyanide even though it is rarely or never used for copper processing. There are 
conflicting reports on whether Mopani may use cyanide to process gold from their slimes, 
selling it on the side. The gas could alternatively be a byproduct of the acid plant. Acid 
plants convert SO2 into sulfuric acid. During the conversion process, SO2 is converted to 
SO3, which is much more potent and could perhaps produce the effects the community 
complains about. Finally, it’s possible some complaints about senta worsening are due to 
health impacts from Mopani’s recent foray into smelting copper byproducts from the 
Lumwana uranium mine. Rumor is that Mopani’s machines started faltering due to the 
high radiation in Lumwana’s ores and stopped processing them. In sum, legal debate 
around air quality in Kankoyo focuses on environmental liability, indemnity agreements, 
the timing of contamination and chronic health problems—what’s new, and what’s been 
ongoing, what is the result of new equipment, and what comes from the old smelter. 
In Butondo, the main environmental issue facing residents is residual acid mist 
being carried into their Township from Mopani’s heap leaching plant mere meters away 
from houses. This is not a historic issue like senta. Heap leaching was started by Mopani 
in 2006-2007 and Mopani simply claims they are within the allowable limits.  
Both Kankoyo and Butondo suffers from industrial water (water used in industry and 
therefore likely more contaminated with chemicals and heavy metals) being piped into 
their taps, and the potential impacts of Mopani’s in situ leaching on their domestic water 
supply. Industrial water use is a hold-over from colonial and ZCCM management, when 
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mineworker Townships were supplied free water from the mine. Since the mine built the 
water network, they used industrial water as a cost-saving measure (I heard, but cannot 
verify, that ZCCM had a water treatment plant and could treat this industrial water; at 
minimum they were not in situ leaching above the pumps). Concern about water quality 
mushroomed after hundreds of residents were hospitalized from drinking contaminated 
tap water in 2006 and 2008. By the time of my study in 2016, residents claimed there was 
“acid in the water”18 on a regular basis. Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company 
(MWSC) claim that while they cannot regularly test for chemicals, most heavy metals 
including lead, and metalloids like arsenic, after these incidents they started automatically 
testing for low pH and shut down water supply when the pH drops. 
Kabwe hosted a lead-zinc mine and unsurprisingly, both of the Kabwe Townships 
I focus on suffer from exposure to lead. The vector for lead in these Townships is the 
soil, not water. People breathe (and potentially also eat) dirt and dust contaminated with 
lead. Contamination is also brought into the Townships, from rocks and bricks bought 
from small-scale re-mining and quarrying operations at the tailings site. (This is more 
common in Makululu but also happens in Chowa). In Kabwe, how the lead got into the 
soil—and whether this means any liability lies with ZCCM and the government—is 
disputed. 
 
18 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
 26 
 
Image 10: Children playing in Chowa 
If you didn’t know Chowa was the epicenter of one of the most polluted cities in the world, you probably 
wouldn’t guess when visiting. The houses are larger than those in other African mineworker townships. 
Streets are spacious and tree-lined, though full of potholes. There are football fields for children to play in and 
residents host gardens that inspire. But the soil contains high amounts of lead.  
 
Image 11: Lead in Kabwe's soil 
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* * * 
Despite the tight geographical focus, my field research extended far beyond the 
sites of these case studies. In addition to my field work in Mufulira and Kabwe, I also 
visited sites of regulatory oversight and historical record-keeping. I interviewed several 
environmental specialists at the Mine Safety Department in Kitwe and took weekly trips 
for months to the ZEMA regional office in Ndola in an attempt to get environmental data 
about Mopani’s operations.19 I visited Misenge Environmental & Technical Services 
(METS) at the ZCCM-IH headquarters in Kitwe and the ZCCM archive in Ndola. In 
Zambia’s capital of Lusaka, I frequently visited the ZEMA headquarters, the Ministry of 
Mines and Minerals, the National Archives and Parliamentary Library, and many 
individuals involved in Mufulira and Kabwe that had subsequently moved to the capital 
city. This web of sites and constant travel along the country’s main corridor shows how 
these cases are intricately woven into Zambia’s political, social, ecological, historical, 
and economic systems. 
Some housekeeping 
 
Pollution and mining in Zambia, as we shall see, is a political land mine and even 
the slight potential for backlash against research participants necessitates a high level of 
anonymity throughout the dissertation. All names of people who I interviewed or 
conducted focus groups with are pseudonyms. Problematically, I also opted to de-gender 
all interviewees (not focus groups) by using the pronouns he/him/his. When only eight 
 
19 In the end I was told a former employee took the data on Mopani that I wanted with to Asia when they 
became an ambassador. Reading the 2016 case against Mopani I wonder if evidence was being guarded for 
trial. 
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people in the world attended a meeting, knew a data point, or worked in an agency at a 
given time—and one of the eight is female—gender can out. I want to make it clear, 
though, that not all ‘experts’ are male and not all residents are female. While a few 
participants agreed to be identified by their job title or organizational affiliation, to ensure 
the full anonymity of those who elected to maintain it, I granted anonymity to all 
individuals. When reporting on public records—newspaper articles, meeting minutes, 
court cases—I kept names true to the original source. 
To further anonymize, I have not given exact dates or locations for interviews 
because many times I got official permission for interviews—from Ministers, heads of 
departments, Town Clerks, etc.—and I did not want even the possibility of identification 
via dates to spell trouble. Finally, I have grouped interviewees into broad categories of 
“government official”, “industry insider”, and “civil society leader.” While not ideal—
indeed, there are times when it makes a difference that a national-scale department head 
rather than a local government-community liaison downplays the impacts of lead 
poisoning—in the end, this vagueness circles back to the central theme of my 
dissertation: the fraught maneuverings of knowledge and power in toxic environments. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
  
This dissertation is composed of three moments pivoting around a central axis: a 
duration in which nothing much changes. Its scheme is ambiguously nonlinear. Like the 
children’s book Round Trip by Ann Jonas, these moments could be read backwards as 
well as forwards. One could start with residents’ embodied accounts of toxicity (moment 
3), find all their knowledge resulting in an active and furious waiting (moment 2), and 
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then begin to understand the maneuverings and manipulations of industry that produced 
these scenes (moment 1). This reading may be more affective, but I find it less hopeful. It 
seems to rob embodied knowledge of any subversive potential, however nascent. Moving 
forwards, however, could too easily fool the reader into an optimism that is sadly 
unwarranted. Certainly, at least, each moment needs the others. And the best account, 
while impenetrable, would be thoroughly interwoven. 
Construction 
 
In the second chapter I analyze the aftermath of the ZCCM-owned lead mine in 
Kabwe, where 100% of randomly sampled children in Chowa had dangerously elevated 
levels of lead in their blood. I argue that the Zambian government is manufacturing 
ignorance about lead contamination by claiming lead contamination is natural (not due to 
mining operations) and emphasizing individual ways to mitigate lead poisoning rather 
than promoting public solutions. This chapter brings together work on the production of 
ignorance (Anand 2015; Chailleux 2018; Kirsch 2014; Oreskes and Conway 2010; 
Proctor and Schiebinger 2008; Slater 2019) with Elizabeth Povinelli’s (2011) theoretical 
account of quasi-events (semi-happenings that leave residents to endure burdens) to 
examine how quasi-events quasi-become.  
These two literatures were formative throughout the dissertation. They created a 
starting point for thinking differently about control over knowledge, control over how 
things happen, and what it means to endure. As a literature, agnotology too often assumes 
that scientific methods and measurements define what it means to know. Agnotology thus 
far has not examined how different forms of knowledge—such as embodied 
knowledge—can thwart attempts by those ‘in the know’ to produce or maintain a 
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calculated ignorance among others. Quasi-events, according to Povinelli, are rarely 
studied because they are “quickly felt and then swallowed up by ongoing life” (2011:84). 
Nonetheless, they are important, Povinelli argues, because they are characteristic of the 
way power dominates others in late liberalism. “No one”, she says, “is going to kill us or 
lock us up for trying to succeed… they are just going to let us exhaust ourselves” 
(ibid:118). They force us to endure, despite exhaustion, contamination, or debility. 
In the third chapter I investigate how Mopani Copper Mine in Mufulira has 
evaded liability for life-threatening levels of pollution. Motivated by Stengers’ (2000) 
work on the abstract experimental apparatus, I define an abstract regulatory apparatus. 
This allows me to scrutinize how Mopani and the Zambian government frame how one 
may know, measure, and manage Mufulira’s contaminated Townships. Stengers defines a 
modern experimental apparatus as a schema, or stage; it is a “premeditated setup that 
produces ‘facts of art’ [and in doing so] allows its author to withdraw” (ibid:83). In other 
words, the abstract experimental apparatus determines whose voice is silenced and whose 
gains such legitimacy they are seen as speaking from the apparatus itself.  
I argue simple stories are the abstract regulatory apparatus’s scaffolding—stories 
so easy to remember they easily overwhelm more complicated facts. Then, alternative 
regulations found in the secret Development Agreements redefine how pollution can be 
measured. Within the apparatus, I argue, enumeration is more performative than factive. 
That is, while enumerations rarely calculate what matters for how pollution impacts 
health and wellbeing, they do confer certainty and expertise. Finally, I look at how 
Mopani and the government police who can be considered an expert, following Stengers’ 
argument that an apparatus silences its rivals to hide its own construction. 
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Delay 
The fourth chapter takes up waiting, the ordinary act of surviving in the 
meantime. Here I expound upon what waiting means, how it is experienced, and what it 
produces. This intervenes in a burgeoning literature on waiting in everyday life (Auyero 
and Swistun 2007; Gupta 2012; Jeffrey 2010; Jeffrey and Young 2012; Koppelman 2018; 
Oldfield and Greyling 2015; Sharma and Bhaduri 2014; Simone 2008). I offer an 
alternative to the pervasive perception that people wait because they do not know enough, 
or care enough, or even do enough. Residents are not waiting in ignorance, nor in 
passivity. Theirs is an active waiting. Even a furious waiting. There is, they say, nowhere 
else to go because they have been everywhere already. That their actions and tactics have 
not yielded change has resulted in despair, suspicion, and a sense of dehumanization. And 
finally, through the time and space of waiting a minoritarian knowledge can arise. 
Waiting might matter not only because it is their experience but also because of what it 
could engender. 
 The fifth chapter takes a meander to examine everyday life in the meantime. I 
look at small-scale re-mining operations by the notorious ‘mafia’ locally known as the 
Jerabo (Jerabo stands for jail-boy and some fully supported this term and a few wanted to 
be considered the Wusakile Youth after the Township many grew up in). This is 
simultaneously a story of impoverished residents eking out a livelihood in the ruins of the 
mines and one of amassing immense profits, potentially smuggling stolen copper, and 
illicit smelting. It is also about reclaiming copper for Zambians—contesting foreign 




 In the final two chapters I develop the concept of embodied knowledge, a 
knowledge born out of manufactured ignorance and waiting. The sixth chapter defines 
embodied knowledge and specifically looks at how embodied knowledge is sensed, 
emplaced, and recounted. While Mopani might mis-count their pollution, residents re-
count with each other their experiences and suspicions. I argue this embodied knowledge 
is executed through a politics of refusal; a refusal to consent to the abstract regulatory 
apparatus or its claims that they are ignorant. 
The seventh chapter explores how residents have attempted to use this knowledge 
while directly challenging Mopani over the issue of acid mist. This chapter highlights the 
limits of citizen science-type initiatives that keep challengers within the apparatus, 
however helpful in other contexts. Bringing non-specialists (non ‘scientists’, however this 
is defined by those with the power do define such things) into research processes on 
environment and public health has been a trend over the past few decades (Brown 1992; 
Corburn 2005; Northridge et al. 1999; Scott and Barnett 2009; Wier et al. 2009). But this 
approach often assumes that citizen knowledge can and should be ‘mined’ for the kinds 
of systematic, technical data that regulatory agencies, legal cases, and (some) scientific 
experts demand (Ottinger 2009). I argue that we should take residents’ accounts seriously 
and contend with them as they are. Embodied knowledge should challenge the abstract 
regulatory apparatus. It should unsettle our accounting of the world. 
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Chapter 2: The biopower of ignorance: Individualizing blame for lead 
poisoning in Kabwe, Zambia1 
 
‘People have forgotten this truth,’ the fox said. ‘But you mustn’t forget it. You become responsible forever 
for what you’ve tamed. You’re responsible for your rose.’ 
― Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince  
 
 
“Shit. Shit shit shit. What have I done?”2 
 
* * * 
 
For over a decade Kabwe, Zambia, a city of 200,000 residents, has been 
considered one of the ten most polluted cities in the world (Blacksmith Institute, 2006), 
recently earning the title “the world’s most toxic town” (Carrington, 2017). Outside 
Zambia, it seems clear the heavy metal contamination is due to 92 years of mining, 
processing, and smelting lead, zinc, cadmium, and arsenic. Yet within Zambia and 
Kabwe itself, these reports are taken “with a pinch of salt”.3 Even—if not especially—at 
the highest levels of government, leaders argue claims of catastrophe are overblown 
because “Zambian bodies react differently to lead”4 given blood lead levels (BLL) of 
over 100 µg dL-1 reported in children who “should be dead” but “are running in the fields 
 
1 Revised from Waters, H. 2019. “The biopower of ignorance: Individualizing blame for lead poisoning in 
Kabwe, Zambia” in Environment and Planning E.  
2 Interview, anonymous, 2016 when talking about the narrative that lead is natural. 
3 Interview, David Kalenga, national government, July 2016. 
4 Interview, Oscar Monge, national government, June 2016. 
 
 34 
playing football”.5 Lead contamination is viewed as inherited: a “natural part of the 
environment”6, a “pollution [that] will never cease; it will always be with us [because] we 
found it. [It was here before us]”7. Likewise, poisoning is discussed not as a catastrophic 
event, but rather an everyday occurrence to be mitigated with simple, individual habits. 
 This insidious narrative began decades ago, while the mine was still operational 
under the government-run ZCCM. Despite workers continually getting BLL tests and 
being “leaded out” to other mines,8 the extent and cause of lead poisoning in Kabwe was 
kept, largely, a secret. Everyone knew lead was there, of course, because they were 
mining it. But the fact that some workers and their families were disproportionately 
harmed because of the decisions of colonial and government ZCCM mine managers was 
concealed. Even now, over two decades after its 1994 closure, those in power rarely 
blame the mining process and lack of environmental procedures at the mine for ongoing 
heavy metal contamination, in spite of obvious ‘hot spots’ of lead toxicity in and around 
mine waste canals, waste rock mounds, and tailings piles. Further, although the lead 
smelter operated without the necessary air filtering scrubbers for several years in the late 
1980s, analyses of soil contamination are never publicly linked to smelter emissions. 
Instead, a discourse of personal responsibility, hygiene, and individual blame frames 
community discussions and ‘educational campaigns’ about lead.  
 
5 Interview, Mwale Kabaza, national government and private sector, July 2016. Corroborated by David 
Kalenga, July 2016; Oscar Monge, June 2016; and Alex Chomba, July 2016. 
6 Interview, Benjamin Reynolds, mining industry, June 2016 
7 Interview, Chisha Chibuye, national government, April 2016. 
8 In common Kabwe understandings, a mine worker being “leaded out” means they were (most often) 
moved to work on a copper mine in the Copperbelt, or were administered medical treatment to remove lead 
from their blood through chelation therapy. Children, pregnant women, and other community members 
were often given nutritional supplements. 
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 Thus far scholars across the world have focused inquiries into individualization of 
responsibility for public dangers on how neoliberal discourse eschews collective action 
and wrests blame from public institutions (Beck 1996; Gray 2009; MacKendrick 2010; 
Nadesan 2013; Rockhill 2001; Tilt 2013). Yet rarely have these scholarly works 
scrutinized the most audacious of cases: when the government participated in and 
benefited from the destruction of its land and poisoning of its people, and then, rather 
than admit culpability, turns around to blame its citizens’ ill health on their individual 
behavior.  
I argue that by depoliticizing lead contamination via narratives of lead being 
naturally occurring in the environment and individualizing responsibility for exposure, 
the Zambian government walks the line between concealing the life-threatening nature of 
the issue and revealing its complicity. NGO initiatives follow this script in order to 
navigate government bureaucracy and dodge the pitfalls of political interference. Rather 
than expanding knowledge of the causes, consequences, and potential long-term solutions 
to lead contamination, ‘education campaigns’ manufacture ignorance by stifling 
questions concerning why the contamination exists and who should be held responsible 
for the poisoning of entire communities.  
This turns what would be “events”—happenings that the community can use as a 
catalyst for action—into “quasi-events”, or states of “ordinary suffering” Povinelli 
(2011), which residents are left to endure in their everyday life. In this chapter, I 
investigate how quasi-events are produced via the government’s manufacturing of 
ignorance as a biopolitical technology to manage afflicted populations. 
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 While there is an impressive body of scholarly work on knowledge as a political 
technology of governing, there is a lacuna about how the production of ignorance, 
confusion, and uncertainty can also be mobilized to exclude some from the rights of 
citizenship, or otherwise ‘let die.’ On the other hand, within agnotology—the study of 
ignorance (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008)—scholars focus on corporations and seldom 
consider how public authorities manufacture ignorance. This chapter brings biopolitics 
together with agnotology in order to examine the role governments play in manufacturing 
ignorance. After a brief overview of lead contamination in Kabwe I first examine 
attempts to depoliticize through secrecy and then through the notion that lead is natural in 
Kabwe townships. I then analyze the individualization of lead poisoning and exposure as 
a governing tool that turns ‘events’ into ‘quasi-events’. 
Quasi-becoming through the biopower of ignorance 
 
In Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, he argues “one of the greatest 
transformations” in the 19th century was the institution of a new power of the state: no 
longer did the state merely have the power to “take life”, it now had the power to “let 
die” (2003:241). Since this declaration, a large body of scholarship has arisen concerning 
how “power over and through life and death [is] organized and expressed” (Povinelli 
2011:22). Salient here are scholars specifically interrogating the changing ways that life 
becomes political (Cooper 2015; Gupta 2012; Povinelli 2011; Rajan 2006; Rose 2006). 
Many interventions focus on cutting-edge technologies like gene sequencing (Rose 2006) 
and the catastrophe (Giroux 2006; Marchezini 2015). In rebuttal of this proclivity, a few 
scholars have shifted focus to slow, mundane, everyday happenings that cause, in many 
cases, more long-term damage (Auyero and Swistun 2009; Davies 2018; Gupta 2012; 
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Nixon 2011; Povinelli 2011). For example, Rob Nixon examines several cases of “slow 
violence”, which he defines as gradual, invisible, and dispersed disasters—the kinds of 
“scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed” and thus do not 
merit attention in a media climate obsessed with spectacular events (2011:3). Yet Nixon’s 
insistence that “the insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal 
attention given to [the] spectacular [versus the] unspectacular” by the media (ibid:6) 
ignores cases where slow violence may be strategically manufactured—or at least 
strategically maintained—by interested actors. 
Povinelli, in her formative book Economies of Abandonment (2011), similarly 
investigates non-spectacular forms of “letting die” in the late liberal era. Taking issue 
with the mainstream social scientific focus on “events”, Povinelli instead considers the 
endurance and exhaustion produced through forms of destruction that “never quite 
achieve the status of having occurred or taken place”—or, the “quasi-event” (ibid:13). 
By only focusing on events, Povinelli argues, scholars “foreclose an anthropology of 
ordinary suffering and thus an anthropological understanding of the dynamic by which 
extraordinary events of violence are folded into everyday routine—and vice versa” 
(ibid:14). Povinelli instead centers her work on quasi-events, semi-happenings that are 
“ordinary, chronic, and cruddy” and are experienced more as states of being than 
definitive happenings. Quasi-events continually wear down people’s bodies and demand 
from them an endurance that is neither hopeful nor marked by an ending; because they 
are not acute crises, quasi-events do not demand an immediate ethical response or 
summon social scientific inquiry. This ambivalent status of quasi-events also confers on 
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the people who experience them an exclusionary status, where their suffering is never 
quite seen as warranting decisive response.  
In this chapter, I take up Povinelli’s attention to quasi-events and the folding of 
extraordinary violence into ordinary, everyday routine. My main point of departure from 
Povinelli is her focus on how quasi-events shelter the possibility for radical politics 
(which I attend to in chapters 6 and 7). In this chapter, I instead attend to how actors 
create, maintain, and reify the quasi-event—how actors fold ordinary routine into 
extraordinary violence. That is, while Povinelli appears to treat the quasi-event as an 
already existing state of (quasi-)being to elicit the potential within quasi-events for new 
social projects, I analyze how quasi-events are manufactured from potential events: how 
quasi-events come into quasi-being. In particular, I argue that one way quasi-events come 
into quasi-being is through the creation of ignorance as a biopolitical tool. 
Concerned with the intersections of knowledge and power (for an overview, see 
Stoddart 2007), few biopolitics scholars have considered how ignorance may also be 
mobilized as a governing technology. Ananya Roy briefly examines urban governance 
through ‘unmapping’, defined in opposition to governing through “technologies of 
visibility, counting, mapping, and enumerating” (2009:81). Roy claims the Indian 
government leaves some urban property rights ambiguous in order to more flexibly 
exercise state power. Nora Stel investigates Lebanese authorities operating through a 
“politics of uncertainty” in her discussion of Palestinian gatherings in South Lebanon 
(2016). Finally, Akhil Gupta argues that the banal workings of bureaucracy reproduce 
extreme poverty in India by rendering invisible both the poor and the structural violence 
done to them (2012). Gupta claims extreme poverty is a “direct and culpable” act of 
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violence “made possible” through the way the state manufactures invisibility (ibid:5-6). 
He asks whether the state can remedy injuries when it is itself the perpetrator, though in 
Gupta’s case the state is depicted as an indifferent, rather than interested, actor. These 
few examples stand out in a field otherwise dominated by knowledge production to the 
eschewal of ignorance production. 
Agnotology, however, takes the study of ignorance as its central concern. It 
questions the assumption that ignorance is an original state that humanity is progressively 
erasing through the acquisition of knowledge (Croissant 2014; Proctor and Schiebinger 
2008). This allows for analyzing ignorance as intentional. For example, ignorance can be 
strategically manufactured. Likewise, knowledge can be refused or even deliberately 
forgotten. Agnotologists describe how corporations have “made, maintained, and 
manipulated” ignorance in order to gain profit, keep trade secrets, or escape responsibility 
for enormous social harms (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008:8-10). This is often done 
through secrecy, questioning the certainty of scientific results, or disputing the validity of 
the scientific apparatus. For example, tobacco companies manufactured ignorance about 
the harms of tobacco by arguing the science linking smoking to cancer was not 
conclusive. Big oil companies similarly mislead the public by saying studies linking 
human actions to climate change are not precise or are still disputed, despite a 95% 
confidence margin by scientists (Supran and Oreskes 2017). Yet with rare exceptions (see 
McGoey 2007; Slater 2012; Anand 2015), few consider manufacturing ignorance outside 
the corporate realm. 
I take up agnotology to argue that ignorance is produced when matters of public 
concern are re-framed as individual risk. Instead of rooting the move towards 
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individualizing risk firmly in the rise of neoliberalism—as is widely done by diverse 
cases arising from ecology (Beck 1996), epidemiology (Rockhill 2001), workplace safety 
(Gray 2009) the food industry (Sanabria 2016), pollution (Tilt 2013), and environmental 
catastrophe (Nadesan 2013)—I analyze how individualizing risk manufactures ignorance 
by ignoring the public causes and consequences of problems. This approach follows 
Norah MacKendrick’s (2010) demonstration of how media frames “body burdens” 
(cumulative effects of exposure to toxins) in terms of an individual’s responsibility to 
conceal both industrial causes of toxicity and the government regulator’s complicity. 
Pulling together these threads I argue that shifting focus towards individual 
responsibility when toxicity was caused by a government-run industry is an instance of 
manufacturing ignorance as a biopolitical technology of rule. This is significant because 
governing through manufacturing ignorance turns what could have been events that 
mobilize a public outcry and legal restitution into quasi-events that residents are left to 
endure in the everyday. As we shall see, lead contamination in Kabwe constantly 
oscillates between event and quasi-event. It is at times spectacular and then suddenly 
mundane. Extraordinary violence—the lead poisoning of entire communities—gets made 
into quasi-events. Things that ‘happen’ are turned ‘ordinary, chronic and cruddy’ as 
residents are taught to endure toxicity in their everyday life. 
Kabwe’s Broken Hill 
 
Kabwe was once one of Zambia’s largest and richest mining towns, located in its 
Central Province. Lead mining and smelting at the Broken Hill Mine began in 1902 and 
operated nearly continuously until its closure in 1994. During this time the Kabwe mine 
was the principle lead-zinc mine in the Southern African region and exported over 1.8 
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million tons of zinc and 800,000 tons of lead across the world. Prior to nationalization in 
1973, the Kabwe mine was owned and operated by various colonial companies with 
financial links to the British South Africa Company and later with the Anglo-American 
Company. In 1982, the government merged their mines to create ZCCM as a 51% state-
owned company, though Anglo-American and Roan Selection Trust (later American 
Metal Climax, or Amax) retained minority shares. Falling prices and declining ore 
concentrations lead to decommissioning the ZCCM-Kabwe division in 1994 while under 
government control. After ZCCM sold their remaining Copperbelt assets during the 
privatization process, they created an investments holdings company (ZCCM-IH). This 
state-owned company holds approximately 10% minority shares in former ZCCM mines 
and is potentially—though this is disputed—liable for all environmental ramifications of 
historic ZCCM operations. 
Most government officials and mine experts interviewed agreed that full 
remediation of the area would cost hundreds of millions of dollars when Zambia’s total 
GDP in 2017 was estimated at only 25 billion. Full remediation would mostly likely 
mean removing and replacing all contaminated soil two meters deep throughout entire 
neighborhoods, while capping (or fully re-vegetating) the mine tailings and dredging and 
capping the waste canal. Jay Wilson, an expatriate expert involved in analyzing ZCCMs 
environmental liability during privatization, said the cost would be “exorbitant” and “not 
the sensible thing to do.”9 A more “sensible” but still costly option according to Wilson 
would be to relocate residents in these three neighborhoods and destroy their current 
 
9 Interview, Jay Wilson, mine industry, September 2017. 
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houses. The World Bank has standards for relocating residents and estimates such an 
initiative would cost tens of millions of dollars. 
Historically, Kabwe was planned as a company mining town. Kasanda Township 
was built downwind from the smelter specifically for African mineworkers and their 
families. White expatriates and after independence, the wealthy, lived upwind in green 
neighborhoods near golf courses and other amenities. Chowa Township was built after 
Kasanda for black working-class mineworkers. It is on the east side of the mine, abutting 
tailings dumps and the waste canal. During the privatization process these mine-owned 
houses were sold. Now residents in Chowa either own their homes or rent them in the 
private sector. Makululu is an informal unplanned settlement to Kasanda’s west and is 
characterized by higher poverty, tenuous property rights, and a lack of infrastructure. Due 
to higher levels of pollution, my research focused on these townships (see image 12) and 
small-scale re-mining at tailings dumps. 
 
Image 12: Lead in Kabwe's soil from World Bank, 2012 
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It took until 2015 for a survey of childhood lead poisoning in Kabwe to be 
published, but information is slowly starting to permeate – albeit to a largely international 
audience. In Chemosphere, John Yabe and colleagues (2015) reported that every child 
randomly sampled during their study exceeded the CDC’s BLL level of concern of 5 µg 
dL-1.10 The arithmetic mean BLL was 65.9 µg dL-1, significantly exceeding the acute 
intervention level for chelation therapy of 45µg dL-1(ibid).11 Testing only 246 of the 
forecasted 3,000 children12 in contaminated areas, the highest BLL found was 427.8 µg 
dL-1. Their report also concluded there was “no difference between the severity of Pb 
[lead] poisoning during active mining period and almost 20 years after closure of the 
mine” (ibid:945). This shows that despite closure, individual health interventions by local 
NGOs, and the $43.1 million World Bank Copperbelt Environment Project (CEP) 
operating from 2003-2011,13 the area remains just as toxic to residents as during the 
phase of active mining—strongly implying interventions were not effective long-term. 
 
10 The unit µg dL-1 measures how much lead is in someone’s blood. The amount of lead is measured in 
micrograms (µg) per deciliter (dL) of blood. The CDC’s blood lead level (BLL) of concern is 5 µg dL-1 due 
to the harmful long-term health impacts of this contamination level. 
11 These BLLs are amongst the worst in the world. In Flint, Michigan, where there is significant media 
attention related to BLL in children, around 5% of children had elevated BLL (over 5 µg dL-1) whereas in 
these neighborhoods of Kabwe, all children sampled had elevated BLL and average BLL were reported to 
be 60-120 µg dL-1. Government decisions led to elevated BLL in both cases but unlike in Flint where the 
causality is clear, in Zambia the cause of elevated BLLs is obscured leaving a weaker civil society less able 
to hold government to account. In terms of severity, lead toxicity in Kabwe compares most closely with 
observations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Tuakuila et al. 2013) and Nigeria (Bello et al., 2016)—
but in both cases mining was ongoing at the time of the study and children impacted had parents working in 
the metal processing industry, or even processing metal inside their homes. 
12 The World Bank estimates the number of affected children to be closer to 9,000 (World Bank, 2012). 
13 $36.5 million of the $43.1 million was a loan to the Zambian government. Anonymous sources involved 
in the privatization meetings have said CEP funding was offered as an incentive for privatizing the mine 
industry. The CEP funds were spread out amongst projects in Kabwe and in the Copperbelt region. 
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 Significantly, the 2015 article also claims it is “the first published study 
evaluating Pb poisoning in Kabwe” (ibid:946)—though just because nothing had been 
previously published does not mean nobody knew about lead contamination. Senior level 
mine managers and government leaders were aware of the problem. Yabe and his 
colleagues follow up on and cite unpublished data from a study by ARL Clark 
demonstrating that between 1971 and 1974 there were “cases of suspected Pb poisoning 
with encephalopathy” 1975:947)  and clinic records from the 1970s and earlier reported 
elevated BLL in children with no indication it was unusual. Further, this now-leaked 
Clark study was motivated by the “death of some eight Kabwe children following 
convulsions and coma” (1975:iii). When Jay Wilson arrived in the mid-1990s, he 
confirmed ZCCM “had all these [internal] reports on Kabwe. They had studies… but they 
weren’t very open, you couldn’t find anyone who would give you a good description”. 
That it took decades to publish the first physical study of lead poisoning in Kabwe 
highlights ZCCMs secrecy about lead contamination. 
Secrecy 
 
While the Kabwe mine was operating, the extent of lead contamination and its 
adverse health impacts were kept quiet. Though government officials now claim not 
much was known about lead contamination in the neighborhoods prior to the World 
Bank’s Copperbelt Environment Project (CEP) in the early 2000s,14 evidence shows that 
lead contamination, exposure, and poisoning was routinely discussed amongst hospital 
staff and higher levels of the mine’s management. Documents I obtained anonymously 
 
14 A common refrain in several interviews with government officials and mining experts. 
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reveal managers knew about the dangers of lead, knew which operational decisions led to 
increased ambient lead levels, and knew workers, nearby children, and pregnant women 
showed dangerously elevated BLLs. Meticulous records were kept showing children’s 
BLLs, how many workers were ‘leaded out’ to the Copperbelt mines, and soil 
contamination. These internal documents and conversations often linked trends in 
children’s BLLs and leaded out workers to operational decisions that went against best 
practices at the time. 
Mwale Kabaza, who worked under ZCCM as part of a team decommissioning the 
Kabwe mine in the early 1990s, focused his work on the impacts of lead in the local 
townships. He says that when he started working for ZCCM he learned “ZCCM really 
kept secrets when it came to Kabwe…Kabwe [and its lead poisoning] was limited to 
senior meetings. It had to be kept quiet”. Even the Ministry of Health knew very little 
about lead poisoning in Kabwe until they took over the mine hospitals later during the 
privatization era, because knowledge about lead poisonings was limited to the local 
ZCCM mine hospital that held patient records.15 Rumors abound of health workers in the 
1970s and 1980s being relocated to rural posts or, in the case of foreign workers, being 
deported for speaking up. Jay Wilson remarked that while he was in Kabwe “there was a 
sense of keeping things secret, [things] that were ZCCM issues before privatization […] 
During ZCCM times yes, there was a perception that, ‘don’t reveal things. Keep things 
 
15 During the nationalized era government-controlled ZCCM oversaw hospitals for mineworkers located in 
mine-controlled townships wholly separate from the Ministry of Health. Knowledge about lead illnesses 
was kept within ZCCM. When ZCCM was privatized, the Ministry of Health took over oversight of the 
former ZCCM hospitals and organizationally ‘discovered’ the issue of lead. 
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quiet.’ […] When we were cleaning up Kabwe we didn’t reveal information readily, that 
was just the reasonable approach that was there”.16 Reasonable, according to Wilson, 
because keeping this information within the technocratic sphere would skirt the messy 
politics of contamination that could hinder the country’s privatization efforts or lead to 
scrutiny of ZCCM’s operations.  
When I asked Kabaza how parents responded to their children having regular 
BLL tests because of a known exposure to ambient lead, he said there was little outcry 
because “what [parents] didn’t realize is that each time a child went to the hospital they 
took the blood levels without telling them”. By 1989, BLLs in children were only taken 
when symptoms were shown due to the “inherent suspicion that might be engendered by 
such a move”.17 This internal memo reveals that nurses were told to raise awareness 
about lead poisoning symptoms to ensure children were brought to the mine hospital, but 
to only tell parents their children had elevated BLL if high enough to warrant chelation 
therapy. Additional hospital records show children regularly had BLL over 100 µg dL-1. 
Another internal memo from Medical Department to ZCCM-Kabwe assured managers 
that the Medical Department kept confidential the reasons workers or families were 
moved out of Kabwe, noting that “transfers to Copperbelt from Kabwe are designated 
‘redeployment’ [instead of ‘leaded out’]. Here again this was done so to avoid exposure 
of Divisional intentions”.18 A corresponding graph charting cases of workers being 
 
16 Interview with Wilson, industry insider, 2016. 
17 Anonymous, 1989. Leaked to me. 
18 Anonymous memo, 1989b, leaked to me. 
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“leaded out” for a BLL over 80 µg dL-1 shows the monthly average to be over 100 
workers.  
Kabaza argues lead poisoning in Kabwe has “always been sensitive. I think that 
for you to understand why it has been sensitive you need to understand the magnitude” of 
the pollution.  In fact, he says that “the more I found out, [the more] my work became 
restricted. I operated in a very unconventional sense [as] people [at ZCCM] hoped I 
wouldn’t find out” what was going on. Then, as now, ZCCM managers hoped anyone 
would believe that the lead contamination was recently discovered. Indeed, when Kabaza 
started his job he assumed ZCCM operators simply had not known the consequences of 
their management decisions, “and then I realized that everybody [in ZCCM management 
at Kabwe] really knew about it. Not only did [ZCCM] know about it, but of course Anglo 
[American Corporation] did as well”. What he uncovered was that not only did the 
hospital keep records of BLL dating back decades, but that mine executives knew Chowa 
Township was contaminated before a single house was built there. He reveals, 
One of the most fascinating correspondences I got [ahold of] was… a gentleman 
complaining about… how African workers were late for work and therefore they 
should be placed closer to the site. In the same set of correspondences, [another 
mentioned they] had been privy to [data about a site] they considered [for] open 
pit mining because dogs were dying lying on the surface of these mounds and 
[they died because] those were outcrops of lead. So everybody knew locally that 
those dogs died because they laid on these outcrops. They then… recommended 
building the African houses there, after it was determined that there was no value 
for [open pit] mining. And that site is Chowa.19  
 
 
19 Interview with Kabaza, industry and government insider, 2016. 
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While some of the lead in Chowa occurs ‘naturally’, the decision by mine managers to 
site the neighborhood on lead outcrops willfully exposed residents to contamination. 
After decommissioning, the houses were sold without notifying buyers of the extent of 
contamination, again despite knowledge within both ZCCM and the local government of 
the area’s soil contamination.20  
Further, internal ZCCM knowledge of hazardous airborne lead levels was not 
limited to the mine area. Unlike in Chowa, contamination in Kasanda Township and in 
Makululu was largely due to lead in the air resulting from emissions from the processing 
plants. Environmental surveys of lead contamination in soil and house dust (as airborne 
lead settles) were carried out between 1979 and 1981 and again in 1986 to “establish the 
relative hazard from domestic exposure to lead and study the fall out pattern of lead from 
the plume”.21 Both studies concluded that in Kabwe’s Kasanda Township “no particular 
relatively ‘safe’ area can be identified” (ibid). Air pollution was made worse in the late 
1980s when ZCCM-Kabwe operated smelters without the necessary and industry-
standard scrubbers to filter air emissions, despite knowing it would drastically increase 
airborne lead pollution. 22 One internal correspondence says, “if we recognize the extent 
of the medical problems then we also have to recognize the need to identify some sort of 
emission control system”, directly linking environmental health to mine operations.23 
Another 1995 memo from the Environmental Services Division about contamination in 
Kasanda reads they “confirm that lead in contaminated surgical soils exists mainly in 
 
20 Anonymous letter from 1994, leaked. 
21 Anonymous, 1989. 
22 Anonymous, 1989. 
23 Anonymous, 1991. 
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oxide form (PbO), the bulk of which is the main product of the ceased pyrometallurgical 
operations”.24 Another report links ambient lead levels with the smelter and wind 
direction, reading:  
Prior to the closure of the Kabwe mine blood lead levels were considerably higher 
in Kasanda than Chowa. The difference … was probably due to the combined 
factors of high ambient lead levels and the prevailing wind… from the smelter 
and sinter stacks… The high levels can also be attributed to the electrostatic 
precipitator becoming non-operational in 1985 and its removal from the discharge 
circuit in 1988 which necessitated the discharge of fumes at lower levels. 1989 
[to] 1991 most likely represents the worst period, in terms of lead pollution, in the 
history of Kabwe Mine and is marked by an increase in blood lead levels of 20 - 
100% from the 1983 levels.25  
 
Right after linking lead concentration to specific mine operations, however, the report 
ends by saying that “little can be achieved in reducing blood lead levels unless those that 
are vulnerable are educated as to the actual and potential hazards of lead in soil and the 
necessity for hygiene in and outside the home” (ibid, emphasis mine). It goes further, 
proposing that hygiene as a solution to exposure should be done as “a prerequisite to any 
other remediation activity such as soil replacement” because the latter would place blame 
on mining operations. This memo, written while the extent of lead contamination was 
still secret, discloses the beginnings of the next strategy the Zambian government took 
concerning lead contamination in Kabwe: creating a fold between extraordinary 
violence—for example, BLL increases of 20-100% over already life-threatening levels—
and ordinary routine— daily hygiene practices. In order to cover up the fact that 
operational decisions pointed to ZCCMs ongoing culpability for lead contamination, the 
 
24 Anonymous, 1995.  
25 Anonymous, 1995. 
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government focused, then as now, on educational campaigns that naturalize lead 
contamination and individualize responsibility for exposure. 
De-politicization narratives 
 
Lead is natural 
 
 After secrecy became untenable due to increased scrutiny of mining operations 
during the privatization process, ZCCM and the government needed to come up with an 
explanation for lead contamination that would not implicate mining operations. Mark 
Green, an industry expert who worked in Kabwe for decades, exemplified their next 
approach well. He allowed that environmental regulations were “far more relaxed” during 
the ZCCM era because it was “government chasing government”. Yet when I asked 
Green whether mining exacerbated the lead contamination, he laughed, deflected, and 
replied, “lead has been in Kabwe for millions of years!” Kabaza himself admits he was 
involved in shaping and promoting this narrative:  
It was never said that [lead contamination] was the mine's fault. The narrative was 
‘it exists in the environment.’ That was the narrative. That was the key condition 
to me being able to continue my work. They asked, ‘how is it going to be done 
without alarming the people?’ I said, ok, fine. So I had to establish a narrative. 
And I said, ‘ok, this is how it can be done’. The narrative became: lead is natural, 
it has always been in Kabwe, and it has little to do with mining operations.  
 
Kabaza explained that the government placed these parameters on speech to control 
community reactions. They wanted to prevent rioting “because miners are very volatile 
people” and lawsuits because “this knowledge would be highly detrimental to a lot of 
people because it would almost certainly result in demands for compensation”. When I 
followed up, asking why he did not pursue an approach that could result in compensation 
for the community he replied, “What would have been the benefit? Living in such 
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political times what would have been the benefit? Especially when there were no 
[ongoing] regulatory or enforcement issues” because the mine was being 
decommissioned. He sighed, “I couldn’t see the benefit and it wouldn’t have helped the 
people I was trying to help”.  
 When Kabaza talked about his time at ZCCM, he spoke of the difficulty of 
operating within “restrictive communication” conditions. He was notified when children 
were hospitalized due to lead poisoning. People in the community, some ineligible to be 
treated at the mine hospital, regularly phoned for help. “It became a very heavy emotional 
toll on me. I’ll never forget the first child who died on me, that was Joseph Kabwe. I even 
remember his house number…”. He said later that he “felt partially responsible for” lead 
poisoning deaths at the time “in the sense that we could not actually communicate 
entirely properly”. To be able to help the children suffering from lead poisoning before 
him and bring up lead contamination at all, Kabaza maintains he could not implicate 
mining activities or highlight ZCCM’s involvement in the contamination. Kabaza 
recalled specific parameters for his team from ZCCM management: 
We couldn't fully communicate the extent … of the pollution—and the fact that 
the pollution killed—caused deaths, [or] the fact that it was a result of 
operations… it wasn't necessarily a lie, in [the sense] that what was 
communicated was that yes, there is lead that exists naturally, and it is 
preventable, and it is treatable. Those were the various parameters… I had to 
explain [to community members], ‘yes, there is this problem [with lead], but it's 
manageable.’ 
 
These three talking points—that the lead contamination is natural, that it is easily 
preventable, and that it is treatable—are now deeply rooted in how Kabwe residents 
understand their environment.  
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I heard this narrative from public city officials, national-level government leaders, 
industry insiders and experts, and even residents themselves. For example, several 
different mine industry experts in the city told me speculations about lead contamination 
were “overblown”26 because the “lead is natural”.27 One repeated story was that a 100-
year old building was torn down and the soil was tested underneath it. When this soil also 
tested high for lead, everyone deduced that 100 years of mining activity did little to 
increase the ‘natural’ occurrence of lead in Kabwe. (However, Wilson recalled soil 
testing that showed lead contamination went down two meters before the soil was clean, 
indicating much of the soil contamination is due to air emissions from the smelter, dust 
from tailings, and runoff from the unlined waste canal). David Kalenga, a former national 
environmental ministry leader, told me that it was “better off to leave it” when I asked 
about Kabwe because “even if there was no mine there, [there would still be lead] 
because the mineralogy is lead”. Chinjila Mukoma from the Kabwe City Council said, 
“lead has always been there and it will always be there. I think people tend to live with 
it”.28  
Many current residents in contaminated townships also consider the lead an 
accident of geography—certainly not a toxicity exacerbated by operational decisions or 
an issue mine executives knew about before building houses. Kennedy Kalaba, a former 
mineworker still living in Chowa remembers it promoted as a safe neighborhood, free 
from lead:  
 
26 Interview with Mark Green, industry expert, June 2016. 
27 Interview with Benjamin Reynold, industry expert, June 2016. 
28 Interview with Chinjila Mukoma, local government, June 2016. 
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At first, it seems very nice. Nobody knew this place could be [contaminated] like 
this. [When built] it was considered the safest township whereby if … a lady is 
pregnant [and] when going to the medical checkup they found that she has lead, 
they would shift [her] to Chowa in order to change her environment.29  
 
Now, if residents blame the government at all it is because the government stopped 
providing products residents believe helps cure lead poisoning, such as free water, milk, 
cocoa, soya products, and vitamins for children. This ‘help’ ended throughout Zambia’s 
mining townships when ZCCM services were individualized, privatized, and/or turned 
over to parastatals.30 Absent from all focus group discussions was any indication 
residents held the government or ZCCM  operations responsible for contamination itself. 
The narrative that lead contamination is natural in Kabwe does more than prevent 
protests or lawsuits; it has long-term repercussions on the types of interventions possible 
in Kabwe. After the mine's decommissioning, the Kabwe Environmental Remediation 
Foundation (KERF) partnered with the international Blacksmith Institute (now 
PureEarth). Together, they began raising awareness of lead contamination in Kabwe to 
the World Bank. A representative for KERF, Hector Chama, said that KERF  
had a particular approach to the media… If you politicize it too much it won’t 
help because … if a politician feels he’s … being embarrassed, they’ll shy away 
from it, which is just a disaster. So we always had to make them feel as if there 
was an element of cooperation between us and [the government party in power].  
 
Chama says KERF’s advocacy work convinced the World Bank to include Kabwe in the 
Copperbelt Environment Project (CEP), which it later partnered with. Within Zambia, 
though, KERF’s mission was to “inform the community about the dangers of lead and 
 
29 Focus Group 1, June 2016. 
30 Focus group 3, 2016. 
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how to limit exposure” and provide individual support for ill residents (Blacksmith 
Institute 2006). Thus, despite their advocacy behind the scenes at the World Bank, locally 
KERF stuck with the narrative that lead was natural and could be mitigated by individual 
action.
 
Image 13: Houses are still being built along the contaminated waste canal 
The CEP in Kabwe has been considered by many to be a failure, often precisely 
because their talking points and programs often fell within the depoliticizing parameters 
laid out by the Zambian government. CEP initiatives in Kabwe focused on scientific 
research (soil testing and BLL testing in children because government research was 
unpublished); community education; and short-term solutions to lead exposure. For 
example, trucks drove around the townships spraying water to suppress dust. The CEP 
left out relocation or remediation of townships, the waste canal for mine effluents, and 
the dump-sites for mine tailings.31 One insider said “it was a mess… it could not respond 
in a timely manner [to acute cases of lead poisoning] and the World Bank's method of 
operations are, for lack of a better term, not case sensitive. Not case and human sensitive. 
They respond to administrative issues, not the human factor”. That both the World Bank 
 
31 There was a project specifically designed to look at and remedy contamination along the canal, but it 
does not appear the project was ever undertaken. At present the canal is polluted and new houses are being 
built along its former banks. 
 55 
and PureEarth started another remediation effort in 2016 reinforces claims their programs 
had negligible long-term impacts. 
Yet the CEP also published documents that for the first time publicly linked 
contamination to mining activities, although carefully avoiding language that could result 
in legal claims. Another insider said, “As much as I despise them, I will say [the World 
Bank] played ball… That’s how you realize how political institutions like the World 
Bank are. They will present various facades [to governments to get things done]”. The 
CEP’s project appraisal does more to circumvent the narrative that lead is natural than 
any other public document to date, but even it equivocates: “ZCCM-IH has serious 
liabilities related to lead zinc mining in Kabwe. It is estimated tens of thousands of 
residents (including 9,000 children) may be affected by high lead levels in the soil, both 
from naturally occurring mineralization and the impact of the smelting and mining 
operations” (World Bank 2012, emphasis mine). Despite this admission, not public until 
2016, community discussion in Kabwe remains framed by lead being natural and not a 
ZCCM liability. 
NGOs continue to work within the narrative, taking care to not politicize toxicity 
and avoiding questions that could lead to demands for compensation. Programs mostly 
focus on educational campaigns, as I discuss in the next section. With more financing, 
NGOs conduct small-scale interventions at the household level and deal with pathways of 
contamination rather than contamination itself. This includes providing water for people 
to grass their lawns for dust suppression, or covering a yard with “black” soil from 
outside Kabwe. But even these types of interventions only help in the long term, Kabaza 
says, “assuming, of course, that you have taken care of the source, the ambient source of 
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lead” such as the large tailings dumps, the area around the canal, and the topsoil that was 
contaminated due to smelter emissions. Wilson argues the area is so contaminated—“the 
depth of the lead in the soil went down some two meters… and it’s a big area… And 
there’s a pile of waste that was pretty toxic, with water [flowing] into the natural water 
sources”—that “the damage to the soil was done” and residents should be relocated.  
 
Image 14: House with remediated soil (left) next to one without 
 
Relocating residents or undertaking large-scale remediation would be a tacit admission 
that mining operations continue to be a major cause of lead toxicity. Chama says any 
project focusing on controlling ambient pollution by remediating mine dumps or the 
effluent canal “was exceptionally political because it would therefore mean that ZCCM 
was very much now out in the open, [needing to] explain what actually had happened… 
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The correct type of remediation would have made a public situation”. This in turn “would 
have created more questions than answers and it would have thereby created lawsuits”. 
By promoting the narrative that lead is natural—manufacturing ignorance about the 
causes of lead contamination—the Zambian government was able to avoid the creation of 
‘a public situation’: an ‘event’ that the community could have used to mobilize support 
and make a legal case for compensation or relocation. 
 
Individual responsibility for toxic exposure 
 
Along with the narrative that lead is natural came the programmatic solution that 
individualizes toxic exposure. Government health clinics and NGOs hold educational 
campaigns with residents focusing on everyday actions and personal hygiene. This allows 
educators to acknowledge lead poisoning and talk about contamination pathways without 
Image 15: Gardens in Chowa, Kabwe 
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discussing liability, implicating ZCCM, or ‘alarming’ residents. Proposed mitigation 
actions include limiting where children play outdoors, not eating soil32, washing hands 
and feet before going inside, mopping frequently, watering the yard, and covering your 
face from dust on windy days. One NGO is introducing vacuum cleaning as a way to 
minimize exposure. Efforts to educate teachers are focused on creating safer places for 
children to play at school so they do not play near home. Charles Mulena, an NGO 
leader, says his resident workshops on lead contamination in Kabwe specifically look at 
“what you can do, and how you can reduce exposure within your household”. It is 
revealing that left out of the action list are public goods the government should be 
responsible for even if ‘lead is natural’, such as re-paving streets so they are not dusty 
and grassing public fields where children play football.  
Mulena said when he tells people about lead contamination they are often 
surprised, despite generally knowing that “lead is an issue”.33 He says, “there is an 
emotional reaction. We ran a workshop for teachers and community members and after 
sharing the results of the soil tests that we did, lots of questions came up in terms of 
compensation. ‘You are giving us these results. You’re telling us that this is the extent of 
the problem and someone should be accountable for this.’ So those kinds of questions 
started coming up”.34 He says his organization deflects these questions. While privately 
agreeing responsible parties should be held to account, his organization does not 
 
32 Eating soil, especially while pregnant, is a common practice in many African countries. In focus group 2, 
a women said, “we women have a craving for it, that’s how pregnancy operates.” In addition, children often 
eat soil while playing. 
33 Focus group 3, 2016. 
34 Interview with Charles Mulena, civil society, June 2016 
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participate in advocacy or seek compensation for residents. Mulena does not believe that 
approach would be fruitful: “I don’t think [the government] will do anything… the 
official position … is that they don’t want to openly admit that there is a problem here. 
They have been trying to avoid that”. Others say that the government simply does not 
have the funds, despite ZCCM-IH holding minority shares in currently operating former 
ZCCM copper mines.  
Mulena avoids advocacy because for NGOs in Zambia, it is easier “to partner 
with the government. [With a different approach] there would be more resistance… In 
closed door meetings [government] will acknowledge there’s a problem and they want 
something to be done. But the moment you start going to the newspapers, and do 
advocacy work, then you create problems for yourself”. Later he said, “the government 
has not been forthcoming… [it] has been very secretive… The Environmental Council 
was in a meeting—and [local teachers] asked, ‘Why were you quiet all these years? Why 
are you telling us this now?’ The councilor said, ‘listen, let’s not go into the past. Let’s 
not dwell on the past. Let’s look at the issues now and see how we can address them and 
move forward’”. When I asked why he felt this secrecy about the past still existed, 
Mulena said the governments secretive behavior “was about responsibility. It was about 
who would take responsibility. It was about who would be held accountable for this”. The 
accountable party became residents themselves. 
Community members appear well aware of the mitigation suggestions and have 
learned a great deal about health impacts of lead poisoning, or chitofu. They also contend 
daily with the fear of exposure and, due to poverty, their inability to enact the mitigation 
measures brought to their attention. In all my focus groups residents could recite 
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individual or household-level strategies to mitigate lead poisoning but they felt unable to 
act upon these best practices, mostly because many of the individual strategies require 
water, time, or money. People talked about not having the water they needed in order to 
reduce exposure. One conversation with several middle-aged mothers went: 
- “This place is a leaded area. We need plenty of water to have a clean 
environment.” 
- “The air! The air is polluted because we don’t have enough water!” 
- “There is plenty of dust. If we had plenty of water there wouldn’t be any dust 
because everything would be green. The dust that blows here contains a lot of 
lead. At one time we were workers of the mines and we know how it used to be. 
We had plenty of water which was even free at that time [ZCCM offered free 
water to employees] but now we are paying a lot of money for water, so we 
cannot even afford to water the grass.”35  
 
Men and women talked about the inability to prevent exposure because they did not have 
enough water to frequently mop floors or even wash their hands and feet. Because water 
infrastructure is now run by a parastatal, there are no subsidized water rates for 
contaminated areas and neither the government nor NGOs are pursuing subsidized water 
as a short-term solution. 
 In Makululu, informality and more extreme poverty exacerbates these issues. 
Water purchased by the liter must be carried from a kiosk. Roads were never paved and 
children have even fewer uncontaminated areas in which to play. Residents here also 
construct house bricks from contaminated soil: 
- “We know lead is in there but there is really nothing we can do about it.” 
- “We are in full knowledge the blocks have such and such issues, but due to the 
lack of money, we [buy them]… Some illnesses, we call them upon ourselves 
because we know full well that we are putting ourselves at risk, but we still go 
ahead.” 
 
35 Focus Group 4, 2016 
 61 
- “It’s up to each and every one one of us individually… and our own financial 
capacity.”36 
 
In each focus group, it was clear residents are exhausted from holding themselves 
responsible for chitofu while lacking financial resources to avoid exposure.  
 
36 Focus group 2, 2016. 
Image 16: In Makululu, residents must walk to water kiosks and pay for litres of water. 
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Image 17: Because of high rates of poverty, some people have taken to re-mining lead from the tailings piles, selling to 
a nearby company that processes this lead without a ZEMA permit. In other tailings sections, residents are quarrying 
rock with a high content of lead, selling it to community members who use the material for building houses and paving. 
 
 Along with this burden to endure chitofu comes a weariness towards outsiders 
who talk about lead while placing the financial onus on residents. In Chowa, women said,  
- People come here in trick us into thinking that they will eliminate the lead. They 
don’t!  
- They can’t! 
- They come with projects nearly every year but they don’t do anything. 
- The only solution, we always tell them, is that if you give us plenty of water 
then we are going to eliminate the lead.37 
 
When they push for the water utility company, NGOs, or the government to help them 
with affording water bills, they frame it as ‘help’ due to their poverty instead of 
 
37 Chowa Focus Group 3, 2016. 
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compensation or justice for the environmental harms the lead mine caused. Even in their 
appeals to outsiders for help, residents framed their situation as one “we found”, a natural 
situation that has always been true and is nobody’s fault, rather than one that was created, 
or at least worsened by, mine operations. 
 
Image 18: Residents say they need affordable or free water to keep their yards green and prevent dust 
 
Individualization is also experienced when NGO programs choose individual 
houses for remediation or clinics focus on the health of individual kids: 
- When you bring health in most cases they only go to a few houses. Perhaps they 
would pick one house as being affected and leave out the next! 
- Can you imagine! Although you are in the same row of houses or even an 
immediate neighbor. 
- It’s really unfair. 
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- Then we just hear rumors. One can’t trust rumors. We just sit back and see for 
ourselves, period. And what we see is a worker starting to prepare some of the 
houses and not preparing others. They pick and choose.38 
 
NGOs argue this operational style is necessary in the first phase of work. Using a low 
number of houses, the organizations can determine whether their remediation efforts 
actually decrease contamination. However, these remediation programs will not work, 
according to experts such as Green, Wilson, and Kabaza, because they do not account for 
re-contamination from the source, such as the tailings dumps, or heavily polluted areas 
nearby, for example leaded soil from adjacent houses. In addition to simply not working, 
these programs cause people to contest not the injustices of contamination, but instead the 
injustices of remediation. Rumors and accusations swirl, and the community is divided 
over perceived corruption, as residents constantly suspect neighbors with ‘black dirt’, 
supplemental nutrition for children, or the ability to get free BLL tests (see image 14).  
Over time, the ‘naturalization’ and ‘individualization’ strategy has potentially 
become less deliberate than in the past. It is possible some current government officials 
do not know how deeply ZCCM’s culpability runs. Yet projects continue in much the 
same style and with the same talking points as before. PureEarth recently re-started their 
work after determining their first project did not have a long-term impact because lead 
levels were dangerously high again. Despite their first project not working, they are again 
conducting a small-scale program that brings in “black soil” to a randomized sampling of 
households. The World Bank has also decided to fund another project, a sort of CEP do-
 
38 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016 
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over, that will again focus on scientific research, education campaigns that individualize 
responsibility for exposure, and yard-level remediation work (World Bank 2016). 
I spoke with Isaac Hangoma, a senior government public health official, about 
why current programs are not reducing incidents of lead poisoning. He blamed residents, 
saying, “The knowledge is given out, but it will be individuals who will respond to say, 
‘If I do this then I’m putting myself in [a] hazard[ous] situation… behavior change is 
difficult, it’s a process”.39 When I asked Hangoma how residents responded to 
educational campaigns, he said, 
With their immediate response, if you say, ‘your child will suffer organ failure or 
they'll be very dull.’ [then] people [will ask] ‘But why is it like this?’ Their 
immediate reaction of course [is] they will get annoyed. But we should look at it 
from a broader perspective because these people are in this community and we are 
trying to help them with the immediate thing, in terms of hygiene. At least, can 
you tell your children to reduce the amount of time they spend in dusty 
conditions, green their environment, clean your homes, avoid being in polluted 
environments? So this is the basic thing.40 
 
Hangoma admits that when residents ask ‘why is it like this’ he pivots the conversation 
towards individualizing responsibility for exposure. Hangoma places blame directly on 
residents, dissipating the moral indignation of the community into the anti-political 
language of individual behavior. ‘It is like this’ not because of 92 years of lead mining 
and smelting, or because ZCCM managers operated without environmental regard, or 
because the neighborhood was deliberately located on an outcrop of lead, but instead 
because of the personal “hygiene” of the complainant—letting children play football in 
the field, not cleaning appropriately, not watering grass. By reproducing ignorance about 
 
39 Interview with Isaac Hangoma, national government, July 2016 
40 Interview with Hangoma, senior government representative, 2016. 
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the causes of contamination, Hangoma’s response at clinic education campaigns turns 
what could be an event—a revelation of the extraordinary violence of unjust lead 
poisoning due to ZCCM practices and a government coverup that could provoke public 
outcry—into a quasi-event—an everyday occurrence or ordinary routine that residents are 
sent home from their meeting to endure. Extraordinary violence turns into ordinary 
routine. 
 When I brought up resident complaints about water and asked Hangoma whether 
it was even feasible for residents to follow his offered strategies, he shows me a map. 
Pointing to a deep red spot, Hangoma says, “so this second [highly polluted area here…] 
if you look at the ‘community garden’ it’s a sports field. It’s a sports field! And this is 
where our children play! So can you cage them? No”. This slippage—between 
demanding individual responsibility and indignation at the absurdity of solutions he is 
constrained to offer—from a senior member of the government—reveals the biopolitical 
fold between the extraordinary violence done to these communities and the everyday 
routines of cleaning, avoiding play, and enduring. 
* * * 
Of course, Kabwe town is located where it is because of a high presence of lead; 
it is a mine town. However, it is deceitful to deny the impact of 92 years of mining, 
processing, and smelting lead with few environmental regulations. After an era of secrecy 
during ZCCM-Kabwe’s operations, narratives that ‘make natural’ lead contamination in 
Kabwe depoliticize who is exposed, the extent of the issue and why—why these 
particular neighborhoods; why so badly; why little was done or admitted to decades 
before.  
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Insiders maintain that because of the political atmosphere, the most effective 
strategy for combating contamination competes with holding responsible parties to 
account. The approach government clinics and NGOs take prioritizes the immediate 
health of individual children. This pushes the community apart to deal with exposure 
individually—through cleaning their own houses, washing their own hands, or not letting 
their children play outside with neighborhood kids. With all these burdens, residents feel 
unable to escape lead and are resigned to endure ongoing toxicity with only appeals for 
help, rather than demands for justice. Educational campaigns and public meetings that 
could reveal the extraordinary violence of ZCCMs operations and cover-up instead 
become just a part of everyday life in contaminated Kabwe townships. The detrimental 
long-term effects of this approach are seen in children born well after the mine closed 
who have severely elevated BLLs. Continual re-contamination of soil occurs because to 
even discuss the source of pollution would expose the government to questions about 
liability. This obstructs solutions such as capping tailings, fully dredging the canal, 
excavating the contaminated soil throughout the townships, and relocating residents. 
 The biopolitical technology of manufacturing ignorance summons residents to 
consider environmental exposure to lead in individualizing ways. Actions limiting 
personal exposure are less about false consciousness—residents are keenly aware of their 
place within an exploitative classed system, they do not value this type of ‘hygiene’ or 
cleanliness, and ZCCM was a nationalized mine—and are more a product of a ‘perverse 
environmentality’ formed through ignorance manufactured as a tactic of governmental 
power. In his discussion of environmentality, Arun Agrawal (2005) investigates how 
residents acting in response to short-term gain later justify their behavior on 
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environmental grounds. In Kabwe, residents later justify exposure-limiting actions by 
reinforcing the myth that lead contamination in Kabwe is natural and was not made worse 
by mining operations. 
I argue that by promoting narratives that lead is natural and individualizing 
responsibility for exposure, the Zambian government creates knowledge parameters that 
foreclose on residents’ ability to demand justice, restitution, or simply hold perpetrators 
liable. The government’s ‘letting die’ in contaminated townships demonstrates how the 
production of ignorance—not just knowledge—can be a biopolitical technology, a 
strategy for usurping power used by governments as well as corporations. Finally, this 
chapter extends Povinelli’s work on quasi-events by investigating how they quasi-
become. If as Povinelli says, quasi-events hold within themselves the conditions for 
forging radical new politics, investigating how events get made quasi may enable us to 
expose the potential within them. In the case of Kabwe, I investigate quasi-becoming as 
an intentional strategy, where the Zambian government uses the production of ignorance 
to retool potential events into quasi-events, thus turning potential political momentum 





Chapter 3: ‘There are no facts’: Manufactured ignorance through a 
regulatory apparatus and seductive enumerations 
 
 
There is perhaps no beguilement more insidious and dangerous than an elaborate and elegant mathematical 
process built upon unfortified premises. 
—T. C. Chamberlain, Lord Kelvin’s Address on the Age of the Earth 
 
 It was happenstance, as these things are. Positioning, for sure, and a bit of luck. 
As a white researcher from the United States I could have the sorts of random encounters 
with the movers and shakers in Zambia’s mining world—at the gym, in my backyard, 
attending a braai1 with a friend, watching Game of Thrones in the evening, visiting 
offices and attending meetings for something completely unrelated—that led to slippages. 
The slip of a document. A slip of the tongue.  
  “You know, I used to work for them at that time. It was a mess. Butondo was a 
mess.”2 Musosha was with me during this chance encounter and he appeared as 
flabbergasted as I was. We recalled the pages and pages of enumerated data we had seen. 
All < 1 mg/m3. Believable. Persuasive. Seductive. We looked over Soko’s shoulder to the 
screen and saw Mopani’s internal, raw data from monitoring the heap leach. We 
scrutinized the figures—routinely triple, quadruple times what Mopani submits to the 
regulators. All the while, the back of our minds played scenes from the Multi-Stakeholder 
Meetings3 Mopani held with representatives of Butondo—meetings in which Mopani 
 
1 Barbeque 
2 Interview with Soko, Mopani insider, 2016. After our initial happenstance meeting I conducted an official 
interview and we poured over the data. This meeting led to others, with additional Mopani insiders, who 
corroborated these claims. Chapter 7 focuses on details from these meetings. 
3 I was thinking of the minutes of the meetings and my focus group with the Butondo Committee. Musosha 
helped facilitate some of these Multi-Stakeholder meetings and couldn’t believe Soko had been hidden on 
the other side. 
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claimed they were within national limits and implied residents were uneducated lay 
people who couldn’t understand their monitoring technology. 
In this chapter I investigate the tactics industry uses to manufacture ignorance and 
create confusion in order to evade responsibility for contamination. Towards this end, I 
detail how Mopani Copper Mine and the Zambian government as an institution mobilize 
legal, scientific, and technical language to create an abstracted regulatory apparatus—a 
framework within which Mopani can claim they are well regulated and adhering to 
national environmental standards. Meanwhile, their simple fictions and enumerations 
actually obscure a more complicated situation regarding pollution and liability. 
This intervention is motivated by Isabelle Stengers’ concept of the “abstract 
experimental apparatus”—the frameworks created by western science to define 
objectivity and legitimacy. The apparatus is abstract not (only) because “things have been 
eliminated” (Stengers 2000:71)4 but because something else is created in its place. 
Abstraction, she says, “expresses an event” (ibid:71). It creates a way of seeing things, 
understanding things, and quantifying things that precludes other ways of knowing or 
explaining. That is, it “forc[es] the skeptic to admit that there is only one legitimate way 
to articulate” (ibid:71). This chapter broadens Stengers’ concept to include in the 
apparatus not only the ‘sciences’ of mining, ecology, public health, and toxicity, but also 
its legal and economic framings—together, a regulatory apparatus.  
 
4 Stengers argues that abstraction is too often used to refer to the ‘absence’ of other things—for example, 
when some political ecologists (UPE scholars who focus on water issues comes to mind) use the concept to 
discuss the separation of a happening or material object from the social, economic, cultural, and historical 
forces that help define it and give it meaning. 
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This chapter also enters the conversation on agnotology with two key 
interventions. First, rather than investigating how industries create doubt (Oreskes and 
Conway 2010), I analyze another tactic: how ignorance can be manufactured by 
upstaging a complex truth with a simple but false certainty, one so persuasive to so many 
that it forecloses on any counter-knowledge. Within this, one strategy I examine is 
mobilizing the performativity of numbers and data. That is, I analyze how things that look 
like good science, or good data, make us believe that they are. Second, thus far 
agnotology has focused on the state of ignorance and overlooked how actors might 
produce people as ignorant by limiting who is considered an expert. 
Bringing these two literatures together in this chapter, I call attention to three 
facets of this abstract regulatory apparatus that enables Mopani to, in effect, manufacture 
ignorance about the causes, extent, and liability for mine pollution. First, they use simple 
stories, or “simple untruths” about the environment and Mopani’s mining technology. 
These simple stories frame what one can know, or even try to know, about mining 
contamination in Mufulira and they do so by overwhelming potentially more complicated 
facts as “when doubt prevails, people will often end up believing whatever sticks in the 
mind” (Harford 2017). Second, the Development Agreements and environmental law in 
Zambia allows Mopani to (re)produce ambiguities in legal language and codify 
exclusions. 
Third, I investigate the way Mopani creates false certainty through the 
performativity of enumeration. Numerical precision is used to confer certainty, expertise, 
and transparency—but, as we shall see, this ostensibly precise enumeration does not 
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actually tell us much about what matters regarding emissions: their absolute levels, the 
impact on the environment, and their consequences for human health. 
It is important here to acknowledge that I am not arguing against facts. I am not 
implying that pollution levels should never be tested, or that all numerical ways of 
dealing with pollution are inextricably bound up in networks that include potentially 
corrupt corporations. Numbers can indeed be emancipatory, as the environmental justice 
movement has found on multiple occasions (Bullard 2000; Cole and Foster 2000; 
Commission for Racial Justice 1987; Sze 2007). Yet in this case, the way the regulatory 
apparatus has been set up evades the truth and silences all other accounts, especially other 
ways of knowing about the environment, pollution, or its impacts on human bodies.   
Construction 
 
Creating an apparatus 
 
In her book The Invention of Modern Science, Isabelle Stengers (2000) offers a 
fascinating way to view abstraction. She takes up Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the 
Two Chief World Systems, written as a conversation between Salviati (who represents the 
Copernican position that the Earth revolves around the sun), Simplicio (who represents 
the traditional views of Aristotle and Ptolemy that everything revolves around the Earth) 
and Sagredo (who Salviati and Simplicio attempt to convince). She argues Galileo’s book 
is a sort of play, set up on an elaborate stage and using the “power of fiction... to invent 
‘rational arguments’ to bend the facts, to create illusions of necessity, and to produce an 
apparent submission of the world to its definitions ‘elaborated in the abstract’” (ibid: 80). 
What Galileo does, according to Stengers, is set up an “abstract, idealized, geometric 
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world”—the world of the laboratory and modern science (ibid: 85). But Galileo’s 
abstraction does more than produce mathematical equations. In Dialogue he creates a  
“fictive world… that no one could interrogate differently than he. It is a 
world whose categories [and abstractions] are practical because they are 
those of an experimental apparatus that he invented. It is in fact a concrete 
world in the sense that this world allows him to welcome the multitude of 
rival fictions about motions that compose it, and to make the difference 
between them, and designate the one that represents it in a legitimate 
manner (ibid).  
 
In other words, Galileo’s world is not merely simple and abstracted from broader political, 
economic, social and scientific concerns—it is designed and staged by Galileo so that by 
the end of Dialogue the reader can only come to the conclusion that Salviati is correct and 
everything Simplicio represents (most of astronomical thought at the time) “is by definition 
ridiculous” (ibid: 77).  
Through his abstract experimental apparatus, not only does Galileo convince the 
reader of his own position but the readers are “made to participate in a veritable intellectual 
lynching” of Simplicio and Aristotelian thought (ibid: 75). There is, simply, no other 
option. Stengers argues “it was the experimental apparatus that silenced… that was 
precisely its function: to silence all the other fictions” (ibid: 86). It forces one conclusion—
or legitimizes one conclusion as ‘fact’—and silences others—as story, rumor, or ignorance.  
* * * 
While not contending directly with Stengers, this kind of analysis can be seen in 
some of the scholarship focused on Zambia—for example work critiquing public health 
approaches to malaria and critical STS-inspired approaches to the development of mining 
geology. Lyn Schumaker (2008) critiques the colonial history of public health science by 
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examining malaria eradication programs in the then-Northern Rhodesian mines that still 
have environmental ramifications today. In the 1930s, a high prevalence of malaria—
rates exacerbated by mining practices—made the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt 
infamous for sickness and death of mine workers. Once this notoriety began to impede 
mining operations, the Roan Antelope Mine in Luanshya, Zambia, owned by the London-
based Selection Trust Group, hired the Ross Institute for Tropical Disease for malaria 
prevention. Malcolm Watson and his colleagues at the Ross Institute further developed 
and applied a new public health technique that they initiated in Malaysia: rather than 
targeting malaria itself they sought to control the vectors of the disease—mosquitoes—
during the larva phase of their lifespan. Surveying the land around the Roan Mine, they 
found stagnant and slow-moving water ideal for mosquito spawning. The Ross Institute 
claimed that Luanshya “waterscapes were sick” due to the “sluggish and chocked” pace 
of the river that “winded torturously” through its “flood plain covered with seepage water 
[dambos]” (Watson 1953:38-45). Their prescribed cure was thus to straighten “tortuous 
river channels” and channel the water to “quicken” the river’s flow, eliminate vegetation 
along the Luanshya River banks, and finally, to “treat… the infectious landscape… 
through burying dambos under [toxic] excess mine tailings” and urban refuse (ibid:38-
55,113,115).5 The results of this vast hydrological, mechanical and chemical undertaking 
were rapid. The Luanshya valley drained within 24 hours of rainfall, where previously 
the rainwater would irrigate the landscape for months (ibid:5). This solution, ‘scientific’ 
 
5 Since vegetation slows the flow of water and provides habitat for spawning, upwards of 1,000 gallons of 
oil were also sprayed along these engineered riverbanks and in marshy areas to eliminate growth (ibid: 55). 
At various times this mixture included crude oil from the mine, paraffin, solar oil, Tarakon oil and kerosene 
before it was replaced by DDT in 1945 (Watson 1953: 45-141). 
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as it may have been, increased food insecurity for Africans at a time when malnutrition 
was a greater cause of sickness for Africans than malaria (which disproportionately 
impacted European workers with less immunity). 
In effect, the Ross Institute used the language of public health to create a public 
health apparatus that led to their ‘solution’ (controlling the vector of disease, mosquitos) 
seeming obvious and silencing rival options. They asserted that their “modern scientific 
methods” (ibid: 19) and “special knowledge and skill” (ibid: 61) produced the most 
objective, efficient, and healthy project plan. Schumaker argues the Roan Mine’s 
scientific “conquest of the wetlands,” was not simply about “banishing” water—or even 
disease—but “employ[ing] it in highly controlled ways” to benefit mining operations and 
reify colonial control (2008:835). This economic and political purpose not only 
influenced the solution given—the practices of hydrologic science—but was also built 
upon constructing an abstract apparatus, constraining the types of questions asked about 
the environment, the kinds of efficiencies considered, and the type of knowledge 
considered “scientific” or “ignorant.” 
  Tomas Frederiksen (2013) examines the methods of European prospectors in 
early Northern Rhodesia to demonstrate how colonial power was propped up by the ways 
in which scientists (geologists) produced ‘scientific truths’ and read the landscape by 
“rendering [it] legible” (ibid:272). Frederiksen argues that while local people—and their 
knowledge about mining and materials—played a significant role in finding outcrops, 
they (and their knowledges) “were largely invisible in the final scientific reports and 
presentations” (ibid:272). According to Frederiksen this shows that: “The claim to 
foundational truth, objectivity, and universality, then, is in part a performance; a set of 
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cultural practices used to legitimate the forms of knowledge produced and its produces. 
The practices of science simultaneously generated knowledge and performed authority” 
(ibid:273). 
In this chapter, I combine Stengers’ concept of the abstract apparatus with 
Schumaker’s (2008) and Frederiksen’s (2013) interventions into the ties between science, 
mining, and colonial power in Zambia to examine how in Mufulira the enumeration of 
pollution—that is, making pollution legible through calculation by specific instruments, 
in designated ways, by sanctioned experts, and within a circumscribed legal framework—
works to force one conclusion (that the mine is not polluting excessively) and silence 
rivals (who contend that the mine’s pollution is harming their health). The Zambian state 
is party to this. Appearing as an unbiased regulator, ZEMA and MSD legitimize 
Mopani’s self-report emissions and do not allow residents to submit their own data. 
Attempts to challenge this process, say by NGOs or residents bringing in outside 
equipment or using international labs to test air quality, are quickly stifled, with these 
interventions considered “biased”6 or “rumor mongering.” 7 
Agnotology 
 
Thus far, few political ecologists, environmental humanities scholars, or nature-
society geographers have taken up agnotology, or the study of ignorance (for some 
exceptions see Anand 2015; Auyero and Swistun 2009; Fusco et al. 2017; Kirsch 2014; 
Oldfield and Greyling 2015; Slater 2019; Stel 2016; Uekotter and Lubken 2014). One 
 
6 Interview with Mberi, ZEMA, 2016. 
7 Interview with Edson Nawa, Mopani insider, 2016. 
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major focus of this research is the production of doubt. Oreskes and Conway investigate 
one tactic of producing doubt: confusing types of uncertainty.  
Being ‘uncertain’ of the science of acid rain research and policy in the United 
States, they say, would be akin to “saying that we know that both cigarettes and asbestos 
cause lung cancer, but we can’t say either is proven, because we don’t know exactly how 
much cancer is caused by one and how much by the other, and we don’t know whether 
eating vegetables might prevent those cancers” (Oreskes and Conway 2010:76). 
“Merchants of doubt”, they argue, exploit the vulnerability in the kind of skepticism that 
is crucial to science. Finally, they investigate how doubt is reified through emphasizing 
these uncertainties over settled knowledge, re-framing the narrative to one focused on the 
doubt instead of the known. This could include cherry-picking facts or simply overly 
focusing on facts no matter how irrelevant they are to the case at hand. 
So far, there has been little research that looks at how ignorance functions within 
the regulatory framework of the state, with the notable exceptions of Anand (2015) and 
McGoey (2007). McGoey, in her discussion of ignorance and regulation, argues that this 
is because the production of ignorance is at odds with the common perceptions of the role 
and purpose of the state and its bureaucracy. “Error and ignorance have so long been 
thought of as antithetical to the pursuit of truth and knowledge that to realize that 
bureaucratic errors might be perpetuated on purpose, that a regulatory body might 
systematically and purposefully conduct faulty inquiry after faulty inquiry in order to 
serve a more implicit interest at first strikes us as absurd” (ibid: 221). While potentially 
less absurd to postcolonial scholars who have a less rosy image of the uses of state power 
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(Gupta 2012), in popular imagination bureaucracies are often considered too boring, 
mundane, and background to take part in these maneuverings.  
Seductive Enumerations 
 
Inquiry into the spatial politics of calculation and legibility has examined 
calculative techniques as political technologies of the modern state (Crampton 2011; 
Hannah 2009; Mitchel 2005; Rose-Redwood 2012). Tather than looking at what numbers 
measure, these theorists are interested in what numbers do—or, what numbers enable—
when they are wielded as tools of the state. Analyzing state mapping projects in forestry, 
Scott (1998) argues that a “schematized process of abstraction and simplification” 
happens in spatial science, as the state attempts to make both nature and humans legible 
and calculative (ibid:22-25). Scott argues that the “systematic and synoptic” nature of 
abstraction—both in the case of the forester and the tax collector—allows the viewer to 
acquire knowledge others cannot and in particular knowledge that results in economic 
value or centralized state control. Scott contrasts (no-state) metis to state techne 
knowledge arguing that state knowledge is “gained at the expense” of all others—such as 
the way farmers viewed the forest or locals organized common property. Scott argues that 
a key to both modern governance and modern science is the creation of abstract 
knowledge through the map. This spatial legibility was ripe for manipulation by a 
powerful, interested actor such as the state. Scott’s intervention has been taken up by 
many political ecologists and state theorists since.  
 This idea of spatial abstraction was further developed by Appadurai (2001) in 
“Numbers in the Colonial Imagination.” He argues that while many theorists have 
examined the significance of classification schemes to the colonial project, particularly in 
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South Asia, numbers in themselves have received less attention. He demonstrates that 
numbers about population—demographic enumerations—are significant in themselves, 
as they were a “central technique of social control” (ibid:317). The technique enabled the 
“sheer narrative clutter of prose descriptions of the colonial landscape, to be domesticated 
into the abstract, precise, complete, and cool idiom of number” (ibid:323). It is his 
attention to the ability for numbers to tame complex situations—‘narrative clutter’—that 
I take up as particularly useful in this chapter. I too examine numbers as a technique of 
control, employed by Mopani to obfuscate, and then endorsed by the government 
regulatory agencies so as to perform effectively as Galilean ‘truth’.8  
Further, numbers matter because they confer authority and expertise. Christopher 
Hamlin (1990) analyzes the history of water quality science in Britain to argue that the 
development of hydrology as a science was murky, uncertain, and biased. Hamlin argues 
that because chemistry was viewed as neutral and value-free in nineteenth century 
Britain, water scientists were able to “exploit” objectivity for their own purposes (ibid:7). 
The neutral ideal was a “powerful” tool to “legitimate” particular policies, as any conflict 
could be “redefined as technical questions” (ibid:7-8). Hamlin concludes that at this time 
determining whether water was good or bad became more of a technical issue and less 
meaningful or accessible to the common layperson. 
Far less work in critical environmental science scholarship has examined the ways 
uncertainty and illegibility in science can also be wielded for political gain or legitimacy. 
 
8 Of course we now accept Galileo’s account of planetary motion because the weight of scientific evidence 
since has done nothing to falsify it. The difference in the case of Mopani is that they have set up an abstract 
apparatus that brooks no other account and are unwilling to let science (citizen or otherwise) corroborate. 
Science in the best sense is about a spirit of radical skepticism and Mopani fears this, which should make 
us skeptical of their stance. 
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One exception is Nikhil Anand’s work on water networks and engineering in Mumbai 
(for another exception see Thompson and Warbuton 1985). Rather than uncertainty being 
something that water utility engineers in Mumbai are trying to avoid and overcome, 
Anand (2015) argues that they used uncertainty as a way to “actively ignore the 
measurement of leakage” in the urban water network in their management, despite 
reducing leaks being a key part of their jobs. This ignorance, Anand argues, is 
constructive as it gives authority to the institutions managing the city’s water as they see 
fit. It enables state-building and legitimacy because it provides the state with the rhetoric 
of scarcity to require rationing. He argues that while likely inaccurate, “numerical fictions 
such as these are powerful” (ibid:11) for social, political, and economic positioning.  
Numbers, Anand argues, “are intended to tell a story” and both city engineers and 
the World Bank consultants used ignorance and uncertainty over these numbers in order 
to tell particular stories. He presents an example of World Bank consultants coming in to 
calculate leakages in order to promote private water programs. The consultants conducted 
audits for a water balance survey for a particular purpose: to make the water “more 
legible, countable, and billable” (ibid). Their equations centered on calculating revenue-
generating water and non-revenue water (NRW), viewing water obtained “illegally” as a 
water “loss” (ibid:12). The World Bank came up with a wildly different loss ratio: 40% 
compared to the engineer’s 25%. Local engineers saw this as a threat to their competence. 
In retaliation they called into question the expertise of the consultants, who ultimately re-
calculated water lose, landing on a number more acceptable to the local engineers. This, 
Anand argues, “reveals the power of the number, even when it is rendered unstable by 
qualifications, estimates, projections and other unstable conditions of production” 
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(ibid:17). My argument in this chapter builds upon Anand’s work considering the 
particular ways ignorance enables state building, the ways expertise can be mobilized, 
and the power of numbers—even false ones—to tell stories. However, contra Anand I 
argue that rather than exacerbating instability, the ways in which the Mopani mine 
company in Mufulira produces (un)certainty and ignorance actually works to foreclose 
counter-claims. (Whether this strategy works is a question I take up later in the 
dissertation.) Enumeration can produce an aura of certainty, but it can also create 




Mopani’s first line of argumentation is that there is, quite simply, no longer (too 
much) pollution at the mine site. This is the simple answer they often present to media or 
unsuspicious researchers. Regarding senta in Kankoyo, their claim is that they upgraded 
the smelter (in or around 2006) and built two acid plants to capture sulfur dioxide 
emissions from the smelter, one in 20069 and another in June 2014, the second of which 
reduced pollution by 97%. Glencore cites this 97% number throughout their public 
relations annual reports10 and Kankoyo residents are well aware of the 97% claim.11 
Jackson Luangwa, an industry insider with Mopani gives an overview of this simple 
story,  
[During the ZCCM era, prior to Mopani’s upgrades] we had what was known as an 
electric furnace, and with this furnace, we didn’t have any means of capturing the 
 
9 Some reports suggest it didn’t come ‘online’ until years later. 
10 Glencore, Annual Report 2011. Found online at www.glencore.com 
11 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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sulfur dioxide we were producing from the smelter. All that sulfur was just going 
into the environment and causing a lot of challenges to the environment.  
 
But one of the good things that has happened with privatization, after the new 
owners came in, one of the commitments they made was to come up with new 
technologies that will primarily capture sulfur, and they try to make the 
environment cleaner. That's why you are even able to breath clean air. In the past, 
even here where we are seated, there would be a lot of fumes, especially in this 
season, the rainy season…  
 
The first thing [Mopani did is] come up with a new furnace which is known as 
IsaSmelt. This is a new technology that we got from Australia … That started in 
2006, [when it] was commissioned. So from 2006 we have been running the 
IsaSmelter together with acid plants. So from 2006… we have the furnace where 
we melt the concentrates and we also have the converters.  
 
So, what happened was in 2006, the electric furnace, which was the main polluter, 
stopped polluting. Most of the gases were now being captured through the acid 
plant, but we remained with the converters still venting fumes into the atmosphere. 
So, a second phase was brought in to bring in … to reduce the sulfur … So, we had 
to build new converters which would direct the gases to the acid plant. And this 
project I think, I can say 2015 that's when it finished. So now as we speak, the 
whole smelter, almost, you can say 90-something, 95 or 97% of the gases being 
produced are being captured. On the percentages let me get you more accurate 
figures, but what I'm trying to say is there is no pollution now into the 
environment, except for a few fugitive fumes that escape here and there. So that 
has been a big plus to the environment and to Mufulira. This has been because of 
the investment that the owners, Mopani, have put in.12 
 
I certainly do not dispute that an acid plant means they are capturing sulfur dioxide that 
could otherwise be admitted into the air—indeed, a new income stream for the company 
is selling the resulting sulfuric acid so it is in their financial interest to capture it—several 
questions remain: would these types of emissions have occurred with the old smelter and 
processes? What does this actually mean in terms of absolute levels of air pollution? 
 
12 Jackson, industry insider, January 2016. 
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What are its effects on human and ecosystem health? Are we confusing types of 
certainty, just as Oreskes and Conway argue some confuse types of uncertainty? Does a 
97% capture mean, as Jackson said, that “there is no pollution now into the 
environment”, which is what the simple story implies?  
 Regarding the acid mist pollution Butondo, Mopani has always claimed that it 
meets—and has always met—applicable standards.13 In a full-page ad they took out in 
the Times of Zambia, their press release stated that they “continuously and carefully 
monitor” for acid emissions around the heap and that the “results of this monitoring have 
always been within limits agreed by the government”.14 Even though national agencies 
including ZEMA and the MSD have said that they do not conduct independent 
monitoring because they do not have the equipment for it15, Mopani also claims “the 
operation is audited regularly by independent experts [and] scrutinized by the Mines 
Safety Department [and] closely monitored by the Government.”16 Important here for the 
discussion on the ‘regulatory’ part of the abstracted regulatory apparatus, is the 
implication that ZEMA and the MSD are not biased and therefore their data—which is 
self-reported by Mopani—is objective. 
 
13 Sometimes they claim these standards are “international” like in the Multi-Stakeholder meetings with 
Butondo residents. In public documents, however, they say that they meet ZEMAs standards. 
14 Callow, March 3, 2012. “Press Statement on the operations of Mufulira West mining and heap leach 
project, “ in Times of Zambia. 
15 This has been said publicly a few times, as well as in each of my interviews with insiders at MSD and 
ZEMA. 
16 Callow, March 3, 2012. “Press Statement on the operations of Mufulira West mining and heap leach 
project,” Times of Zambia. 
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Despite their self-reported data claiming they never exceeded standards, Mopani 
says that after residents raised concerns—and Vice President Guy Scott visited the heap 
leach and shut down the operation for several says—they added several environmental 
fail-safes to their heap leach operation: tarps, drip irrigation, barrier trees, and wind 
sensors. Less publicly, I heard from Mopani insiders that they also started to use a weaker 
acid.17 With these basic changes and mounting political pressure, the government allowed 
them to re-open after only three days. The company called the shutdown a threat to local 
employment.18 Mopani also noted that while ZEMA started a new investigation, “It is 
unclear how this data could differ from the previous five years’ satisfactory results”. 19 
Indeed, given ZEMA and MSD had no air quality testing equipment at the time, it is hard 
to know how they could do anything more than reproduce Mopani’s self-reported data.  
In sum, Mopani CEO Callow claimed the shutdown was “unjustified” because 
“ZEMA has closely and properly monitored the Heap Leach project since the project’s 
inception in 2007 and always found the operation to be in compliance with ZEMA 
regulations.”20 Mopani’s simple story, here, is that they were always in compliance and 
still are. They see the fact that ZEMA renewed their “license to pollute”21 every year as 
 
17 Interview with David, Mopani insider, 2016. 
18 Callow, March 5, 2012. “Press statement on suspension of Mopani heap leach project threatens jobs, 
unjustified by track record,” in the Times of Zambia. 
19 Callow, March 5, 2012. “Press statement on suspension of Mopani heap leach project threatens jobs, 
unjustified by track record,” in the Times of Zambia. 
20 Callow, March 5, 2012. “Press statement on suspension of Mopani heap leach project threatens jobs, 
unjustified by track record,” in the Times of Zambia. 
21 Interview with Mberi, ZEMA, 2016. 
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corroboration. Even so, Mopani added extra environmental safeguards. Now, this simple 
story implies, the community are just complaining due to greed and lack of knowledge. 
* * * 
 Upon closer examination these simple accounts raise suspicion. Residents in 
Kankoyo—and throughout Mufulira more generally—laugh at the idea that the mine is 
no longer polluting and will respond “they are lying if they are saying they do not 
pollute”.22 Some government officials I spoke with agreed with Mopani’s official account 
that the pollution has ended, but many others admitted—anonymously—that 
acknowledging pollution publicly is “too political”, yet they are personally certain that it 
exceeds the legal limits.23  
These simple accounts, however, ground the regulatory apparatus. They begin to 
set limits for what kind of pollution we can talk about, how it can be measured, and who 
is considered an unbiased expert—who can speak with the authority of the apparatus. At 
the end of the day, these simple fictions persuade. It makes sense that making sulfuric 
acid out of fumes would reduce emissions. These simple stories are so easy to remember, 
in fact, it becomes hard for complicated facts to compete. 
Regulations 
 
 We begin with the Development Agreements (DAs). In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Zambia was forced by international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF 
to privatize their economy in order to gain HIPC status and get debt relief. The Zambian 
 
22 Focus Group with the Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
23 Interview with Enock, ZEMA, 2016. Regarding air pollution from the smelter and processing facilities 
there is suspicion they have not met the DA-associated timelines. 
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Privatization Agency (ZPA) was set up to oversee the sales and “privatize everything 
from a toothbrush to a car assembly plant” (President Chiluba, in Ham 1992: 4, cited in 
Myers 2005). After politicking, political controversy, and accusations of corruption24, the 
Mufulira mine was sold to Anglo-American Corporation,25 which quickly sold it back to 
the government. When the government re-sold the mine to Mopani, the Development 
Agreement included a stability period with extremely lucrative tax incentives and 
environmental indemnity if Mopani met certain upgrade timelines.26 Its exact language is 
startling: 
GRZ hereby confirms that for the Stability Period it will not take any action 
(and will procure no action is taken by any of its ministries, departments, or 
agencies over which it has operational control acting on its behalf) under, 
or in enforcing, any applicable Environmental Laws with the intent of:  
 
(a) securing the Company's earlier compliance with Environmental 
Laws other than that envisaged by the timetable and conditions set 
out in the Environmental Plan; 
(b) requiring the Company to clean up and/or remove any stock of 
pollutants and/or remedy any other condition which was pre-
existing as at the date of this Agreement (other than in respect of 
areas of land or bodies of water identified by the Company pursuant 
to Clause 12.19(b)(ii))27 
 
24 According to an anonymous interview with someone in the ZPA, there was a Zambian buyer who made 
an offer to take over the ZCCM mines but Chiluba did not want any Zambian to be more powerful than he 
was. Interview conducted in Lusaka, 2016. Chiluba’s corruption during the privatization process has been 
proven in UK Courts; it is only in Zambia that it is up for question. 
25 Myers, 2017, considers this a cruel irony since Anglo-American “originated in the breakup of the British 
South Africa Company” which was, in effect, the “colonial master” of Zambia. However, some argued that 
Anglo-American had a significantly better environmental record than the new owners—especially in 
Chingola. 
26 Interview with Chinjila, government - part of the environmental team involved with Development 
Agreements, 2016. 
27 If companies decided, for example, to re-mine tailings then they would have to clean them up as well. 
Companies had a set amount of time to decide which liabilities were worth enough for them to take on. 
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(c) imposing fines or penalties upon the Company payable under 
Environmental Laws (or enacting new fines and penalties 
thereunder) which are payable in respect of the Company's non-
compliance with such Environmental Laws and where the 
Environmental Plan provides for the remedy of the same in 
accordance with a specified timetable and the Company is in 
material compliance with that timetable. 
(d) Imposing fines or penalties in respect of the Company’s breach of 
Environmental Laws in the case of penalty charges in respect of the 
emission of sulfur dioxide arising from the ongoing operation of the 
Mufulira smelter provided that the Company remains in compliance 
with the measures, and in material compliance with the timetables 
for implementing those measures set out in the Environmental Plan 
to reduce such omissions and, as appropriate, for the construction of 
a new acid plant as set out in the Environmental Plan; or 
(e) effecting any changes thereto or enacting new legislation and 
regulation or repealing existing legislation or regulation which 
would prevent the Company complying with the Environmental 
plan and the timetables contained therein without making provision 
for the Company to be exempted therefrom or materially alter or 
affect the scope, enforcement or application of Environmental Laws 
regarding the establishment, maintenance or operation of the 
Environmental Protection Fund.28 
 
Basically, at point of sale none of the privatized mines could ever be held liable for any 
contamination that existed or may have existed prior to sale (this part appears fairly 
standard, made more difficult because the onus would be on the government to prove 
when the contamination occurred). But in addition, for the 15-year stability period, the 
government agreed to not hold Mopani to national environmental laws, as long as they 
followed a timetable for completing infrastructure upgrades to the mine.  
 Lawrence, a high-level government insider involved with the ZPA during the time 
 
28 Development Agreement between Government of the Republic of Zambia and Mopani Copper Mines 
Plc, March 31, 2000. 
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of sale, claimed that the language in the timetable documents implied that Mopani would 
not be held liable for any further pollution that resulted from the equipment (in particular 
the smelter) purchased during the sale. Lawrence claims this indemnity holds even if 
Mopani used the equipment differently (for example, without lime for the smelter’s 
scrubbers) or increased production (which they more than doubled almost 
immediately).29 In the Mithi case, Mopani too argued the agreement states they should be 
held “harmless against any and all environmental liabilities arising from the operation of 
the assets acquired from the Government of the Republic of Zambia” (Kabwe High 
Court 2016, emphasis mine). The judge disputed this meaning, but Mopani has continued 
to appeal using the same argument. This entire debate neglects the fact that the smelter is 
new and so is not even an asset acquired. 
Further, the Development Agreement reads that Mopani should technically never 
be liable to “remedy any other condition which was pre-existing”.30 Chinjila, another 
insider with the ZPA, argued to me that not only is the poor environment of Kankoyo 
“pre-existing”, so are all the chronic medical issues they are accused of exacerbating.31 
Also significant, says, Chinjila, these timetables were based on ZCCM’s own internal 
schedule for upgrades, and thus did not account for any capital inflow expected from the 
privatization process.32 33  
 
29 Lawrence, ZPA insider, 2016. 
30 Development Agreement between Government of the Republic of Zambia and Mopani Copper Mines 
Plc, March 31, 2000. 
31 Interview with Chinjila, government - part of the environmental team with ZPA, 2016. 
32 In other words, these timetables were based on the project resources of the highly in debt (basically 
bankrupt) ZCCM. 
33 Interview with Chinjila, government - part of the environmental team with ZPA, 2016. 
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While the DAs have been leaked, the environmental timetable and the EMP have 
not, and this secrecy plays a significant role in the abstract regulatory apparatus. People I 
spoke with who had knowledge of the timetable admitted that Mopani had over a decade 
to upgrade the smelter and refinery operations and build acid plants. 34 35 Kaoma, a 
Mopani insider, recounts, “I remember 2012 being the date that things had to be done 
by... that's why, for instance, they closed the smelter in Nkana by that date... [that closure 
was] probably because of those development agreements because they would be subject 
to emissions penalizations and stuff, so that obviously had a cost implication to it.”36 
Testifying to the Kabwe High Court, ZEMA inspector Cliff Ngwata said 2014 was the 
final date but that “his understanding was that the Development Agreements were not 
legally binding after the enactment of the Mines and Minerals Act of 2008”, which had 
overturned the tax provisions in the DAs (Kabwe High Court 2016).  
I did not hear this claim from anyone else, within ZEMA or outside of it. Nor did 
ZEMA ever fine Mopani for excess emissions after 2008. While it is common knowledge 
that the financial arrangements in the DAs were not legally binding after the 2008 law 
was enacted, the law did not specifically mention the EMP timetables or environmental 
indemnity. All of the people I spoke with about this claimed Mopani argues they still 
have environmental indemnity from the DAs. 
Those with knowledge of the EMP recalled that the timetables refer to percentages 
of SO2 emissions captured but appear not to limit the absolute quantity of sulfur dioxide, 
 
34 Interview with Chinjila, government - part of the environmental team with ZPA, 2016. 
35 Lawrence, ZPA insider, 2016. 
36 Interview with Kaoma, Mopani insider, 2016. 
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heavy metals, or other particulate matter released. 37 38 For example, by a certain date 
Mopani had to construct an acid plant that would capture 50% of the SO2 from the 
smelter and by a later date, they had to capture around 97% (which Mopani argued they 
were doing even as residents argued the pollution was worsening).39 Mopani has argued 
in court (and, according to interviews, with regulatory agencies) that as long as the 
timelines are met, they are not liable for any resulting pollution or any direct 
environmental or human health impacts of their emissions (ibid).  
Many government workers, including in the local government, ZEMA, and MSD, 
were unaware of this until Mopani brought them up. Maluza, a local government official, 
remembered a meeting he had with Mopani and ZEMA officials back when they only had 
one acid plant and Mopani claimed they were meeting the Development Agreement 
timetable of 50% capture: 
It was shocking. When the mines came, the CEO came with an 
environmental management plan that was signed by the former president… 
They were only told to capture 50% of the emissions. And that is subjective 
[based on production]—they had no [absolute] figures… There was no 
limit. And like that we were handicapped… when there is too much 
production 50% is subjective, it is too high… The local authority was not 




37 Interview with Chinjila, government - part of the environmental team with ZPA, 2016. 
38 Lawrence, ZPA insider, 2016. 
39 Interview with Chinjila, government - part of the environmental team with ZPA, 2016. 
40 Interview with Maluza, local government worker, 2016. 
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Image 19: Air pollution in Kankoyo. Source: Res Gehriger 
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RU 2  28° 13.804'E  12° 31.769'S 27.8 3.0
RU 3  28° 13.220'E  12° 31.960'S 15.6 4.6
RU 4  28° 13.507'E  12° 32.332'S 432.7 5.3
RU 5  28° 14.035'E  12° 32.475'S 782.2 5.3
RU 6  28° 13.711'E  12° 32.764'S 429.1 32.2
RU 7  28° 14.448'E  12° 33.145'S 253.8 4.0
RU 8  28° 16.073'E  12° 33.499'S 41.3 0.9
RU 9  28° 14.573'E  12° 32.398'S 278.7 2.9
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Grenzwerte Mensch 50 ug/m3 über 50 rot
Grenzwerte 40 ug/m3 über 40 rot
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Maluza went on to say that to this date – 2016 –  the local government was not even 
aware of the specifics of the timetables or the EMP.  
Because production numbers are also considered confidential, even if they had 
both the timetables and the appropriate air testing equipment, the government still would 
be unable to prove whether Mopani was releasing more than 97% of the sulfur dioxide 
produced.41 What this means is that fluctuations or large increases in production, changes 
in release duration, or the timing of emissions could result in events that are more 
dangerous to human health and environmental wellbeing even while staying within 
allowable percentages. For example, an air analysis from an international journalist 
demonstrated SO2 levels over 70 times above WHO standards in 2013—years after their 
first acid plant went online (Odiot and Gallet 2012)—but absolute figure could still meet 
the percentage requirements due to, as Mopani argues, scaling up operations. With all the 
secrecy, it is impossible to prove otherwise. 
When I brought this up with ZEMA officials, Sapato said Mopani “still has to 
work within absolute limits” and that any time their pollution exceeded national standards 
they needed to apply for a variance, though they are almost always granted them.42 Silas, 
who had been at ZEMA (and ECZ before that) long enough to be aware of the DAs and 
associated timetable, said that even if Mopani had a variance for emissions standards, 
they were still liable for any new pollution, or increases in pollution, that have resulted in 
 
41 By this point Mopani is required to capture over 50%. They say they capture 97% - it is unclear whether 
this is the minimum percentage they can currently capture or based on their perception of the IsaSmelt 
technology. 
42 Sapato, ZEMA, 2016. 
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a documented actual harm—including crop failures, deaths, or respiratory ailments that 
are a direct result of their emissions.43 (Any claim for compensation would of course be 
limited to those with the power and resources to document direct harm from pollution in 
a way that is legally recognizable.)  
This, and any liability while under the EMP, is fiercely contested by Mopani. As 
seen in the introduction, when District Commissioner Mithi’s family sued Mopani over 
an emissions event that directly led to her death in 2013, Mopani argued they were not 
liable due to the DAs.44 Similarly, in 2014, large-scale farmers nearby went to Mopani 
for compensation for crop failures and harm to animals due to egregious emissions. 
Mopani responded that they were not liable—yet opted to compensate anyway so as to 
avoid further legal arguments. It is significant to note that these emissions events were 
said to have occurred in February, 2014 – over a month after the death of DC Beatrice 
Mithi from a different emissions event and years after Mopani had purportedly upgraded 
their smelter and installed a new acid plant. 
In a document to the Mufulira District Commissioner outlining a settlement for 
which farmers would receive 40% of their stated losses from an emissions event, Mopani 
said both that “our readings show that on and around the material dates, our operations 
were within the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) guidelines and 
license limits”. 45 It is interesting that they mention license limits and not air quality 
 
43 Silas, ZEMA, 2016. 
44 Kabwe High Court, 2016. Judgment Mithi vs Mopani. Found online at: 
<https://www.srf.ch/news/content/download/11003760/file/Urteil%20High%20Court%20%20%028002%2
9.pdf> , accessed May, 2, 2019. 
45 Letter from Mopani to Mufulira District Commissioner, 2014. “Settlement for Farmers.” 
 94 
limits—as they may have a license to pollute over the current national standards. And, 
Mopani writes, “in any case, Mopani is not liable pursuant to an agreement made on 31st 
March, 2000 between the Government of the Republic of Zambia and Mopani called the 
‘Environmental Liabilities Agreement’ in which the government undertook and 
covenanted with Mopani to indemnify and hold Mopani harmless against any and all 
environmental liabilities arising from the operation of assets acquired46 from the 
Government”.47 To the farmers and District Commissioner, Mopani did not attach the 
‘Environmental Liabilities Agreement’ for corroboration or proof, nor did they provide 
any documentation showing they were polluting within the percentage allowed—though 
interestingly they did attach charts that showed them drastically exceeding SO2 limits set 
by ZEMA, in particular on January 29th, when emissions between 10 and 11am reached 
up to 5000 µg/m3. 48 Thus, confidentiality is a vital aspect of the regulatory apparatus, one 
that frames official understanding of environmental pollution and liability here. 
* * * 
Another regulatory dimension of the abstract regulatory apparatus is the 
legitimizing—and limiting—of experts. While EMA does allow for ‘honorary inspectors’ 
who are citizens and not a part of ZEMA, none have yet been appointed and a system has 
not yet been set up to do so. This leaves Mopani arguing that the only “unbiased” 
information comes from the government itself—remembering, of course, that the 
 
46 That the emissions resulted from the ‘operation of assets acquired’ is a deception—Mopani installed its 
new IsaSmelt smelter in 2006. That means after 2006 smelter emissions were not caused by ‘operating 
assets acquired’. 
47 Letter from Mopani to Mufulira District Commissioner, 2014. “Settlement for Farmers.” 
48 Letter from Mopani to Mufulira District Commissioner, 2014. “Settlement for Farmers.” 
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government relies on self-reported data from Mopani due to lack of monitoring 
equipment and a small number of inspectors (there are around 19 environmental 
inspectors for the whole of Zambia, and fewer than 10 overseeing the entire Copperbelt 
and Northwestern Province).49 Mopani invokes the government to legitimize the numbers 
they themselves produce, arguing that any source other than the government’s arises from 
particular interests (the government, on its part, plays along with this Kafkaesque 
scenario for pecuniary and political reasons, not the least of these being its desire to 
prevent scrutiny of its questionable Development Agreements).50 
* * * 
The IFI community has also played a role in consolidating the abstract regulatory 
apparatus. The World Bank helped Zambia write its environmental laws and loaned the 
government millions of dollars during the privatization process in exchange for taking on 
environmental liabilities.51 In an international scandal, the European Investment Bank 
took funds set aside for development efforts to loan Glencore millions of dollars for their 
smelter upgrade under the expectation that the upgrade would provide a healthier 
environment. As reports leaked out about transfer pricing52 and foreign reporters 
 
49 The Copperbelt is the most industrial region in Zambia, and the Solwezi and Lumwana mines would be 
over a day’s drive away for inspectors. These inspectors oversee over a dozen large-scale mines. These 
inspectors also oversee every business that has an environmental permit, including other sources of 
manufacturing and things like building malls. 
50 This can be seen in many of their press releases, in which they continually invoke ZEMA records without 
mentioning they are self-reported. 
51 While the World Bank denied this in interviews with me, several people involved in the ZPA said their 
understanding of the Copperbelt Environment Project was that it was a quid-pro-quo for privatizing the 
mines. 
52 A Zambia Revenues Authority audit, covering tax years 2006-2008 was leaked in 2011. This highlighted 
financial irregularities at Mopani including suspicious operating costs, revenues, transfer pricing, and 
employee overheads. This lead the EIB to an investigation that was inconclusive. 
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highlighted the worsening environmental situation in Mufulira, including the full-length 
documentary film Good Copper, Bad Copper, the European Investment Bank set a team 
of investigators to Mufulira. The EIB could have potentially forced Mopani’s hand, since 
they loaned the money for the project. Rather than allowing the EIB to conduct a proper 
investigation, however, Glencore immediately re-paid their loan. After months of NGOs 
asking to see the EIB’s report, the EIB says that it “decided to keep its findings secret”.53 
Finally, the EIB published a short, 2-page summary that says their work was “non-
conclusive due to the difficulties faced in the investigation of the case. As not all of the 
necessary information could be obtained, it was not possible to comprehensively prove or 
disprove the allegations”. 54  In sum, Glencore even evaded international mechanisms for 
regulation by hampering investigators and then paying off their development loan early 
so as to shut down the investigation. The apparatus at work. 
Enumerations 
 
97% of [redacted] 
Reporting only percentages of SO2 capture allows Mopani to conceal the actual 
quantity of SO2 being emitted while still appearing certain and transparent. The 95% or 
97% figure appears precise and imbues confidence in their data, but it is a precise 
numerical percentage based upon a fluctuating and consistently unknown whole (the total 
amount of SO2 created through their processing, itself dependent upon their production).  
Whether Mopani meets these percentages is unknown. While some mine insiders 
hewed to the company line, others will admit that the acid plant on the smelter side is less 
 
53 European Investment Bank website at: <www.eib.org> 
54 European Investment Bank website at: <www.eib.org> 
 97 
efficient than stated and the converters still emit acid: “So the first acid plant was only 
looking at the Isa side… and there’s what we’ve developed, we’re calling it the sulfur 
capture… So the design was about 50% capture… But, you agree with me, any machine 
on earth, whether it’s a car you say goes to 250 whatever stuff, it never really gets there, 
you know? So [laughs] efficiency issues. So we never really used to capture 50%, so we 
were doing 40-something”.55 With the addition of the second acid plant, this mine insider 
argued that the capture is “closer to 97%”, but that residents were likely still complaining 
about emissions because “no plant is flawless [laughter]… we are still fine-tuning”.56  
Efficiency issues. Laughter. The apparatus at work. 
Even after I requested production numbers and got permission from the Minister 
of Mines57, I received production levels aggregated over an entire region and over 
significant time periods, rather than showing the daily or hourly output at one particular 
smelter. This is, of course, more likely done to conceal profits (Mopani’s parent company 
Glencore is internationally notorious for evading taxes) but has the added impact of 
making it difficult to confirm or contest their accounts of SO2 capture. Air quality tests 
that hold Mopani to their EMP simply cannot be conducted by anyone other than Mopani 
(or possibly government officials who may possibly know these production numbers—
and how they could relate to total possible emissions58—even though they are considered 
a state secret). Only Mopani can say what a 50% or even 97% capture actually means. 
 
55 Interview with Kennedy, Mopani insider, 2016. 
56 Interview with Kennedy, Mopani insider, 2016. 
57 The Minister of Mines would be akin to a Secretary of Energy, directly appointed by the President into 
their cabinet. 
58 Whether these numbers would even help is another question as total SOx potential would also relate to 
ore quality, sulfur content, and processing method.  
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Mopani could be legally permitted to pollute drastically over the national emissions 
standards due to this loophole—or perhaps not. Only Mopani knows.  
I asked Nawa, a Mopani insider familiar with the smelter upgrade, why Kankoyo 
residents were still complaining if Mopani did indeed capture between 50-97% of the 
SO2. He claimed it was because the new smelter and acid plants produce a more 
concentrated offgas: 
When it does escape, once in a while it happens—anywhere in the 
world—because it’s concentrated, it’s designed to make sulfuric acid, it’s 
a little bit more irritating… than it was in the past… To make sulfuric 
acid, which they are making now, you need to convert Sulfur dioxide to 
into Sulfur trioxide. So usually whatever escapes from the acid plant it 
will be a mixture of that Sulfur dioxide and some Sulfur trioxide. So it’s 
stronger, it’s more irritating. But the real issue is not about it escaping… 
the real issues is that people have become more enlightened [about their 
environmental rights, and] are more militant now, especially because they 
are dealing with a privately-owned company.59 
 
In other words, what is being emitted now is different, stronger, than what was emitted 
before.60 
Banda, another Mopani insider called leaked fumes due to inefficiencies and 
equipment failures “fugitive fumes” (this is the term often used for fumes that do not 
come out of a point source like a stack, but instead leak from multiple places in a way 
that is hard to capture) and said that during the final process in the converters “a little 
sulfur dioxide will fall out but just a little, infinitesimal really, not something that you can 
like measure… and it never really finds its way to the acid plant”.61 The use of passive 
 
59 Interview with Nawa, Mopani insider, 2016. 
60 And even 3% of new emissions may be worse than 100% of the old emissions—though as we will see 
the 3% figure does not mean what it implies. 
61 Interview with Banda, Mopani insider, 2016. 
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voice in this language (“it never really finds its way”) is significant. Should Mopani only 
be responsible for SO2 that finds its way to the acid plant? 
In Mopani’s own 2015 review of smelter activities to ZEMA, they admit that the 
acid plants only capture 95% of furnace offgasses (including SO2) from the ISA and 
converters. In the same report they said the first acid plant captured a full 50%, though 
this was disputed by mine insiders such as the one above. But, they admit, they do not 
capture SO2 from other sources and thus “do not meet the long-term limits for these two 
parameters [SO2 and dust]”.62 For example, their estimate of SO2 released from the 
hygiene stack is 12,000 mg/Nm3, the matte settling furnace releases 3,000 mg/Nm3, the 
anode furnaces stack emits under the limit of 1,000 mg/Nm3—though Mopani is applying 
for an exemption to 1,200 mg/Nm3 and also applying for “interim limits for heavy 
metals”—and finally the no. 1 acid plant: “it is planned to convert the No. 1 acid plant to 
double conversion-double absorption (DCDA) so as bring it into compliance with the 
limit of 700 - 4,300 kg/day for SO2”.63 These “infinitesimal” amounts of “fugitive fumes” 
that Banda talks about, therefore, actually each surpass the legal SO2 long term emissions 
limits—though in the report Mopani argues the limits should be changed to these current 
levels.64 
Further, in a report Mopani commissioned to document why they chose to install 
the IsaSmelt, a Top Submerged Lance (TSL) technology, Ross and de Vries (2005) claim 
TSL was chosen because of low operating costs and because it “produces a high strength 
 
62 Mopani, 2015. Report on their smelter activities to ZEMA. Leaked to me. 
63 Mopani, 2015. Report on their smelter activities to ZEMA. Leaked to me. 
64 Mopani, 2015. Report on their smelter activities to ZEMA. Leaked to me. 
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offgas” to make into sulfuric acid. In the report, they also reject using an electric smelter 
(which is the ‘asset acquired’ that was historically in operation) because of the “low 
Sulphur dioxide tenor of electric furnace offgas”—meaning it is significantly weaker 
(ibid). And finally, the report claims that with the acid plants, “compared to the current 
smelter operation, installation… will result in a 17% reduction in Sulphur dioxide 
emissions” when considering all sources of SOx (ibid). In a separate report commissioned 
for the EIB on the TSL technology Mopani would be installing, Mopani said that in 
comparison to operating the existing electric furnace, when “conversion efficiency of the 
acid plant will be in excess of 97% this translates into a fixation of 55-59% and 50% of 
total sulfur dioxide produced… When compared to the current [production] scenario the 
total sulfur dioxide emissions will reduce by 18%”.65 When the smelter’s conversion 
efficiency is 97%—as Mopani claims—the total—more concentrated—SO2 emissions 
reduce by only 18% compared to the ZCCM era. That is, while they may be able to 
convert 97% of what they capture, they do not capture close to all of the SOx. An 18% 
reduction is a far cry from 97%. This does not even appear to account for doubling or 
tripling production. The apparatus at work. 
* * * 
 These percentages also do not take into account anything else discharged into the 
air. A focus on sulfur dioxide could be hiding other environmental issues such as heavy 
metal toxicity, water pollution from in situ leaching, and more. Heavy metals and other 
 
65 European Investment Bank report, leaked. 
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materials emitted as “dust” are not captured in tests or public media outcry focusing on 
SO2.  
I spoke with researchers who have uncovered high levels of heavy metals in the 
dust on people’s houses, though they say they have not been able to publish this 
information.66 Mopani itself has applied for exceedances for their heavy metal pollution 
into the air.67 Ex-industry insiders, scientific researchers, and other environmental 
specialists would acknowledge that senta was not the most severe, let alone only, 
environmental issue in Kankoyo arising from Mopani’s operations. One Mopani insider 
gave me a knowing nod: “If I were studying the environmental impacts of [Mopani] I 
would be looking at lead, not senta”.68  
While most mine insiders at Mopani Mine and local government officials in 
Mufulira said that “lead is not a problem here, that’s Kabwe” 69 a Copperbelt 
Environment Project Issue Report reveals that children in Mufulira have elevated levels 
of lead (34.2 - 153 ug/l), cadmium (0.07 - 0.38 ug/l), and cobalt (0.31-4.81 ug/l) in their 
blood (Copperbelt Environment Project, 2005). The only document I was shown that 
monitored lead in Mopani’s air emissions revealed that in August 2015—after the new 
smelter and acid plants were in operation—lead emissions from the matte settling furnace 
were 14.69 mg/Nm3 (exceeding the maximum allowable limit of 0.2 mg/Nm3) and from 
the anode furnace they were 13.42 mg/Nm3 (again over the limit of 0.2 mg/Nm3).70 In the 
 
66 Interview with Emmanuel and Miza, Zambian researchers, 2016. 
67 I saw many requests from Mopani to ZEMA for an exceedance. ZEMA offices. 
68 Interview with Mopani insider, 2016. 
69 Interview, David Kalenga, national government, July 2016. 
70 Alfred H Knit Metallurgy Department Report No. 4 to the Mine Safety Department. 
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same report, they declined to test acid plant emissions due to safety concerns. 71 Clearly, 
heavy metal exposure is not just a ‘Kabwe issue.’  
Known pollutants are not residents’ only concern. For example, there are rumors 
of nuclear radiation exposure in Mufulira. Mopani admits it processed copper ore with 
traces of uranium from the Lumwana Mine. Rumors are they did so until the radiation 
was so damaging to their machines that they stopped (they still process material from 
Lumwana, though insiders say it now contains less uranium than before). Copper ore 
containing arsenic was brought to Zambia from Chile. Although the government refused 
to let the ore enter the country, rumors are that some arsenic-tainted ore from other areas 
has been processed by them.  
In addition, Kennedy claimed that another reason for Mopani’s recent smelter 
upgrade to Isasmelt was because “Isa can smelt different types of concentrates”.72 Other 
mine insiders at Mopani anonymously confirmed to me that Mopani processed materials 
other than copper, including one who slipped that in the refinery, “gold and platinum, 
silver, and all of these other things will fall of [the copper cathode during electrolysis] 
and they will go to the bottom… We call them slimes. Gold, as you know, is always good 
for business. Silver is also good. So these slimes are collected and [up to a few months 
prior to the conversation when most of the mine operations shut down and went on care 
and maintenance] we used to work on them but I think [now they] are just selling them 
 
71 Alfred H Knit Metallurgy Department Report No. 4 to the Mine Safety Department. The report does not 
say what these safety concerns were. Presumably they were worried about the safety of the testers. 
72 Interview with Kennedy, Mopani insider, 2016. 
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directly [as slimes]”.73 Processing slimes may be the reason Mopani’s original 2002 EIA 
includes using—and dumping in the river—cyanide. 
Because historically the smelter has been the main air polluter in Mufulira, and 
because senta is what most outsiders associate with pollution, the simple story that the 
acid plants must have “ended” environmental abuses remains credible to the broader 
public and government regulators. By leaving aside a discussion of the raw volume of 
SO2 going into the air, Mopani is able to direct the conversation away from how much 
SO2 is still emitted. What really matters regarding emissions is absolute quantity over 
time and spikes that lead to acute respiratory issues and environmental harm. This 
determines potential health ramifications, not percentages based on shifting production 
levels. Mopani is thus able to appear both precise and certain about the SO2 capture—
97% is a specific number that engenders confidence—to seem well-regulated, while 
simultaneously making ambiguous the connections between their emissions and human 
and environmental health. 
Pollution (Mis)Counted 
 
In Butondo, the number also performs. Mopani claims they do not pollute above 
the allowable limit of less than one microgram per cubic meter of air. Throughout 
stakeholder meetings and in the media, Mopani claims this is an “international standard”, 
giving them an aura of global legitimacy for their operations. The standard did originally 
come from the USA’s EPA—but nobody mentions that this was a standard for 
 
73 Interview with anonymous Mopani insider, 2016. 
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occupational exposure74 given a 10-hour workday and was not, in the USA, a standard for 
emissions into residential neighborhoods. Kaoma himself laughed at these standards, 
saying that for the heap leach project, Mopani was trying to get “within the limits, the 
Zambian limits—not the international [limits] for that one [laugh].”75  
All documentation I saw from ZEMA (shown but not given) was just scores of 
‘less than 1’ numbers, not ever specific enough to distinguish between amounts, but with 
the clear implication that their heap leach was operating so much below the limits that 
there were no times they even accidentally exceeded them. Regulators such as ZEMA 
and MSD lack equipment to verify their self-reported data.76 Kaoma, a Mopani insider, 
says “I don't think you get away with that kind of stuff in America but anyway in 
Zambia, you know. And it wasn't independently verified, [it is] the mines’ own [data]. So 
it wasn't a consultant, it wasn't ZEMA that set up their monitoring systems. Not Alfred 
Knight77.”78  
Further, the only source for “unbiased” data continues to be ZEMA, despite their 
data being derived from Mopani’s self-reported data. Most people in the government I 
talked to simply said they had no other data and had to take Mopani at its word, because 
those were the only unbiased numbers they had. Other government representatives, like 
 
74 In other words, this was also a standard that applies to limited (10 hour) exposure by healthy adult 
workers, not children, the elderly, or otherwise vulnerable. 
75 Kaoma, Mopani insider, 2016. This conversation continues: [Me: So, if they were trying to get within the 
limits, it must mean at one point they were not always within them] You could say that. They weren't. They 
were completely exceeding it. [Me: do you have data to show that?] I do have data...”  
76 While I was there ZEMA said they had acquired air testing equipment but that it was broken down. 
77 Alfred Knight is an international laboratory that provides inspection and testing services. 
78 Interview with Kaoma, Mopani insider, 2016. 
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Kalenga, kept referring back to the simple stories, and even mixing them up. I had to 
remind him multiple times, for example, that the acid mist was not senta, even though he 
was personally involved in managing the acid mist affair as a local government 
representative. It was clear through our interview79 that the mix-ups were to confuse me, 
not out of his own confusion. This reliance on self-reported data and simple fictions 
comes despite community complaints or even their own suspicions. Seeing pages and 
pages of data from Mopani, I too wondered at times if they were under the limit, but that 
the limits were not appropriate and should be drastically lowered. 
Yet after months in Zambia, I began making more serendipitous connections with 
Mopani insiders. These connections led to more interviews with people directly 
knowledgeable about Mopani’s monitoring of the heap leach operation. I was shown (but 
not given) internal Mopani reports demonstrating that high-level managers within 
Mopani knew that the heap leach operation was emitting acid mist far exceeding this 
national limit— 3-hour averages up to 8 times higher—without reporting this to ZEMA. 
ZEMA, it appears, is unaware that Mopani exceeds these limits. Several Mopani insiders 
showed me internal data proving they exceed the standard of less than one microgram per 
cubic meter of air. One agreed to discuss specifics in an interview on tape: 
[Mopani] claim that they’ve been monitoring the acid mist and they claim 
that they haven’t been going beyond the limit… that’s what they’ve been 
reporting in their annual reports. [But yet] even in 2012 [after they switched 
to drip irrigation] there are figures over one [… My bosses] kept saying 
‘you can’t publish this information because we have been telling the 
regulators that we are below the limit.’ One [of my bosses] said, ‘if you 
 
79 Musosha, my research assistant, was with me during this interview and our whole hour-long car ride 
back to Kitwe we talked about how evasive and purposefully confusing Kalenga was. 
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publish this information, you will actually take me to prison because we 
have been reporting that we are within the limit.’” 80  
 
Soko then showed me email correspondence to verify this. While he wouldn’t give me 
the documentation itself, we poured over some of this raw data together. Pointing to a 
chart, he continued: 
3.4181… [and now] this is a three-hour average. 6.26. These [pointing] are 
the times of day. From 19-22 [from 7pm to 10pm] it was 6.26 average in 
2012. [Notice the time] because the people claim that they release a lot of it 
in the night. [‘19, 7pm, is a little early,’ I say.] Yea, people are still awake. 
So yea, they still release over the limit. This [pointing] is 2013. It does get 
better but it is still over the limit. So you see [here, pointing] they are still 
above. And these are average concentrations [there are times they do not 
spray] and the minimums are 0.0, so, yea [the maximum amounts would be 
much higher]. That’s 2014. Here you can see 2014 data… 
 
It too shows exceedance. When I asked Kaoma, who had recounted similar events, if 
Mopani knew they were exceeding limits while they were doing so, or if they just found 
out years after the fact while re-analyzing their data, he laughs: “Yea, they knew [laughs] 
of course they knew.”82 Keep this in mind when you read chapter 7. 
 I asked Soko how the monitoring equipment that Mopani purchased the 
community, the Dräger X-Act 5000, was also reading lower than the national limits. He 
said,  
The equipment that they got and gave to the community is not... they [must 
have] tampered with it. Because it always just shows below. The community 
certainly think they have tampered it. At one point they stopped monitoring. 
They were so upset that they stopped. They were like ‘these people are 
 
80 Alfred H Knight Metallurgy Department Report No. 4 to the Mine Safety Department. 
81 The limit is 1 mg/m3, which is also .1 g/m3. 
82 Kaoma, Mopani insider, 2016. 
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playing with our minds because they gave us this thing, and it shows the 
same figures all the time.’ It doesn't show anything. 
 
Mopani may not have had to tamper with it, however. Looking into the equipment 
myself, it appears the Dräger X-Act 5000 does not even test for acid mist of this kind. 
The Dräger handbook for the device says this tube pump is for “gas detection” and works 
for gases, vapors, and aerosols (they specify “the word vapor is used to describe the 
gaseous state of a material below its boiling point” and define aerosols as a dissolved 
liquid). Significantly, the device handbook never says it can monitor for droplets of 
sulfuric acid that come out of a sprinkler system. Keep this, too, in mind when you read 
chapter 7. The apparatus at work. 
While the government might not have known exactly what ‘the numbers’ were, 
they have been aware for years of the debilitating health impacts of the acid mist on 
residents. A government report written by the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit 
under Vice President Guy Scott was leaked to me (see Appendix B) as it remains 
confidential and has not been given to residents, NGOs, advocacy organizations, or the 
local government. This report showed short- and medium-term health impacts of the 
Butondo resident’s exposure to acid mist, including infections, vision loss, and 
respiratory issues. Yet during my interviews with people who worked on the DMMU 
report or the few people who I knew had access to it, I was instead told that the report “is 
not important”. 83 Kalenga claimed “the funny thing is the people in the control area had 
more serious ailments than the people in Kankoyo”.84 This is not true (see the DMMU 
 
83 Interview with Kalenga, government leader, 2016. 
84 Interview with Kalenga, government leader, 2016. 
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report in the Appendix). In this interview I pushed the point, incredulous because 
(unbeknownst to Kalenga) I had already acquired the report. Kalenga shifted in his seat, 
“Everyone in business will not give you the true picture. Because it’s like ‘I’m in 
business, if I give you the true picture I maybe would lose out. So I have to be very 
tactical as I give out the information.’ So, I don’t know. But a person who is in business 
is a tricky person. You never know. But you cannot bite the finger that feeds you.”85 The 




The final stage of the apparatus is to silence all other accounts, as Stengers says, 
to represent Simplicio as ridiculous and ignorant. Mopani does this through appealing to 
their international, or global, connections—saying they work with experts—and 
excluding all others. They use “internationally certified labs”86 for testing, international 
consultants for their reports, and fly their employees to trainings around the world.  
Mopani often advertises that their technology is first world. Their new smelter, 
the Isasmelt, was built and developed in Australia, giving it a ‘first-world’ shine. Yet they 
never acknowledge that the Mount Isa smelter outside of Perth has long had issues with 
the Australian government (and was almost shut down) due to its poor environmental 
performance—in particular the amount of lead the smelter released into the air. The 
smelter (in 2006, when it was put into Zambia) polluted too much for Australian air 
 
85 Interview with Kalenga, government leader, 2016. 
86 Interview with Emmanuel and Miza, Zambian researchers, 2016. Researchers using their own equipment 
to test the air, water, or soil can’t compete, they say. 
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quality standards—but when brought to Zambia was considered “first world” technology 
implying it was state-of-the-art and must be meeting “international standards”.87 They 
argue in situ leaching is an “international technique also used in the United States” (it is, 
but underlying geology matters significantly in how environmentally risky the process 
is), and that heap leaching is used all over the world (it is, though doubtfully mere meters 
away from an urban residential neighborhood). 
These international connections and expertise are often cited as reasons Mopani 
should continue to be able to self-regulate and self-report their environmental data. One 
insider of both the mine and a government regulatory body (just like in the US there is 
often a revolving door at the highest levels) argued that self-reported data was better 
because in Zambia mining companies “are more knowledgeable than regulators in the 
government”.88 Why? Ostensibly because they have connections to international 
expertise and the international legitimacy that come through a multinational company.  
When viewed as a threat to the apparatus, Zambian researchers (including those 
who work at the University of Zambia or the Copperbelt University) are often prevented 
from publishing by Mopani (if, say, Mopani funded their research as is often the case) or 
government institutions like the Ministry of Mines, who often ask to review results89 of 
environmental research prior to publication. Several researchers confirmed to me that 
they are sitting on “explosive” data they are unable to publish, on such topics as heavy 
 
87 Interview with Kennedy, Mopani insider, 2016. 
88 Interview with Phiri, insider with both the mining industry and ZEMA, 2016. 
89 The impression I got was that because government is paying their salaries, when a government institution 
such as the Ministry of Mines, MSD, or ZEMA asks to review their results they feel it is effectively 
obligated even if it is not codified in law. 
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metals being emitted into the air in Mufulira, water contamination as a result of mining 
activity throughout the Copperbelt, and the presence of radioactivity in nearby streams.90 
Outside academics who do come into Zambia and publish articles on the environmental 
impacts of mining are dismissed as “biased”.91 For example, Alistair Fraser and John 
Lungu’s publication “For Whom the Wind Falls” (Fraser and Lungu, 2013) resulted in 
severe retaliation towards researchers from the mining industry, with Mopani taking out 
full page ads disputing their findings. When I requested meetings with Mopani’s CEO, he 
cited their work as his reason for not granting an interview. 
Other outsiders who are labelled as biased by Mopani include foreign reporters 
and non-governmental organizations. For example, two feature-length documentaries, 
Good Copper, Bad Copper and Stealing Africa, illustrate the severity of pollution 
residents face in Kankoyo and Butondo. However, the producers have been smeared as 
biased and self-interested. People who work in the mining industry, for example, will say 
that these reporters “have their own interest in saying there is pollution” in Mufulira. 92 In 
the government, inspectors claim they cannot use this information because they are “not 
sure it is accurate”—even when they do not have similar qualms about using Mopani’s 
self-reported data.93 
When speaking to people in Zambia knowledgeable about environmental law, 
experts told me information from these types of sources—media and scholarly—are not 
 
90 Interview with Emmanuel and Miza, Zambian researchers, 2016. 
91 Interview with Phiri, insider with both the mining industry and ZEMA, 2016. 
92 Interview, Oscar Monge, national government, June 2016. 
93 Interview with Mberi, ZEMA, 2016. 
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admissible in court because certain chain-of-evidence procedures have not been followed. 
These procedures include notifying the company and government of the exact day, time, 
and location of sampling and having representatives of the mine and government come 
along to sign off on any samples taken.94 Residents and scholars alike suspect that this 
notification process allows partial shut-downs of processes that emit large amounts of 
pollution. These logistical constraints prevent anyone from taking a sample during short 
periods of significantly higher emissions (intense emissions lasting for just a few hours 
are quite common. Mopani representatives often argue these are due to a pipe or pump 
breaking). The regulatory apparatus at work. 
* * * 
 There was also, however, an exception to the stability period within the 
Development Agreement: if there is pollution that poses “a material danger to public 
health or safety or may result in significant damage to the ecology of the area which was 
not contemplated in the original Environmental Plan” then the government “may 
propose” an amendment (GRZ, 2000). For this exception, residents in Kankoyo would 
have to prove that current emissions from the new smelter, refinery, and acid plants are 
both new and significantly harmful enough to cause a danger to their health. After this, 
without access to the EMP, they would have to prove that it did not account for things 
like stronger offgases or accidental breakdowns, leaks, or fugitive fumes from Mopani’s 
operations. And finally, they would have to convince the government to “propose” an 
amendment to the agreement. This would risk alienating international investors and 
 
94 Interview with Nyimba, Zambian lawyer, 2016. 
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Mopani, which has supported the PF in elections. In addition to all of this—and even 
after the stability period elapses—residents in Kankoyo also face the challenge of 
needing to prove when specific polluting events occur and their specific, quantifiable 
impacts on their health or livelihood—a quite impossible task in the case of chronic 
effects such as respiratory illness, asthma, or cancers. In the meantime, they must wait. 
Only a year after the second acid plant was completed Mopani went on “care and 
maintenance” for 18 months, laying off most of their workers and decreasing production 
to around 10%. It was a national scandal—the shutdown happened just days after 
President Lungu met with the CEO to urge them to keep the mine open. While officially 
Mopani cited copper prices as their reason for the closure, no other large mine in Zambia 
has shut down during this time. Rumors are that part of the reason for the shutdown was 
because the environmental indemnity agreements were running out. 15 years was up in 
April; Mopani was processing minimal amounts of copper by September. Initially, as the 
rumors go, Mopani did not think the copper reserves would outlast the stability period, so 
the mine would be decommissioned during the stability period. Their goal was then to 
extract as much copper as possible while they were still not liable for any pollution—
without much attention to eventually operating within the national environmental 
standards. They may have realized that even with 97% conversion efficiencies via the 
acid plants their emissions well exceeded the standards. With the sinking of the new 
“deep shaft”, rumor has it, they could eventually be held liable for pollution and need to 
actually upgrade their process.  
This chapter raises several substantial questions: How does Mopani use ambiguity 
to project an expertise, transparency, and truthfulness that actually enables them to avoid 
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liability for hazardous levels of pollution from their smelter, refinery, and leaching 
processes? What does it mean that legal systems are set up to respond to certain types of 
facts from certain reputable sources—but this favors companies circumventing 
regulations? And finally, is the appropriate response to this really more facts? 
Here we see something different from other studies of agnotology and abstraction. 
Rather than continually relying on creating uncertainty and doubt, Mopani produces 
certainty through enumeration and simple stories: they are under 1.0 mg/m3; they 
upgraded their equipment; they capture 97%. But these numbers themselves are 
ambiguous and mean little in terms of what matters for people’s health. Departing from 
Stengers, this chapter shows how the apparatus operates not only through the authority of 
























Chapter 4: “We have even stopped waiting”: Life amidst toxicity in 
Mufulira and Kabwe, Zambia 
 
 
Estragon: Nothing to be done. 
Vladimir: I'm beginning to come round to that opinion. All my life I've tried to put it from me, saying 
Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven't yet tried everything. And I resumed the struggle. 








Let that percentage sit with you for a minute. Wait with it. 
 
0.0012% is the percentage of estimated profits from Mopani’s in situ leaching2 that alone 
would cover the estimated $1.58 million USD to move and compensate all affected 
residents in Butondo.  
 
 
1 It is hard to know Mopani’s overall profits because Mopani has been embroiled in tax evasion lawsuits 
and investigations due to their rampant use of transfer pricing (selling copper at a lower price or even a loss 
to another company owned by the parent, Glencore), thus concealing profits. In Mopani’s Environmental 
Project Brief for the second stage of their in situ leach project, they estimate “the project ore resource 
contains about 700,000 tonnes of copper, and assuming a leaching recovery of 45%, this translates into a 
potential copper recovery of 315,000 tonnes” over their project life of 20 years. Elsewhere in the EPB they 
claim, “the implementation of this project will cost in excess of US$12 million dollars and the annual 
operating cost will be about US$15 million dollars.” Costs, therefore are estimated at $312 million USD for 
the entire 20-year project. At copper selling for 2.58 USD/lb (an estimate based on current value) this 
would result in income of 1,625,400,000 USD and a total profit of $1,313,400,000 USD. 
2 Figures were not available for the profitability of their heap leaching operation. Given the widespread 
notion that it is an extremely economically efficient way to process ore, this seemed like an apt comparison. 
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The Zambian government, in the DMMU report, completed their survey and officially 
recommended free health care and relocation due to the severity of health impacts caused 
by acid mist in Butondo. This report has never been released: 
Since more health effects associated with acid mist were experienced in 
Butondo than Kansuswa and measures to reduce the acid emissions to 
acceptable levels have not been fully implemented, we recommend that the 
houses be demolished and the residents be relocated to an area away from 
the acid leach plant. This is in order to reduce the exposure and other 
impacts.  
 
This recommendation has been broken down further: 
 
• All the affected households… should be allowed to seek free medical 
care… 
• The households who own the 169 housing unites should be 
compensated… the total cost for compensation is K7,915,000,000 [just 
over $1.5 million USD3] 
• …households who rent…should be compensated…K124,786,000 
[$24,500 USD] 
• The Police Camp should be relocated to another area…4 
 
 
Drawered, not shelved. 
 
That word should strike us; it is an act of biopolitical violence. To be put in a drawer. 
Sickened. Weakened. Killed. Slowly and with action. The closing of a drawer. 
 
* * * 
 
3 Kwacha to dollar at the time was ~5,100 ZMK :1USD 
4 DMMU-Office of the Vice President and MoH, 2012. “Report on the acid mist assessment in Butondo 
Township in Mufulira District” p. 50. 
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Worldwide, mining pollution is an ordinary catastrophe. When severe, water 
contamination, air pollution, and soil toxicity have resulted in environmental movements, 
mass protests, calls for decontamination, or outright abandonment of homes. Prioritizing 
movement and action, many social scientists and geographers have focused their analyses 
on such “violent environments” and eventful responses that cause change (Peluso and 
Watts 2001). Yet sometimes, people are “let”5 to wait and the violence is quite “slow” 
(Berlant 2007; Nixon 2011). Closer examinations of lived experiences with toxicity, 
pollution, and other forms of slow, mundane, and bureaucratic violence, have challenged 
this trend of social science to focus on ‘events’ (Auyero 2012; Auyero and Swistun 2009; 
Gupta 2012; Nixon 2011; Povinelli 2011). As Rob Nixon argues about “slowly unfolding 
environmental catastrophes”, these narratives are not only “a contest not only over space, 
or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time” (2011:7-8). Scholars have argued 
waiting (Auyero 2012; Gupta 2012), endurance (Povinelli 2011) and slow death (Berlant 
2011) manifest the experience of domination in the everyday lives of the afflicted—a way 
of ‘letting die’ as ‘letting wait’. 
 In Zambia, in the face of unrelenting toxicity, residents wait. They do not wait 
expectantly (Ferguson 1999). Or hopefully (Oldfield and Greyling 2015). And they 
certainly do not wait patiently (Auyero 2012). There is a Sisyphean element to waiting 
here. Theirs is a furious and active waiting: one of continuous attempts at community 
 
5 Povinelli (2011) takes up Foucault to examine how governments “let [their citizens] die.” It is in this vein 
that I say people are ‘let’ to wait—of course, this waiting is forced, and indirectly through inaction rather 
than action. 
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mobilization, media involvement, pleas to legal and political players for help, and riots. 
Prosper, a member of the Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group said “we wait” when talking 
about her everyday experience of toxicity from Mopani’s smelter, but later insists “we are 
not waiting, we are furious” when describing her community’s actions and temper.6 Years 
of living in toxicity demonstrates that in this instance, waiting is not merely happening 
and it is not of the residents’ choosing; making residents wait is an act of domination by 
mining companies and the government over citizens. 
Despite all of their action, residents are reluctant to assume—or even hope for—
change. They are waiting not because they aren’t doing anything or because they expect 
something else, but because they are daily contending with ongoing contamination. 
Cleanup is postponed, smelter and refinery updates arguably make air pollution worse, 
and new leaching methods continue to threaten. While some may question whether 
actions belie their expectations (why would they act if they expected no change?), I argue 
this is an intrinsic part of how ongoing toxicity is experienced here: it is fought and yet it 
is lived in. 
There is a despair, too, in waiting without expectation. The ceaseless toxicity 
leaves residents feeling dehumanized—“It’s like they view us as wild animals and not 
humans”.7 Here, you wait because that is what you have to do: you act, you despair, and 
you wait. In this interlude, I examine the lived experience of waiting because skipping 
from how companies and the government manufacture ignorance directly to residents’ 
embodied knowledge ignores the everyday experiences of people waiting and living 
 
6 Focus Group with the Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
7 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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amidst toxicity—the endurance, exhaustion, and slow violence that comes from constant 
encounters with contamination.  
Waiting, redefined 
 
Leaving aside literature on pauses in urban rhythm (Simone 2008; Sharma 2014), 
this chapter focuses on three aspects of waiting. First, I discuss theories of what waiting 
is, focusing on claims that forcing people to wait is a form of control and domination. 
Second, I engage with ethnographies that eschew focus on events, and instead describe 
the slow happenings of everyday life. Finally, I briefly consider literature about what 
waiting can do, or produce. Through all of this, I contend waiting itself—why it happens; 
the experience of it; and its effects—matters. I intervene by redefining waiting, showing 
how in this instance it is full of activity and fury rather than passivity.  
First, scholars have interrogated waiting as a manifestation of domination and 
power (Verdery 1996). Verdery explores the politics of waiting, time, and the state in 
Romania under the socialist Ceausescu regime. Time, for her, is a “political process” 
because the state will “seize time” to cement their power (1996:82). For example, when 
rural workers were able to garden with their ‘idle time’, the state seized their produce, 
seizing even the physical manifestations of idle time. In other instances, the state forced 
people to wait—for bread, for travel—to strategically prevent people from making uses 
of time that could undermine the state. For Verdery, waiting is significant because of its 
consequences: it disrupts people’s social lives, reworks the economy, and shifts peoples’ 
sense of self. Unpredictability further immobilizes anti-state dissenters, limiting their 
participation to only the most “flexible and spontaneous” of activities (ibid:86).  
Verdery’s work has been generative for this chapter, because pollution (the 
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mechanism through which the state and company acts in this instance) also organizes 
people’s daily lives—creating the need to do certain activities at certain times and the 
inability to do anything at all at seemingly random moments. I also build from Verdery’s 
conceptualizing of waiting as both being produced (by, in her case, the state8) and also as 
producing outcomes—some of which is intended and forms of resistance that is not.  
Others, too, have examined waiting qua state power. In analyzing Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank, Joronen argues that the state uses “waiting as a means to 
govern and colonize” (2017:996). Joronen examines “the power of waiting—the force 
hidden within the ability to ‘steal time’” (ibid:995) by asking “how and through what 
techniques and configurations waiting itself can operate as a way of governing” 
(ibid:995). Forcing people to wait for things like permits, protection, or security claims, 
he argues, maintains people’s precarious situations. Sophie Oldfield and Saskia Greyling 
similarly reflect on waiting and precarity. They argue the experience of waiting for state-
sponsored affordable housing shapes citizenship in South Africa in ways that both 
“highlight the centrality of the state” (because of how the period of active waiting centers 
people’s lives around state bureaucracy) and also reveal the informal, ‘gray’ zones that 
are contentious and illegal (such as living in informal areas or backyards while waiting 
for the state) (Oldfield and Greyling 2015:1101). Waiting has a “micropolitics” (ibid). A 
politics of being in limbo. It produces meaning because it yields the time for encounter. 
 
8 This interlude departs from Verdery’s work because of her analytical focus on socialist, authoritarian 
states and interrogating modes of production and socialist politico-economic forms of power. While this 
absolute domination over every aspect of everyday life may be peculiar to authoritarian regimes or places 




Explicitly considering toxicity, the politics of time becomes not about production 
rhythms, scarcity, or bureaucratic lines—but ill health and immobilization. Just as forcing 
people to wait in a bureaucrat’s office seizes people’s opportunities to act in other ways 
and constrains possibilities for resistance, so does the debility produced through life in 
toxic environments. Waiting is the daily experience of “slow death”, which Lauren 
Berlant defines as the “physical wearing out of a population and the[ir] deterioration” 
(ibid:754) and which Puar reframes as “the debilitating ongoingness of structural 
inequality and suffering” (2017:30). Povinelli calls this endurance the “substance of 
being”, when one “suffer[s] and yet persist[s]” (2011:30-32). Each locate this 
phenomenon in the context of late capitalism, and examine less direct forms of slow 
violence than this chapter does, but the generative idea remains. 
In Flammable, Auyero and Swistun relay the accounts of residents living amidst 
toxicity in a Buenos Aires neighborhood contaminated from petrochemical companies 
and other industry. Flammable, they argue, is a “story of a people’s confusion, mistakes, 
and/or blindness regarding the toxicity that surrounds them [and] a story of silent 
habituation to contamination and of almost complete absence of mass protest against 
toxic onslaught” (Auyero and Swistun 2009:4). But they appear at times to place blame 
for this ‘complete absence of mass protest’ on the ignorance9 of residents to their 
conditions, implying both that a mass protest could effect change10 and that waiting is of 
 
9 However, Auyero and Swistun tend to oscillate between detailing the knowledge residents do have and 
arguing that their confusion, misunderstanding, and ignorance is resulting in their inaction. I do not take up 
their argument that waiting comes from ignorance.  
10 In their introduction they have a good overview of literature leading to the expectation that one would 
expect mass protests because of the severity of contamination here. It appears scholars are split between 
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residents’ own doing. It is: 
confusions, bewilderments, divisions, rumors, frustrations, and hopes [that] 
are making Flammable residents wait—they wait for more testing, for 
further and better knowledge, for relocation, and for the ‘huge’ settlement 
with one of the ‘powerful companies’ that will, in the words of a neighbor, 
‘allow us to move out.’ (ibid:6). 
 
By the time he writes Patients of the State, Auyero has reconsidered his position on why 
residents wait. Here, he investigates waiting as an experience of domination, an “exercise 
of power” (2012:18). Most of the book deals with waiting for bureaucratic or economic 
reasons (such as waiting at a welfare office for benefits), examining how the state 
‘makes’ citizens into patients. He argues that while many see waiting as something 
intrinsic to being poor, “waiting is neither a trait of their character nor something they 
“value” because they have a different appreciation of time, as a “culture of poverty” type 
of argument would have it; rather, it is a product of a successful strategy of domination” 
(ibid:15). He further argues that by forcing people to wait, the state “(re)creates 
subordination … by producing uncertainty and arbitrariness… To put it bluntly, everyday 
political domination is what happens when nothing apparently happens, when people 
‘just wait.’” (ibid:19).  
In his last chapter, Auyero follows up on his and Swistun’s 2009 study of 
Flammable, finding “nothing has happened. Neighbors are still living, suffering, and 
dying” (ibid:132). He examines “waiting in the midst of toxic assault” given how the “the 
sluggish reactions of courts and state officials impose an endless waiting time on weak, 
 
those who argue protests should be an inevitable outcome (Auyero and Swistun, for example) and those 
who do not (Nixon, for example). 
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sick, and powerless residents” (ibid:133). Part of the experience of waiting in Flammable 
is that despite attempts and actions by residents, “outcomes” are determined elsewhere 
(ibid:135). Through a series of vignettes, Auyero argues that “politics … seems to 
permeate their understandings of the causes and possible solutions to their everyday 
problems. Politics, in other words, is perceived as the source of the injustice, unfairness, 
and arbitrariness that pervades their everyday life” (ibid:152). Flammable is a space of 
contamination, delayed response, and suspicion, as neighbors suspect that “the company 
buys [everybody’s] silence” (ibid:131). Through this ethnography, Auyero finds that  
waiting and politics are lived as profoundly disempowering processes. 
These two lived experiences tend to reinforce each other, generating the 
shared perception that the motor or the initiative of transformative action 
lies elsewhere… most people who we talked to do not see themselves as 
agents capable of modifying their own conditions of [highly polluted] 
existence (ibid:135).  
 
My analysis departs from Auyero’s because I see waiting as active and furious, as well as 
dehumanizing and debilitating. People may not expect they hold the political power to 
improve their conditions, but they are intent on trying. 
A much smaller and emergent strain of theory attempts to see waiting as useful—
maybe at times even strategic. In a presentation to the Association of American 
Geographers on urbanism in Jakarta, Abdou Maliq Simone argued that “the act of waiting 
exceeds being a passive stance, and rather is a process of ‘setting traps’ and opening up 
spaces of maneuver” (2017). He examined whether waiting could be something 
purposeful that residents would do in order to set themselves up for success. In Simone’s 
previous work on African urbanism (2004) he views the city as a continual space of 
movement and action, with things constantly happening that cannot always be accounted 
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for, and short-term collaborations that make cities “work” (ibid:1). While this interlude 
does not go so far as to claim waiting is strategic, or even desired, I remain open to the 
possibility for waiting as a time-space that holds within itself the kernel for a radical 
politics to sprout. 
Further, in Craig Jeffrey’s editorial on chronic waiting11, he examines how the 
politics of waiting is both repressive and has the potential to “engender creative political 
engagement” (2008:957). His analysis follows Jean-Francois Bayart's (2007) argument 
that waiting has “become central to the subaltern experience” and connected to economic 
liberalization and political globalization. Chronic waiting leads to anxiety, grief, and 
angst; feelings of being trapped, in suspense, marooned; and being in a state of crisis 
(ibid:955-956)—this appears to parallel Mufulira and Kabwe, where waiting brings forth 
a type of existential despair and feelings of dehumanization. But Jeffrey argues that while 
waiting is often characterized by pessimism, it may generate a politics that “challenge[s] 
aspects of entrenched privilege and social injustice” (ibid:957). Through his work in 
north India, Jeffrey concludes that waiting is about “forg[ing] new political strategies, in 
which time and space often become the objects of reflection, and in which historical 
inequalities manifest themselves in new ways” (ibid:957). Rather than viewing waiting 
only as an effect—something that is forced on people, or something that people allow to 
happen to them—waiting is also productive, it produces strategies and opportunities.  
Finally, while Povinelli (2011:132) does not specifically use the term waiting, she 
defines quasi-events as when “something but nothing has happened” and yet “exhaustion 
 
11 He defines “chronic waiting” as “waiting for years or whole lifetimes” (Jeffreys 2008:954). 
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is the effect”. She argues quasi-events demand endurance and produce an unending 
exhaustion. In the second chapter I focused on how quasi-events came into quasi-being 
through the manufacturing of ignorance. In this interlude I take up Povinelli’s claim that 
quasi-events hold within themselves the potential for radical reimagining. She argues 
“quasi-events are where the struggle to maintain an alternative social world [away from a 
world of individualizing risk] is at its deepest if also its most tenuous and subtle” 
(ibid:154). I examine waiting one instance of quasi-being, and a time during which 
residents may, however tenuously and subtly, start to imagine a counter-knowledge that 
can upend the abstract regulatory apparatuses investigated in chapter 3.  
The last two chapters of the dissertation take up this embodied knowledge as a 
potentially subversive minoritarian narrative—in the meantime, this chapter observes 
what it means to wait: how is the domination of mine companies and government 
experienced in everyday life? It is simultaneously active, furious, and dehumanizing. And 




This chapter focuses on residents waiting amidst toxicity in Mufulira and Kabwe. 
In Mufulira, the toxicities I focus on here are: air pollution in Kankoyo; the acid mist in 
Butondo; and the supply of industrial water to both Townships as their domestic drinking 
water. In Kabwe, I focus on the everyday experience of lead contamination resulting 
from the almost 100 years of lead mining by colonial and then national regimes. 
As the only new environmental issue for this chapter, I present a brief overview of 
water quality in Kankoyo and Butondo in the context of Mopani’s “in situ leaching” 
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(ISL). In Mufulira’s former African mining townships the domestic water supplied 
through their taps is actually Mopani’s industrial de-watering water. Zambia’s mines are 
wet mines, meaning a large amount of water needs to be pumped out of the mined area in 
order for the underground shafts to not be continually flooded. Historically, because these 
Townships were constructed by the company to house workers, they built their own water 
supply network and used excess de-watering water as the domestic water for African 
workers.12 While this water has not been used in an extraction process, it is considered 
‘industrial’ water because it could contain oils, chemicals, heavy metals, and acids.13  
 During privatization the local government,14 and later the parastatal water supply 
company Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company (MWSC), took over water 
management for the former mining Townships. While Mulonga uses other sources for 
wealthier Townships, at the time of research (2016) they still used Mopani’s industrial 
water for former African mineworker Townships including Kankoyo and Butondo.15 
 
12 Beer before water? Copperbelt cities used the ‘Durban System’ to supply communal water taps to 
townships for Africans who did not work in the mines. This meant a beer hall was built and run by 
companies prior to any water infrastructure. Only after making profits from beer would social 
infrastructure, including water taps, be added. Mutale recounts one self-employed carpenter who said, “the 
municipals say that they will build us a big beer hall. If we drink beer to give profits than one day there will 
be water supplied to us in taps. How much beer must I drink before my children can drink water? Do other 
countries make poor people drink beer to collect money for water? (Mutale 2004:42 citing an interview in 
Hall 1964:135). 
13 During my visit underground in one of Mopani’s mine shafts, I saw this de-watering water pool 
underground, shocked that it was about to be pumped to the surface for residents to drink. I obviously could 
not do any water quality tests on this water, but from general appearance and smell, it was certainly not a 
pure water source. Discussions with Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company (MWSC) confirms this. 
14 The first step of privatizing the mines was to separate out the ‘mining’ activity from the other services 
that ZCCM provided, such as water, healthcare, and education. So, part of privatizing was actually having 
the local government take over these services. 
15 It is unclear legally whether when there is a spill, acid leak, chemical leak, or other contamination, the 
water utility company is responsible for purification—even though they only have the equipment to do 
basic water cleanup, not industrial cleanup—or Mopani is, because they caused the contamination.  
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While senta and acid mist tops the discussions residents have with outsiders about their 
polluted environments, water was not far behind. Residents claim tap water is of poor 
quality, due at minimum to high sulfate levels, hardness, seepage of sewerage, ‘slag’ in 
the water, and the presence of acid.16 Residents report being unable to cook beans in the 
tap water and claim they know the water is mixed with acid because the water will curdle 
the milk in their tea. 
This use of de-watering water for domestic purposes was made more serious when 
Mopani began in situ leaching in the mid 2000s.17 In situ leaching is an extraction method 
whereby acidic leachate is poured directly into the ground (Hiskey 1994). The solution 
permeates through layers of ore and becomes ‘pregnant’ with copper—similar to heap 
leaching, without the heaps, crushed up ore, or tarps lining the bottom of the heap. This 
pregnant solution is then collected via pumps at some level underground, with the rest of 
the waste being left behind in the ground. Usually in situ leaching is performed only in 
places that meet specific geological conditions,18 including not being near a water table or 
aquifer, areas that are surrounded by impermeable rock, and underground pressure 
systems that direct the leachate towards the pumps, thus preventing chemicals, acids, and 
the pregnant solution from escaping. 
Mopani does not appear to be following these norms. They are in situ leaching in 
 
16 They also discussed it being contaminated with sewage due to corroded supply/sewage pipes, though this 
is out of the scope for this dissertation.  
17 I corroborated these reports from several sources, but Mopani would not officially comment. 
18 This was explained to me during my pre-dissertation research in 2014 when I went to tour the First 
Quantum Kansanshi copper/gold mine in NorthWestern Province. The environmental engineer I spoke to 




unstable areas, including areas with old, former mine shafts are too dangerous to be 
mined by humans (for example, there was a huge mining disaster in the 1970s where a 
tailings dam failure filled up the mine shafts with sludge, drowning hundreds of workers). 
Mopani is now shaft mining underneath these old shafts, and in situ leaching above 
operating shafts.19 Mineworkers interviewed in a documentary Good Copper, Bad 
Copper (Odiot et al. 2012) reported walking in inches of acidic water. If true, it would 
also corroborate the claim that Mopani is injecting leachate above the shafts. It would 
also mean that the ISL pumps Mopani claims are capturing all of the sulfuric acid and 
pregnant solution, are, indeed, not doing so. Any leachate or pregnant solution that 
escapes the pumps is also infiltrating not only the shafts further down but also the 
industrial de-watering water supplied to residents for drinking, cooking, and bathing.  
Mass incidents of hospitalizations in 2006 and 2008 due to a “pump failure” within 
Mopani’s ISL operation (BBC 2008), along with repeated cases of acidic water being 
supplied to Mulonga by Mopani20, are further corroboration. When Kaoma, a Mopani 
insider, was pointing me to ISL as a major environmental issue in Mufulira, he recalled 
hearing that Mopani only ever installed one of the three necessary pumps.21 Mopani is 
supposed to neutralize the water by adding lime22—but this of course does not filter out 
anything else, including heavy metals and other industry-related chemicals. 
At Mulonga, Chanda says that they suspect the water to be contaminated with 
 
19 I corroborated these reports from several sources, but Mopani would not officially comment. 
20 Interview with Chanda, Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company, 2016. 
21 Interview with Kaoma, Mopani insider, 2016. 
22 That is what I heard. If true it would mean that powers that be are aware of potential cross-
contamination. 
 129 
more than acid because of ISL. However, Mulonga is only set up for water remediation 
from natural sources, not industrial water remediation. After several incidents of residents 
ending up in the hospital, Mulonga has more recently put in place an acid monitor that 
should immediately stop water being supplied to residents when the pH drops. But, 
Chanda admits, this is not fool proof and does not take other contaminates into 
consideration. Mulonga has long-term plans to shift their water acquisition away from 
industrial water because of these issues, but this is likely over a decade away. In the 
meantime, residents must wait. 
* * * 
 Despite their concerns about toxicity, residents I spoke with said they were unable 
to simply move to less contaminated areas. Most residents own their homes23 but there is 
no market in which to sell them. They are saddled with “assets’ that are not worth much. 
Like the mines and water network, mine houses were sold during the privatization 
process, when the Zambian government needed to liberalize their economy in order to 
obtain debt relief through HIPC status. At the time, local governments were being de-
funded, and councils needed money from the sale of houses to maintain functionality. 
This, in addition to the government not wanting to demolish homes during a housing 
crisis, led the local government to sell homes despite known environmental issues. 
Further, because of their homeownership, residents rightly feel entitled to relocation 
rather than simply being given land and permission to build elsewhere. Unable to move24, 
 
23 Because Makululu was an informal Township, residents did not have legal rights to the land, but they 
still built their own houses and said they would have a difficult time selling them due to the informality as 
well as pollution. 
24 Or certainly, if someone were able to move and did, someone else would move in, in their place. 
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 “Have you ever [drunk] water that has been in an old rusty tin?”25 Kapika asked 
me. “That is the way the water here tastes. The water tastes bitter, like it is sour.”26 And, 
adds Prosper, “sometimes when you get the water and let it settle, it will have something 
like slag [in it. ‘Black slag’ I hear in the background]”. 27 They brought a container to 
show me and let it settle over the course of our focus group (see image 21). Mopani, they 
tell me, can’t use this tap water because it is too acidic for their machines.28 The water is 
 
25 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group. 
26 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group. 
27 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group. 
28 Mulonga water verified that Mopani gets its water elsewhere because it needs to be pure. 
Image 21: A container with an unknown substance in the water. Residents wait for the water to settle to separate before 
drinking 
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“not pure,” they say, and dates to the time ZCCM sold the mine (residents could not 
remember exactly when the quality changed, just that it was after Mopani came in. 
Mulonga claimed the quality got substantially worse when Mopani started in situ 
leaching).  
 When the piped water comes for a few hours a day, residents fill containers to wait. 
The slag is easily dealt with; it just takes time to settle. And a bit of courage, residents 
say, to drink it knowing how dirty it was. “We don’t just use the water immediately,” says 
Prosper, “we wait for the water to change color”. 29 In Butondo, the resident Committee 
described the same thing, saying “amenshi yakufwa [the water is deadly]”.30  
 
29 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group. Residents will often boil water, too, though this is 
due to bacterial contaminates 
30 Focus Groupwith Butondo Committee, 2016. 
 
Image 22: Letting water settle and storing it for when needed 
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 Acid in the water is a bigger issue than the slag, they say.31 They call it acid because 
it burns skin, causes rashes, tears clothes, and curdles any milk you might put in tea. It 
also causes stomach issues, and, at times, people are hospitalized from drinking the 
water.32 When there is acid the water must be dumped. Hours spent collecting, letting it 
settle, and boiling it are all to waste.  
 There are periodically official announcements to avoid tap water. “Sometimes when 
the acid is spilt in the water, they’ll announce it. They’ll tell people not to get water and 
use it. And those who have already taken the water, they advise them to go to the 
clinic”.33 Is this common, I asked? “Yes, it is common” says Choma. Kape adds, “usually, 
we might have four or six incidents in a month” when they are warned.34 Sometimes 
warnings are less official. Friends working at Mopani might warn them about a spillage 
that day and then they will warn others, spreading the word.  
 Because of the poor quality of water from taps residents also access water from 
more natural sources. In the rainy season, residents will collect rainwater when Mopani is 
 
31 I am unsure whether everything here is “acid” in its strict scientific sense. My approach to residents’ 
recountings, as I explore in Chapters 6 and 7, is to take their accounts seriously as testimonials about their 
polluted environments. If acid is the most well-known form of pollution, then they may be using this term 
in a catchall manner to describe other types of pollution that are less well known. It should not be presumed 
that because acid is not visible in water that their accounts are not true. 
32 There were several incidents of mass hospitalizations due to Mopani’s in situ leaching pump breaking 
and the residents getting highly acidic water. Mulonga water says their acid monitors now likely prevent 
some of this. Residents say they warn each other about the acid and now have a better idea what 
contaminated water tastes and looks like, so they can avoid drinking and cooking with it. 
33 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
34 This is, not surprisingly, significantly more often than Mopani and Mulonga claim. Mopani says that 
their incidents are limited to the ones in 2006 and 2008 where hundreds were hospitalized. Residents, 
however, say they have learned from these incidents and fewer hospitalizations is because they now work, 
drink, and cook around water quality. 
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not releasing SO2 (“if this sulfur is released and you want to get rainwater to use, you 
cannot get it because the water will be acid”35). Water is also collected from nearby 
streams, such as the Mufulira Stream and the Zimba Stream. This happens when the 
piped water does not come on when expected, or if they want to cook beans (“beans don’t 
cook in our water, they cannot be boiled”36) or, when the piped water has that acidic 
quality and they want to wash themselves or their clothes. Sometimes, even the stream is 
off limits due to pollution. At times “we are prohibited from getting water from there 
because they’ll tell us the water is dirty and that it has acid”, likely because the Mufulira 
Stream is one of the streams in which Mopani dumps liquid effluent.37 Whatever Mopani 
dumps, they say, “it is visible on top of the water, it is a film, like cooking oil”. 38 When 
there have been no official warnings, this is how they know not to use it. Still, everyone 
in my first Kankoyo Focus Group agreed that the water from the stream is better, because 
“water from the tap you cannot drink”.39 
 Life is reordered because of pollution. Plans to wash clothes or bathe change. Some 
days, residents say, their life is structured completely around avoiding and mitigating the 
effects of pollution—staying inside because of the acid mist, delaying washing for the 
water to settle, or walking to the stream because the piped water is acidic enough to burn 
holes through clothing. Another way that the pollution re-orders life is how much time, 
effort, and attention is spent on efforts to protest or hold Mopani to account. 
 
35 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
36 Focus Group with Kankoyo Pressure Group, 2016. 
37 Focus Group with Kankoyo Pressure Group, 2017. 
38 Focus Group with Kankoyo Pressure Group, 2017. 




 In Mufulira, waiting is characterized by action—a Sisyphean action that never 
seems to move things forward. Residents are actively involved in organizing against 
Mopani. In Kankoyo, despite difficulties including high poverty and a more prolonged 
experience with senta and mining pollution, community-based environmental groups 
have formed including a Women’s Pressure Group and the CBO Green and Justice. In 
Butondo, a resident Committee has formed and their complaints have gone far—all the 
way to the Vice President. In both Townships, residents sometimes join with national or 
international NGOs such as Citizens for a Better Environment, ActionAid, Amnesty 
International, and CCJP to fight Mopani Mine.  
 Together, Kankoyo and Butondo residents have met with city councilors, several 
successive District Commissioners, their Member of Parliament, spoken with TV and 
radio journalists, petitioned the police for permission to demonstrate peacefully, reported 
emissions events to ZEMA, directly appealed to Mopani at their headquarters in Kitwe, 
and spoken with environmental lawyers about potential cases. 40 Esther, a Kankoyo 
resident who was not a part of any official environmental CBO, said she feels that in 
Kankoyo they are all constantly waiting, as “even if we talk about the environment, it 
doesn’t go anywhere it just ends as talk, we will go and sleep… We will just die with 
 
40 Despite being a representative democracy, Zambian politics are highly partisan and in prior elections 
there has been a tremendous spatial and urban/rural divide – meaning districts like Kankoyo are unlikely to 
be in a competitive race. In addition, representatives are often chosen first by the party. While someone 
may campaign on solving environmental issues, residents say they are quickly corrupted once they get in 
power. For example, the Butondo MP has still not released the DMMU report despite the incident 
occurring in their district and it fully placing blame on Mopani. 
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it”.41 But later, she acknowledged that even in though none of the actions go anywhere, 
she, too, has gotten involved:  
Our councilor is the one closest to us in the community. So, we report things 
to the councilor and we also report to the police sometimes. Some people 
just go directly to the DC42 because they don't think these other parties do 
anything.  
 
There was a time when we reported to the DC and he went straight into the 
mines and I think that script was even shown on TV. He wanted to see how 
they operate there concerning the problems of the people. But whatever they 
discussed; he never came back to us to tell us what he had discussed.43 
 
I heard of other actions residents took while waiting. The Women’s Pressure Group got 
medical testing done at a clinic to demonstrate the health impacts of air emissions. But 
even armed with this evidence, they are thwarted. After the results of their medical testing 
came in, “we didn’t do anything. The doctor who conducted the tests said that that if we 
took these results to [Mopani] they will know who conducted the tests and it may cost 
[the doctor their] job. So we just kept the results to ourselves. It became our secret as a 
women’s group, we know what things are affecting us and we cannot do anything about 
it. We tried to engage a lawyer who could represent us but we didn’t have the money to 
pay the lawyer, so the program is just at a standstill”.44 This story—of getting so far only 
to have to wait or postpone—repeats itself over and over. 
 In another instance, a man in the community passed away and the doctor—in an 
extremely political move—wrote he died of “inhalation of poison” on his death certificate 
 
41 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
42 Here she is referring to Chanda Kabwe, the DC for Mufulira after Beatrice Miti. 
43 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
44 Focus Group with the Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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(see image 23). Rumors are this doctor was forced to change the official cause of death 
and issue a new death certificate after the family tried to use the certificate in a duty of 
care lawsuit against Mopani. The community has stowed away the original death 
certificate in an act of refusal.45 Storing this kind of evidence is a form of active waiting. 
 The Women’s Pressure Group said during their ongoing conversations with city 
councilors, the DC, and area MPs, they were told they could hold a peaceful 
demonstration if only they had a police permit. (Because of the colonial-era Public Order 
Act in Zambia you must have a permit to legally protest or even gather in large numbers.) 
 
45 The death certificate was not an easy document to find. When I met with the people who showed it to me 
they said they felt they had to ensure that I was not followed, and that I would not know where the death 
certificate was kept. There is action in even having this document. I encountered similar attitudes about 
other types of evidence. Documentation of pollution from visiting researchers, accounts of what was in the 
water, these were all actively kept—and kept secret, kept for a moment of reveal that may never come.  
Image 23: Death certificate showing cause of death as "inhalation of poison", dated 16/8/14 - over eight months after the 
death of DC Beatrice Mithi 
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Buoyed by their meetings with political figures who appeared to grant them permission, 
they went to the main police station to apply for the necessary permits. The police told 
them to apply using an official letter, which they wrote and delivered (see image 24). 
When I asked what the police’s response was, and if they were ever granted permission to 
demonstrate, Esther said,  
“Nothing. Us, when we went to the police we asked if we could have a peaceful 
demonstration so that we can speak about the problems we are facing, to let the 
whole world know… not just senta but also [about] the water we are drinking, the 
air we are breathing, the way we are living… They told us [we] should write 
something like an application that will go to the government… We wrote to the 
police immediately! After giving them the written application [in 2013] they have 
not replied to us—even up to now [2016] we have not heard from them. They 
don’t answer us. 
Image 24: Request from the community for permission to peacefully demonstrate 
over Mopani's pollution, which, they write, "is killing us slowly... The poison is 
too much, we can't even breath well" 
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Often this forced active waiting takes the form of residents continually being told to go 
elswhere. Indeed, this active waiting involves constant movement within and beyond the 
Townships. Over and over, residents are told by the mines to go to the government, by 
the government to go to the mines, and by the police to go to the government.46 From the 
downtown Mufulira residents travel from the DCs office to the police station, to the 
mayor’s office, and then to the Town Clerk’s office. From there they bus to ZEMA in 
Ndola or Lusaka, and then back to Mopani headquarters in Kitwe. With all of this 
rigmarole, “it is like they are forcing us to wait47; they have really violated our rights”.48 
Within this flurry of activity is delay and denial. 
Once, after a man died from strong emissions the community was in uproar and a 
riot threatened to break out. The Pressure Group tried to organize the community into a 
peaceful demonstration whereby they were parade his coffin in front of Mopani’s acid 
plant. “The police stopped us! The family were willing to do anything, and people were 
willing to follow their lead” but in the end the family was brought food, the DC appeased 
them with tents, and “those people sat the family down and told them it would not be a 
good thing if the body and coffin was paraded. They should just bury [him] in a peaceful 
 
46 Of course, some in the local government are attempting to hold Mopani to account. Most officials who 
were seemingly willing to aid the residents said that it was too “political” to push too hard (Interview with 
local government worker, 2016). 
47 While some residents say that Mopani is forcing them to wait until they die, to not have to pay for 
upgrades or to relocated residents, others suspect that Mopani never intended to stay this long. Rumor is 
that Mopani originally thought the copper would run out before their environmental indemnity agreement 
ran out, so they never put in the financial investment to ever even meet environmental laws. So, Mopani 
gains a substantial amount of money that they would have to spend on upgrading their facilities. The 
government does not want the details of the Development Agreements to get out. 
48 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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manner… The government’s mouths, they have been closed [in the background, ‘they 
have been paid.’].”49 These types of suspicions and accusations are fomented by the 
feeling of being dominated by something “invisible” (Simone 2004) and out of their 
control. This further leads to the feeling, in line with Verdery’s argument (1996), that they 
can only participate in the most “flexible and spontaneous” of mobilizations. Anything 
else would be immediately stopped. 
Residents have also tried creatively protesting emissions—even while escaping 
from its immediate affects. In one instance, Mopani warned people they would be 
emitting strong “gases” and that residents should move out of the area.50 This struck fear. 
They had not ever been notified before despite senta emissions that killed people. How 
much worse would this instance be? Residents went to the police and their city councilor 
to complain “but nothing happened”. 51 They were simply told that “some people will be 
fainting and when that happens you are supposed to go to the clinic”. Oscar cut in, “even 
more ambulances were brought to the clinic”.52 Some stayed in Kankoyo. Most fled.  
It came in the night. “And it was strong”.53 “Actually,” Esther corrects, “it was 
not senta, [Mopani] said ‘it will be acid’”.54 The Women’s Pressure Group remembers 
Mopani saying “some people might die”.55 Those who stayed tried to put a wet cloth over 
 
49 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
50 Not only did Mopani get away with this legally, I heard from several government representatives that this 
would be, in their minds, a solution to Mopani’s emissions (if they always notified residents). They notified 
residents on paper but also by driving through the Township with a loudspeaker. 
51 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
52 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
53 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
54 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
55 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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their mouth “to survive”, closed their doors and windows, and stayed inside.56  
How can you protest or riot outside the mine when the air debilitates? When you 
have to conserve your breath just to survive? Residents got resourceful. Prosper recounts 
that on that day, “We ran. On that day you couldn’t stay in this compound. How could 
you stay when you’ve already been warned?” Nana says that in lieu of a protest in front 
of the plant, “Some of us didn’t have anywhere to go [because they had no family living 
elsewhere in Mufulira] so we opted to go to the mayor and District Commissioner’s 
office [in town center]. We reasoned that that is where we are going to sleep.”57 A quiet 
encroachment on the DCs office. “Imagine everyone moving out of this area to go and 
sleep at the district center! At 04 [4am]. With children!”58 This clever strategy to bring a 
sleepy demonstration straight to the local politicians got some attention but, in the end, 
made little difference.59 
 In Butondo, too, residents wait actively. An organized resident Committee holds 
regular meetings with Mopani representatives and local NGOs, often at Mopani offices. 
Through this group, residents have taken part in tours of the mine and connected with 
local government to monitor acid emissions. Their work getting national media coverage 
in 2011 got the attention of Vice President Guy Scott and led to Mopani’s 3-day 
 
56 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
57 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
58 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
59 Later, when the community went to the media about the incident, Mopani started denying it ever 
happened. Since then, says Prosper, Mopani have “refused to acknowledge they are the authors of the 
paper, even though their logo is on it. And at this same time Mopani brought oxygen masks to aid people 
who are severely affected” (Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016). Kapika added, 
incredulous, “If there's a paper and your face is on that paper, can you say you are not the one who is on 
that paper? (Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016).” 
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shutdown and the DMMU and Ministry of Health report. In 2016, they were raising funds 
to travel by bus to Lusaka so they could speak directly with the DMMU reps. Mwale 
says, with a hint of exhaustion, “We have moved, I tell you, we have really moved… We 
have been everywhere. They don’t help us”.60 Malobo adds that now they don’t know 
what to do because “we have run out of places to go next” and yet are still suffering.61  
 As of 2016, the Committee said they were still meeting amongst themselves and 
some NGOs, waiting for the DMMU / MoH report. They say it offers the proof they 
need: “Ever since they examined us and got the results in 2012, we have been waiting” 
for it to be released. 62 When I asked why they thought the government has not given 
them the results they responded, “even we wonder, maybe they are waiting for the 
[election] campaigns”. 63 After the campaign season in 2017, the report was still 
drawered.64 
* * * 
 Lead pollution intimately affects people’s health and personal wellbeing. It severely 
impacts children. And in Kabwe, it has resulted in documented deaths—reportedly up to 
a child a week.65 In Kabwe, waiting is still characterized by Sisyphean activity, but 
residents will say they are waiting for help—from outside organizations, companies, or 
 
60 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
61 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
62 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
63 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
64 The report was leaked to me (see Appendix A) and I have leaked this back to environmental 
organizations in Zambia, but have not heard of it being the smoking gun hoped for, likely because out or 
not, the government is not willing to risk upsetting Mopani to act. Yet again, residents wait. 
65 That a child a week dies in Kabwe was something I heard from multiple people involved in the 
Copperbelt Environment Project, but I never saw this statistic published anywhere. 
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the government—rather than justice. Maybe this is due to the long-term, “slow violence” 
of lead contamination or because of the government’s attempts to manufacture ignorance 
about the industrial causes and potential ZCCM liability around the issue (see chapter 2). 
Perhaps this is because there has been a history of government and NGO involvement in 
both neighborhoods from the CEP. And, even though lead toxicity persists, it also 
constantly appears as if a project is on the horizon. There could be something to wait for. 
People can (and do) doubt the efficacy of future programs and critique the ones ongoing, 
but overall residents seem to think that if there is a solution, it will come about through an 
outside development-type program.  
 Further, the way lead enters people’s bodies coupled with how the government has 
worked to change “events” into “quasi-events” (see chapter 2) has mean that there are 
rarely, if ever, specific, community-wide events for residents to get upset about and erupt 
in protest. Senta and acid mist are everyday things, part of the ordinariness of life, but 
lead pollution is even less eventful; lead exposure leads to chronic, long-term illnesses 
and slowly builds up in people’s bodies and blood streams. There are personalized events 
where, for example, a child is diagnosed with elevated lead levels or dies of a long-term 
illness associated with lead contamination (though in this case parents may never learn 
the cause). But because the events that do happen are individualized instead of happening 
all at once for the entire community, the lack of catalyst likely makes it more difficult for 
responses like protests and broad community mobilizations to get started—just as, for 
example, Olson (2015) argues that the lack of urgency makes it more difficult for 
scholars to decide to study the happenings and Nixon (2011) says the relative 
“invisibility” of this type of violence prevents the type of drama that rouses. In Kabwe, 
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while people understand the negative impacts of lead and feared its effects, they also 
considered it part of their homes and lives, a toxin in the background of everything, but 
one rarely warranting full attention. The risk of lead poisoning is just one of many 
potentially debilitating risks they face in their everyday lives.  
 Reminiscent of Verdery’s argument, waiting takes time—it seizes time through 
creating debility (weakness and tiredness are symptoms of lead exposure). And its utter 
ordinariness means efforts to mobilize or mitigate would be exhausting. Mapalo, a 
mother who owns her house in Chowa and herself had two children who received 
treatment for elevated blood levels (which meant their blood level would have exceeded 
WHO standards for chelation therapy at 45 µg/dL) said that she often felt that lead was 
an issue that just formed the background for life in the Township. “You can’t sit in one 
place and start talking about lead when you are too busy with other things”, Mapalo 
says.66 Even so, she continues, “my children once tested positive for it and it will 
continue for the rest of their life”. 67  
 This reticence is not because Mapalo does not know or care about the 
consequences of lead poisoning. She can easily recited some of the symptoms of lead 
contamination: stomach problems, “not growing healthily”, headaches, memory issues, 
intestinal issues, high blood pressure, weakness, infertility. 68 Mapalo’s neighbors jumped 
in: “it damages the memory… the brain… as they grow, you find that some of them may 
 
66 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
67 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
68 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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suffer with insanity due to lead… They can’t study properly at school”. 69 Another added 
“some of our children lose their memory because of lead. They can’t study properly at 
school because of air pollution”. 70 In all the focus groups residents were visibly upset 
and afraid of the impacts of lead. They just felt they had no other options. 
 Later in this focus group with Mapalo, they said that while the idea of lead 
poisoning is a part of everyday life that has directly impacted them, their children, and 
others in their family, they also feel that they are left to wait. When we discussed 
potential individualized mitigation efforts to stop lead poisoning, like watering yards so 
there is less dust, or continually mopping the floors with clean water, the women said 
they did not have the finances to do that. “We are poor here” Mapalo said. All her other 
neighbors chimed in: “there’s no money” - “we can’t afford it” - “we are poor”.71 In the 
end, they say, being unable to take these measures they are left to wait. “Waiting for… 
for… to die! We are not waiting for anything else because nobody will help us… nobody 
will help us. If no one is coming to help us how can the illness end? Even when children 
are tested positive for this illness, they do not give us advice about what is to be done 
about it next. All they do is test them and then they leave, that's all”. 72 But, she says, she 
owns her home and “don’t expect us to leave the place, so we shall stay with the lead” — 
and another woman cut in — “and die with lead!”73 Theirs are the tragedies of slow 
death. Crises in ordinary times. 
 
69 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
70 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
71 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
72 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
73 Chowa Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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 In Kabwe, active waiting is a cry for help.74 Many residents still push for 
solutions, worry about the health of themselves and their children, and voice opinions 
about how lead contamination can be resolved. They have petitioned the government, 
tried to get medicine from clinics, and engaged with every new NGO that comes in to try 
a new program in the neighborhood. Because the CEP focused on using water to dampen 
the dust and grow plants, residents saw water as a key resource and often went to petition 
the water utility company and government to lower their water bills so they could water 
their yards. Stymied for years, they have mostly now stopped these petitions. They have 
also tried both youth empowerment schemes and women’s empowerment schemes. 
Maybe if women ran small businesses or youth had jobs, Mapolo said, they could “afford 
to pay the water bills” and keep their lead-filled dirt covered in grass.75  
 Notwithstanding calls for financial empowerment, by waiting Chowa residents are 
also actively challenging the idea that lead remediation will ever be solved at the scale of 
the individual. They see lead contamination as too big of a problem for them to 
mitigate—despite educational campaigns focusing on individual ‘solutions’ such as not 
letting your children play in the yard. Rejecting these proposals, they are waiting for 
bigger NGOs to come and take the lead on a remediation project. Charles, who had been 
active in lead-related projects in the past said, “no there are no small-scale efforts now… 
because we heard that the World Bank will be coming in mid-June so we just grouped 
ourselves and [we] are waiting for something to be done [though the World Bank 
 
74 Here I’m distinguishing between residents in Mufulira who are actively seeking justice or accountability. 
In Kabwe, residents frame it as needing help. 
75 Chowa, Focus Group 2, 2016. 
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project]”.76 Another group said, “we have no resources to do [anything]. We are waiting 




 Residents in Kankoyo have taken to the streets, erupting in protest—particularly 
when emissions appear to result in the death of prominent residents. There were two short 
“riots” 79 in 2014 and one in 2015. These riots lasted only a few hours, were immediately 
met with police presence and tear gas, and only happened after severe emissions appeared 
to cause deaths. In them, residents were accused of attempting to burn down Mopani’s 
acid plant, because they blame it for the stronger emissions. For example, one group 
discussed a “riot” in early 2014: 
- “[What] caused us to riot [then] is that three people died…” 
- “Four” 
- “… And others were rushed to the hospital. What caused this is the senta 
was released the whole day on this day. Emissions were started around 05 
[am] until … 14 hours [2pm]. We were affected so much but you know 
 
76 Chowa, Focus Group 1, 2016. 
77 As discussed in chapter 3, this World Bank project again focuses most of its funding on community 
awareness campaigns—despite community members telling me “most of the people here know about this 
issue [of lead], they know it quite correctly… whoever is residing here is very much aware about lead, 
lead’s effects to human life and to the health of the human body” (Chowa Focus Group 1, 2016). This 
blame game has happened several times in the past: residents see a structural problem that demands a large-
scale, comprehensive solution, and even large funders choose to focus on shifting focus to individual 
actions that largely demand residents spend their own money. Many (but not all) of these programs also 
take the contaminated environment itself as a given—something that will not change and needs to be lived 
with, day in and day out. 
78 Chowa, Focus Group 3, 2016. 
79 While I asked about protests that could include peaceful or violent demonstrations, focus groups (and 
outsiders) often used the word “riot” to talk about incidents that had happened, and “peaceful 
demonstration” to talk about the types of mobilization that they formally requested permission to hold from 
the government, but were denied. The “riots” then were unplanned events that happened directly after 
severe emissions occurred. 
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people are different. Some are strong, others are not strong. I’ll give an 
example of an elderly man who was rushed to the hospital the same day. 
Sad to say, this man died on the way. The other man died on the spot 
while these other two wanted to go to the hospital but also died on the 
way. [That day] I fainted myself”.80 
 
Many blame riots on “youths” getting aggravated and say they are counterproductive. 
Prosper recounts, “some time back there was even a riot because of the youths who 
complained that [Mopani] was killing our children… We tried to calm the youths down 
[saying] that things will be okay, but up to now nothing has changed [at the mine]”.81 The 
Pressure Group says they try to stop riots and calm the community because when there is 
a riot they are held accountable by the government and accused of inciting it. 
 Zambia—and especially the Copperbelt—has a successful history of 
demonstrating, labor strikes, and effecting regime change (anti-colonial as well as anti-
one-party state). Beginning in the 1935s there were riots in the Copperbelt over colonial 
taxes, labor conditions, and pay (Butler 2007; Frederiksen 2010; Money 2015). 
Demonstrations have made a material difference in people’s lives and are embedded in 
the social, economic, and political history of the Copperbelt. Labor unions played a large 
role in anti-colonial movements (Henderson 1975), supporting anti-apartheid movements 
in South Africa, and the move away from a one-party state (Larmer 2005). Strikes, 
demonstrations, and riots continue into the present, with Miles Larmer arguing the 
mineworkers have used their privileged positions as leverage for improved working 
conditions (Larmer 2007).  
 
80 Kankoyo, Focus Group 1, 2016. 
81 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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 But there are real consequences to strikes, riots, and other demonstrations in 
Zambia. Residents in Kankoyo give several reasons for not protesting—or “rioting”—
more often. The colonial-era Public Order Act and need for a permit, as previously 
discussed, was one. Based on past experiences with the Mobile Police Unit based in 
Kitwe, residents fear a swift and violent police pushback to any protests. The police unit 
wears gas masks so as to avoid emissions and tear gas, giving them a decided advantage 
in confrontations. Sometimes, claim residents, police forces arrive in Mufulira before a 
pollution event has even begun, to stop protests from getting started.82 (Mopani 
reportedly pays for the police’s petrol). Residents throughout Kankoyo are justifiably 
afraid of police intervention: 
- “We had one [a riot], though the police starting shooting at us and firing 
tear gas canisters”. 
- “[During] that one [emissions event] they even brought in the mobile unit 
[akin to a SWAT team of police] from Kitwe. 
- “When they know they want to release strong senta, they will call the 
mobile police unit from Kitwe and guard the plant as well as the surrounding 
area. So if you want to protest, they’ll start firing tear gas at you. So this is 
what makes us not riot, even though we are affected by the senta”.83 
 
People also recounted stories of arrest—both during the protest and after, if they are 
thought to have encouraged the protest. The Pressure Group recounted, 
When we had that riot, people were throwing amabwe—stones—at the 
police and the police were firing teargas canisters at the people. One of the 
police officers shot someone with a live bullet. He was just grazed by the 
bullet. He still has a scar and he was taken to the hospital. It was the 
 
82 Residents often cited this as evidence that the pollution was not due to breakages, as Mopani would not 
predict these in advance and call for the police. The police indeed are partially paid for by Mopani through 
petrol purchases. 
83 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
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councilor who took him to the hospital.  Those people who were arrested 
were detained in the cells.  
 
Now, how can we speak out, how can we express ourselves when they84 
were supposed to restrain the police from firing at us. How could this be?  
 
It’s like they view us as wild animals and not humans.85 
 
At the Police Camp the police officer’s wives told me that protesters against Mopani 
could be killed, and “if you are fortunate you only land in the cells”.86 Stampedes, thrown 
rocks, rubber bullets, and tear gas add to the danger. Another reason people gave for not 
protesting was simply that it was too difficult to protest during the senta emissions. 
Residents say the effects of strong senta are severe, and lead to “choking” and 
“fainting”.87 Kaoma says that protests are often a sign of a truly serious problem because 
“it takes quite fundamental issues for them to mobilize, you know there’s a real serious 
issue when they do. It’s not just a little tickly cough. It’s like [laughs]. So, they mobilized 
a few times”.88 Threats and debility surely impede protest, making their existence a sign 
of serious issues.89 
 
84 They seem to be referring to the government, but I am not sure. 
85 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
86 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
87 Kankoyo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
88 Interview with Kaoma, Mopani insider, 2016. 
89 Surprisingly, financial entanglements in the mining industry do not appear to be a reason for the lack of 
protests. While Kankoyo, Butondo, and Chowa used to be housing for mineworkers, now most inhabitants 
do not work for the mines (this is obviously true in Kabwe neighborhoods, where the mine has been closed 
since 1994). In Butondo the Committee said that very few of the affected people work for the mines, 
probably “under 50” (Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016). Even those I spoke to who do still 
work for Mopani support community activism and feel internally “there is nothing we can do” to improve 
the situation. A few mineworkers have even become the most critical of Mopani Mine, notably the leader 




In addition to actual riots, there are many threats of riots that never erupt. During 
a 2014 or 2015 incident, after a prominent member of the community died due to senta 
emissions, the Women’s Pressure Group convinced District Commissioner (post-Mithi) 
to visit the township to see the pollution for himself. When the DC got to the area, the 
emissions were so bad “people were ready with stones. We told [the DC] to continue 
moving [so he could see the pollution but he] denied, saying that people might stone 
him… So, the people were ready for him. They wanted to riot. [Laughter]”.90 Another 
focus group said that after this incident, he “told us to wait a little bit. He said that the 
government knew about the issue now and so Kankoyo residents should just know that 
the government will solve this problem.”91 The Women’s Pressure Group were 
disappointed, saying this near-riot and the DC visit did not result in any action: “He has 
done nothing [and now he has left for a new post in another city]. And the issue [of 
pollution] has now gone quiet. So, for us [because of this] another big issue that we have 
seen here is that the government doesn’t consider us human beings”.92 I discuss this 
effect of waiting—feelings of dehumanization—in the next section. 
 The Butondo community almost rioted once, but they were stopped. After Vice 
President Guy Scott came to the mine to look into the pollution and Mopani was closed 
for 3 days due to the acid heap leach pollution. When they re-started the operation 
without notification, “the youth got some tires to go and burn the tents at [Mopani] where 
there is a [leaching] pond. The police and Mayor came to intervene… they almost burned 
 
90 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
91 Kankoyo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
92 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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the tents”93 but the protest did not go further because of the interventions. The Committee 
say many Butondo residents joined Kankoyo’s protests, to “stand together as one 
community”.94 
 All together the community has mixed feelings about riots. Members of the 
community pressure group in Kankoyo actively tried to prevent members of their 
community from rioting. Part of this is due to fear of being implicated, but they are also 
afraid of the uncontrolled actions of rioters. They said that “youths” (talking about men 
14-35) wanted to “burn down the acid plant” due to the perception that the acid plant was 
making the emissions worse but they were quite fearful of what would happen if the acid 
plant burnt down.95 Acidic explosions and massive emissions were further reasons to 
internally quash the riots.  
 Because the police camp is located in Butondo and is impacted by Mopani’s heap 
leach, I also conducted focus groups with the wives of police officers who were living in 
the police housing (the police themselves refused my request for focus groups). One 
officer’s wife told me “[The police, our family members] are the ones that actually put a 
stop to riots! Beat up and apprehend [rioters] and put them into police cells!”.96 When I 
asked whether they or their families have any sympathy for the protesters they say the 
police “have no choice; it is the government’s rules… we don’t have much of a choice 
because we are sort of stuck in the middle”.97 Another officer’s wife said, “it is not 
 
93 Butondo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
94 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
95 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
96 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
97 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
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necessarily our desire [to stop those fighting Mopani]. We are also unhappy about this 
situation but there is nothing we can do”.98 It was clear that government connections 
enabled Mopani access to the police and that even the police felt they had no option but 
to participate in this type of domination. 
 Finally, residents have mixed views about whether demonstrations even work: 
Choma: “The riot worked” 
Kape: “The riot did not work” 
Eve: “It worked a little” 
Kape: “We can just say that it didn’t work because they are still emitting 
senta. Plus, [now] they are mixing the senta with acid [sentiment: what they 
are emitting now is stronger].” 
Clever: “Actual acid! The air that we are breathing is filled with acid. It 
didn’t work because these emissions still continue.”99 
 
This ambiguous response was common; often people thought the riots worked because 
Mopani stopped emitting as much senta for a few days, while simultaneously claiming 
they did not work because Mopani is still polluting. Oscar says that “even when [the 
government officials] are told [about the senta] there is nothing they can do… even if [the 
police] gave us a permit to protest we will end up being in error [and get arrested]. We are 
told we have to just wait, to calm down… [Mopani] will come out and just say that a pipe 
had just burst and they will mend it and it will go back to normal soon”.100 In general, 
residents viewed riots as a short-term Band-Aid that could have long-term negative 
consequences (jail, being shot, the acid plant exploding) yet this fury was unavoidable in 
the face of prominent community deaths from an acute event.  
 
98 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
99 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 






Waiting produces affects. First, residents see the injustices of the pollution and 
their forced waiting sparks suspicion of corruption. The government is a common target 
of accusations. Residents constantly told stories of government officials walking out of 
[Mopani] with money to keep quiet. But NGOs, fellow residents, and researchers are also 
suspected of being paid off by Mopani. In some of my focus groups there was whispering 
about neighbors who used to speak against the pollution now quieting down and sending 
their children to the private mine school. The Butondo women’s committee admitted 
many members of the community were angry at them and suspected they were corrupt. 
Mwale said, “in fact [at] this time they have started insulting us, they even want to beat 
us. They say, ‘you are the ones dilly-dallying in having these people remove us from 
here,’ that ‘we have waiting and waited.’ So now they are blaming us [saying] that we are 
not doing anything but we have tried”.101 Members of the Butondo committee were 
adamant that they never accepted money or bribes from Mopani, but they knew how 
suspicious their neighbors were simply because they were all still waiting. 
 In response to similar allegations in Kankoyo, members of the Women’s Pressure 
Group will not even accept the (very ubiquitous) small amount of money for 
transportation to meetings or even bottles of water during an encounter with Mopani. 
“Sometimes [when] we [went] to the general offices [of Mopani] upset about the 
situation they would give us food and water. But we wouldn’t take that. We used to tell 
 
101 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
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them, ‘we can’t take these things because once we take them you will think we are okay 
with what you are doing’”.102 Another participant said, “we don’t take those things 
because our hearts might soften. That is how we left the water and the food as well as the 
money. That is why [Mopani] hate[s] us… [They implied they were hated because they 
are incorruptible]”.103 Some of their suspicions of corruption are based on themselves 
being offered money by Mopani: “Yes, I have been offered money” says one.104 Another 
interjects, “What happens mostly is... Most people who go for those meetings are given 
allowances. And those allowances make them fail to represent the people well or express 
their feelings as they are supposed to”.105 Endless trying and waiting has resulted in 
widespread suspicion and accusations of corruption that are far-reaching. 
* * * 
 Suspicion reaches far beyond individual community members. Senta in Kankoyo 
has gotten national and international press, attention from a plethora of NGOs, as well as 
some attention from academics. Residents have spoken about outsiders “constantly” 
coming to hear their stories and then leaving without doing anything.106 Reporters from 
the local news station, ZNBC, have reported from Kankoyo; local radio broadcasters 
(through the BBC) have focused shows on the plight of residents in Kankoyo; and 
multiple documentary teams have flown in from Europe to document the financial, 
political, and environmental failures of Mopani.  In addition, independent and university-
 
102 Focus Group with Kankoyo Committee, 2016. 
103 Focus Group with Kankoyo Committee, 2016. 
104 Focus Group with Kankoyo Committee, 2016. 
105 Focus Group with Kankoyo Committee, 2016. 
106 Focus Group with Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
 155 
affiliated researchers have undertaken environmental studies in the community. Yet 
nothing seems to change and the community are still waiting.  
 The flurry of research that has gone nowhere has led to widespread mistrust about 
participating in any research and suspicions of the motivations of researchers (many 
assume white researchers in particular work for Mopani and are spying). One group even 
light-heartedly threatened me saying, “we used to stone people when they came to take 
pictures, since most of the people who used to come are of your race”.107 While I never 
felt threatened, it was clear people felt abandoned and excluded in a racialized, neo-
colonial order: “we have spoken about this a lot and now when someone comes it is as if 
they are just making fools of us… when they come to ask questions, they would be 
chased away!”.108 The Butondo Committee ties this to the despair of waiting; they tell me 
threats of stoning or violence against white outsiders is due to “sorrow regarding waiting 
for the results [of the DMMU and Public Health research] until now”.109 
 In my fourth focus group in Kankoyo, residents asked me what I was going to do 
with my research to help them. When I responded that I would make sure to submit my 
final report to ZEMA, I got a response full of despair: “but they will just bury that 
information”.110 Even when I responded that I would also follow up with NGOs, they 
said “they [too] will bury the information. Because what I know is that people would cry 
[out, make noise]. They will even have people who will say, ‘We will be representing 
 
107 Butondo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
108 Butondo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
109 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
110 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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you. The help will come in.’ But [these] people too will want to benefit themselves”.111 
Even though they said the information I collected would be buried, they still offered that 
simply by my talking to them, “it is encouraging because we have never had a scenario 
where someone comes in and picks people to interview [like you]. I wish the people in 
government can follow this up by following people in homes. This must be a continuous 
process”.112 This is the kind of waiting people experience: there is despair, a drive to try 
any potential maneuver offered, and a reluctance to hope. 
The dehumanization of waiting 
 
Waiting also produces feelings of fear (of protest but also of what the pollution is 
doing to bodies and health), suspicion, and despair over constant dehumanization. In 
Kabwe, despite their many ideas and petitions, there is an overwhelming sense of 
disillusionment with the idea that anything will change, or that any project will work. At 
the end of the day, I heard, “mostly there is nothing that is happening in our areas”.113 
People feel demoralized and afraid—they live with lead every day, but they also know 
what lead can do and fear it. Many residents in Kabwe did not see much hope in the 
situation changing. In Chowa, for example, in one focus group I asked participants, “Is 
there anything you can see that brings you hope that the situation might change?” And 
around the circle seven of eight residents shook heads. One said “maybe it might, but 
personally I do not see any hope” and only one participant nodding yes.114  
 While many residents did not have much hope the situation would change, most did 
 
111 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
112 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
113 Chowa, Focus Group 4, 2016. 
114 Chowa, Focus Group 2, 2016. 
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appear to have the expectation that things should change and that programs should 
benefit everyone affected; part of waiting was living with a sense of injustice. A pilot 
project to bring in external “black soil” to cover people’s yards was completed for some 
members of the community but not others. While possibly a valid method for an 
organization to determine whether the program would be effective on a larger scale, this 
approach led to suspicion and rumors amongst residents about corruption, connections, 
and distrust. In one focus group, residents said that NGOs would “pick and choose” who 
benefited: “so if you are close to the person who has been given the project [someone 
who works for the organization] then you would automatically benefit from it. But if you 
are not close to that person, then nothing will be done at your house”.115 Later, 
community members agreed they were “very angry” about the situation and distrusted the 
people who had the “black soil”.116 This sense of injustice—some people are benefiting 
but not me; money is being spent on this but the programs are not helping the situation—
shows what Auyero describes as the profoundly disempowering politics of waiting. 
Waiting is not only about time in toxicity but also the “injustice, unfairness, and 
arbitrariness that pervades their everyday life” (2012:152). 
 In Mufulira, residents can often pick out a moment when they finally despaired. 
In Kankoyo, residents cite DC Miti’s death. Grace said that she even stopped reporting 
emissions events to the new DC because when Miti died “nothing was done by the 
government, so what can we do? If the DC died and they didn’t do anything, what will 
 
115 Chowa, Focus Group 2, 2016. 
116 Chowa, Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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they do for us? Nothing”.117 In Butondo, many residents cite former President Sata’s 
death, when Vice President Guy Scott lost power.118 When Scott was replaced they 
started to realize the DMMU report would never come out and they would have to start 
all over convincing the government of the health impacts of acid mist.119 
 This debilitating, exhausting, hopeless waiting often results in feelings of 
dehumanization, the idea that residents in these Townships are being treated as less than 
human. Residents in Kankoyo and Butondo suspect that the pollution is allowed to occur 
because, to the mines or government, “it is just the bush [wilderness]”.120 In Kankoyo in 
particular, multiple focus groups mentioned that they suspect “people have told people 
elsewhere that where we are living [Kankoyo] it is just a bush and no one stays here”.121 
The Pressure Group insists that it is not only Mopani who things of them as less than 
human, it is also the government. Based on the lack of results of their advocacy, they say, 
“The government knows this whole story very well. But they think people don’t stay in 




117 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
118 Guy Scott is a white descendent of a colonial settler. In Zambia, one must be a third generation Zambian 
to be President. 
119 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
120 Butondo Focus Group, 2016. 
121 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
122 Focus Group with Kankoyo Committee, 2016. 
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Chapter 5: Kitwe’s Black Mountain: The politics and livelihoods of 
ruination and refiguration of mining debris 
 
The only place where he was completely free was underground in the mines.  
There he was a master and knew his way. 
~Peter Abrahams, Mine Boy 
 
 
“Last week two people were buried alive. One of them was buried, but he didn’t die. He 
was only buried up to here”, Dan pointed to his neck.1 “Sometimes, we just find people 
dead.” Re-mining Kitwe’s Black Mountain is dangerous. It is, after all, a mountain of 
mining waste and was never meant to have humans tunneling within it. Daniel 
remembered digging out his friend the week before.  
“We were scared. He dug a hole and … on the top there was a hanging rock on a 
slanting surface. He dug beneath it, like how we do it. And the rock rolled and hit him”2. 
Chomba, next to him adds on “the rock just rolled down and fell on him. It was a very big 
rock, about a ton or what. It was just by the grace of God, maybe it was not his time to 
die… He was unable to breathe properly. He was saying It’s over now, I’m gone”.3  
Despite the Black Mountain’s reputation of being a lawless place of former 
criminals, when someone is buried, Daniel says, everyone works together to save them. 
Ndala declares that in dangerous times, “There is unity on the black mountain. When one 
is in trouble we do help. Some will come with shovels and even the machines will come 
 
1 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
2 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
3 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
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from the leaders”.4 Hands, shovels, trucks and other machinery are diverted to uncover 
bodies, and if they work fast enough, they may save a life.  
The Black Mountain towers over the city of Kitwe and divides Wusakile, an 
African mineworker township from Nkana West, at one point reserved for European 
mineworkers (see image 4). It has waste material from Nkana5 Mine’s smelter (and given 
the “acid” that workers say burns their skin and clothes, probably other processing 
activities) dating back to at least the 1950s. I was told there is as much as 18% copper in 
some of the waste product here. What is happening at the Black Mountain in Kitwe is not 
(only) a story of ordinary people eking out livelihoods by repurposing material that poses 
life-threatening hazards. With copper prices as high as they were when I visited, there 
was money to be made. Real money. The kind of money that led to me being driven 
 
4 Focus Group 2 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
5 Kitwe was once Nkana-Kitwe – Nkana is the ‘mining’ side of town, Kitwe is the government side of 
town. Now it is all just Kitwe but the mine is often referred to as Nkana. 
 
Image 25: Re-miners stand before their Black Mountain during a break from work 
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around in “the only Hummer 2 in Southern Africa”6 while the Commander handed wads 
of money out the window. “I can’t drive around town some days” he says, “I have to give 
out so much money”.7 There is also political influence to be had. Some of the top leaders 
are said to be friends with President Lungu himself. Some whispered that one of them, 
Rami, had political connections because of his father used to do Kaunda’s “dirty work.”8 
The Jerabo are famous for their ‘campaigning’—many of them bragged to me about 
being used by the Patriotic Front (PF) for “intimidation” of political opponents.9 In 
exchange, many say, the President “gave” them the Black Mountain. And, finally, there is 
an identity to be reclaimed, of local ownership and employment as a mineworker. 
 
6 Interview with the Commander, 2016. 
7 Interview with the Commander, 2016. 
8 Said in two anonymous interviews, 2016. 
9 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
Image 26: Research assistant Stallone standing before the Black Mountain for perspective on size. The PF flag is 
waving in the background. Some said the Mountain was the most political site in Zambia. 
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There were two different, intertwined re-mining operations happening at Kitwe’s 
Black Mountain while I was there in 2016. There was a larger scale operation with heavy 
machinery and huge trucks delivering ore to nearby processing plants, only some of 
which were operating legally. Two groups work this machine-based operation. One was 
run by Rami, a notorious foreign businessman with a mining license, and the other was 
organized by the Commander, a black Zambian who lives in a wealthier area now but 
group up in Wusakile as the son of a mineworker and told me he had limited formal 
education. The Commander leads the ‘community,’ which some, including him, self-
named as the “Wusakile Youth” but others—including most workers I spoke to and 
people throughout Zambia—call “Jerabo,” derived from “jail boy.”  
On the other side of the Black Mountain are small scale, artisanal re-miners who 
self-identified as Jerabo and still live nearby in Wusakile. They do not have trucks or 
machinery (though some of them may have a ‘turn’ with a truck) but instead work by 
Image 27: A view towards the trucking side of the operation, from the top. 
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“manpower”10. They dig, by hand and small shovel, through the waste and pick out bits 
and pieces with a high copper content. These are placed in a 10-liter white sack which 
may sell for around 100 kwacha ($10 USD in 2016). They usually sell sacks of material 
to recycling facilities throughout town or at times to the Commander or to Rami. They 
say have no alternative employment—many were former mineworkers who were 
retrenched (laid off) and took their skills to the Mountain. Their work is difficult, hot, and 
extremely dangerous. If they dig too far, the mountain collapses, burying them alive. This 
is not uncommon. People recounted several such incidents that happened recently. But 
 
10 Focus Group 2 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
Image 28: This side of the Black Mountain is not even visible from the road. 
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tthey dig on because the better material is found at the bottom, from days when ore 
processing was less efficient. 
Interventions 
This chapter shows another side to what happens while waiting. Throughout the 
Copperbelt (it is different in Kabwe), there is also an aggressive strategy of taking 
possession of the copper found in former waste as a form of community empowerment, 
despite a more figurative mountain of political and legal ambiguities. Many studies of 
waste-centered livelihoods, such as trash picking and e-waste recycling, focuses on 
impoverished people who are just getting by to feed their families (Beall, 2006; Gidwani, 
2013; Medina, 2001; Mususa, 2010; Pickren, 2014). While there have been several 
persuasive calls to recognize the dignity of these workers, there is also an almost 
universal assumption that these workers are marginalized and outcaste. Marginality is 
potentially both a cause and effect of their work in waste.  
I depart from these analyses, demonstrating instead that working on the Black 
Mountain gave people money (even gave some people good money), political 
connections, and a sense of localized power. Global, neoliberal forces may have taken 
away their legitimate jobs, and a neocolonial present their local autonomy, but they found 
copper in the Mountain next door. And even when foreign companies tried to take the 
Mountain away, the Jerabo fought and won (at least temporarily). Many workers on the 
Black Mountain were risking their lives doing dangerous, back-breaking work for mere 
dollars a day. But they did not consider themselves marginalized. To their communities, 
they were heroes. Local heroes for bringing money to their families and national heroes 
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for taking back what should belong to Zambians—their natural resources, even if in the 
form of waste. 
Working on the Mountain gave people a sense of belonging to a greater national 
identity, a connection to a nostalgic past in which everyone thought Zambia would 
become a modern, middle-income country. “I am a miner.”11 It was legitimizing work. I 
find Stoler’s (2013) concept of ‘ruination’ generative here, even though I employ it only 
loosely. Stoler studies “how empire’s ruins contour and carve through the psychic and 
material space in which people live and what compounded layers of imperial debris do to 
them” (ibid: 2). But while the Black Mountain can be viewed as an imperial ruin, it is not 
merely a “toxic corrosion and violent accrual of colonial aftermaths” (ibid). It is also that, 
of course; but it is also a toxic and violent ruin of the nationalist era, an era in which 
Zambians at least hoped to reap the benefits of their resources. For Stoler, ruins are not 
only aesthetically damaged monuments but they are also “what people are left with… 
what remains blocking livelihoods and health… [and the focus should be] not on their 
inert remains, but on their vital refiguration” (ibid:9-10).  
Let me be clear. In one sense, the Black Mountain is not a ruin—it is a dump site 
that is no longer being used, though the mine behind it is still foreign owned and 
operating. On the other hand, the Black Mountain stopped being “added to” at the time of 
mine privatization. It stands in people’s memories as something from before. A before 
when ZCCM took care of the mineworker communities with food, light bulbs, regular 
housing maintenance and more. A before when people who lived in these communities—
 
11 This is a common identity I heard in focus groups and interviews.  
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in Wusakile and Nkana West, in particular—had good union jobs. A before to be a 
modern Zambian was to be a miner. In this way, we can see the Black Mountain as 
representing the ruins of a nostalgic past—and retrenched workers feeling excluded from 
the current neoliberal, mechanized mines can go to the Mountain and use their 
“manpower” to be, again, a miner. The Black Mountain is what people are left with. It is 
an imposing topographical marker that is fecund with meaning. 
Finally, what is going on is not straightforward. It is ambiguous. More than 
anything I studied, I think this is what AbdouMaliq Simone means when he talks about 
“invisibility” in African cities and all that goes on “beneath the surface” (2004: 10). The 
Black Mountain is blanketed in invisible happenings, whispers, and rumors. The 
encounters that take place on the Mountain—between the State and the miners, the 
Commander and foreign operatives—showcase this ambiguity. 
Image 29: Visiting the Black Mountain (this is walking on top) 
 167 
Research on the Mountain 
 While the cities of Mufulira and Kabwe were my principal research sites (see 
Chapter 1), this particular inquiry was an offshoot that I undertook in the town of Kitwe 
(see map 4), employing a different set of methods. Due to the investigation’s tricky 
nature I was not able to randomly sample workers; instead I made connections via 
snowball sampling and became friends with re-miners involved in various facets of the 
work. Much of my information is ethnographic in addition to interviews and focus 
groups. All in all, I interviewed about 20 people throughout the operation and conducted 
focus groups with another 35 workers. Many more were willing to talk to me but 
reluctant to speak on tape, and many of my interactions with friends were of course also 
not on tape. I also conducted focus groups in the neighborhoods near some of the illegal 
processing operations, including one called Twatasha, to understand how they were 
Image 30: I was taking this picture when the Commander spotted me. 
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impacted by emissions from the operations.  
I visited the Black Mountain on two separate occasions. The first was with some 
of the small-scale re-miners. They took me to their side of the mountain and showed me 
how to dig a tunnel in the Mountain, and what kinds of chunks of rock they were looking 
for. Being white, female, and conspicuously out-of-place, my presence was soon spotted 
by the Commander on the other side of the Mountain. He sent some of his security to 
escort me to him. 
I was nervous. Never have I been happier to have a student ID at hand. The 
muscle—we’ll call him Chanda—spent the walk over telling me not to worry despite all I 
had heard about the Jerabo. He was right. After some groveling and explaining to the 
Commander that I was a student interested in the Black Mountain because it seemed they 
were doing “environmental” work, I got the Commander’s cell phone number and set up 
Image 31: Climbing the Mountain (or, rather, climbing some of the large machinery at the Mountain) 
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the first of a few meetings with him. My next trip up the Mountain was less fraught. With 
the Commander’s permission, Chanda showed me all around their operation. After I 
showed him a photo of me rock climbing in Zambia, he even let me clamber over 
equipment so I could ‘climb’ on the mountain (see image 33). 
On a more serious note and unbeknownst to the Commander or Rami, I also 
followed the Jerabo’s trucks to track where they were selling ore. They were selling to 
small pop-up processing plants and smelters located around and just outside of town. I 
walked around them to follow up on reports of water pollution and followed their trucks 
to see where they were dumping waste—a way of tracing the material circuit of re-mined 
ore without tracing the money trail. One such processing operation had no name or sign 
(see image 34) but a giant pile of Black Mountain deposit lay in the back. I found out 
from people walking nearby that it was a Chinese company that had popped up in their 
residential neighborhood. In nearby Twatasha some people told me that the enterprise 
operated a smelter—they knew this because they could see and sense senta coming from 
Image 32: A truck leaving the Black Mountain (from the Wusakile side). 
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the building (one person told me he used to live in Mufulira, so he knew what senta was). 
One nearby resident said they do this at night and “even in the morning… the emissions 
come in [my house] whenever they are smelting”.12 There were no stacks—presumably 
to avoid getting caught. I decided to come back with a friend working on China-Africa 
relations who spoke Mandarin and Bemba.  
We pulled up to the processing operation site and knocked on the gate. The 
security guard asked us to wait as he went to speak to superiors about letting us in. In the 
meantime, standing outside, two vanloads of people drove through the gate and out 
tumbled about a dozen Zambian men and one Chinese manager. The manager had 
everyone line up, with a Zambian translating for him. There was yelling. Soon, the 
translator started beating those in line, on instruction from the manager. We were too far 
away to hear why. And when my friend moved forward to try to hear what was 
 
12 Twatasha Focus Group 1, 2016.  
Image 33: This is one of the places material from the Black Mountain went 
 171 
happening, the manager saw us and immediately had the gate closed in our face. We 
waited another hour or so, talking to a mechanic who joined us on the outside of the gate. 
He said he was there to fix their furnace, and confirmed they were indeed smelting 
copper. On our drive away, we passed the police, with their alarms blaring.13 
Other leads I was unable to follow. Rami, a foreigner with a family history in 
Zambia of being well connected with each of the Presidents (especially Kaunda) is a 
central figure in this story, as he runs about half of the operation. He provides a lot of the 
machinery and a mining license. His presence at the Black Mountain also muddies the 
idea that the Black Mountain is about community empowerment. If it is about 
empowerment for local impoverished communities who grew up in the shadow of this 
 
13 Rumors I heard afterwards are that that operation, like many, receive waste from the Black Mountain and 
stolen copper from the nearby mines. Their processing approximates a copper laundering scheme. Also, it 
was illegal because it was unregistered and had no environmental license. When I had previously asked 
ZEMA about it, the inspector for the area was unaware it existed. 
Image 34: Dusk settling in at the nameless smelter with Black Mountain material in the background. I went back at 
night to see if I could catch them smelting, but soon realized I hadn't accounted for not being able to take pictures in the 
dark. 
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waste dump, why does a powerful, politically connected foreigner have such a claim? 
People on the Rami side of the operation were concerned that if the PF lost the last 
election, Rami could lose the Mountain (others said Rami was already working the angles 
and was also in deep with the main opposition party). They also argued Rami was the 
only one who could control the Jerabo (presumably through fear). 
I never did get to meet with Rami or find out why he started re-mining the 
Mountain (besides for just the clear financial reason). I tried. But after a few attempts and 
some pushing, I was warned by others inside the operation: “Some friendly advice to you. 
You really have to be careful. If he feels like maybe you are getting in his way, I can 
assure you that guy is dangerous”.14 Yes, I replied, I have heard rumors that he killed 
someone—“He killed someone? He kills people”.15 Later I was told everyone fears Rami. 
“Even the Commander is very afraid of him… that guy is very dangerous. He is friends 
with the President. How can you fight such a man?”16 After a final attempt to see Rami 
the week I left the country, I finally gave up. 
The Making of a Mountain 
When Zambia privatized their mining industry in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
government quickly learned that investors were unwilling to take on what they 
considered to be environmental liabilities. This led to both the inclusion of environmental 
indemnity agreements within secret “Development Agreements” (as discussed in Chapter 
3) and the dissociation of unwanted former tailings dams and waste rock sites from the 
 
14 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
15 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
16 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
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mine ‘package.’ Kitwe’s Black Mountain, a dump site since (it is rumored) the 1950s was 
one of these. As the government’s responsibility, many of these dumps were simply 
abandoned or sold to companies that left them alone.  
Kitwe’s Black Mountain17 was sold to Anglo American who left the dump 
unattended, copper prices too low to even take a look. Subsequently, Anglo American 
sold the Mountain to ENRC, a central Asian company that allowed (through lax security) 
people in the Wusakile community to dig through the dumps searching for pieces with a 
high enough copper content to be sold to scrap metal companies, large mines wanting 
extra material, and later a small-scale Chinese concentrator/smelter run by a pioneering 
Chinese woman, Yun. In these intervening years, in desperate poverty, hundreds of 
unemployed former mineworkers and their families—including women and children 
(Mususa, 2010)—found a way to eke out a livelihood by sorting through debris and 
finding valuable material amidst the waste.  
Meanwhile, rumors18 are that the Jerabo got started by stealing copper, not re-
mining it. One locally famous person was repeatedly imprisoned for stealing copper from 
the major companies that ZCCM had been sold off to—he “became a hero within 
Wusakile, for taking back a national product”.19 He distributed his stolen earnings in the 
 
17 There are other Black Mountains in the other cities, including Mufulira, Chingola, Luanshya, and Kabwe. 
But Kitwe’s is the biggest. It also happened to be my home turf, which enabled me to make the connections 
that made this study possible. Kabwe’s Black Mountain, because Kabwe was a lead mine, is significantly 
less valuable. The people who are re-mining there are not connected with the Jerabo network and barely 
make a living. Patience Mususa (2010) wrote a great chapter on re-mining in Luanshya years before I was 
in the field (2016), where it appears it was a mostly female centered small-scale operation. I wonder if this 
has changed with the reach of the Jerabo 
18 This whole paragraph is information I heard from multiple sources, but there was no way for me to verify 
it beyond hearing it from different, unconnected people. 
19 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
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community: “He was like a godfather of the community”, one person said. 20 Even the 
government thought that he was a “superstar”, the perfect person to steal and launder 
copper for those high up in the government.  
At privatization, government leaders lost access to mining money that made many 
of them wealthy. Sensing an opportunity, “they sent in the guys at night to still make 
money off of the copper, which they had sold to someone else. Double profits [for the 
government]”.21 And the Jerabo were perfect for this because they did not want to be 
associated with the government, “they want to stand out as heroes”. 22 At some point, 
rumor has it, some of the Jerabo started to re-mine as a way to legitimize their businesses. 
Without a legitimate mining license they kept being imprisoned for transporting ore, 
though in the early days Yun often bribed police for them. Rami soon entered the scene, 
providing the legitimate business and mining license, thus allowing the Jerabo to ferry the 
ore and copper to the processing facilities without being stopped by police. If believed, 
part (but not all) of what is going on there can be thought of as a copper laundering 
scheme for copper stolen from companies including Mopani. Some of the operation is 
quite legitimately a community empowerment and re-mining project. And the rest is 
politics. 
After a spike in copper prices, these former waste sites became quite valuable and 
foreign investors started eying the dumps—but by that time, the Jerabo and other small-
scale miners had been working on the Black Mountains for years. Some told me they had 
 
20 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
21 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
22 Interview with Anonymous Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
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worked there since they were as young as five years old. Their fathers were miners and 
they learned from them. They had developed a strong and proud identity surrounding 
their work and were able to provide for their families. Workers I spoke to beamed with 
pride when they called themselves miners, saying that the Black Mountain was theirs, 
and they would fight for it. 
And fight they did. After ENRC owned it, a Chinese company, Chambishi, 
bought rights. At one point the company reportedly attempted to pay the community a 
sum of money in order to appease the miners and get them to stop working, but instead 
the miners protested against the company—turning violent and turning to the courts. 
Given the rumored political connections between the Jerabo and the Government—and 
the fact that they were willing to be violent, break machinery, and threaten any of the 
legal owners who visited the Mountain—the Government “gave” the Mountain to the 
communities, saying that the communities needed to be benefiting from the waste in their 
backyards.23  
Politically, the Black Mountain had been ‘given’ to the Wusakile Youth—but not 
legally. When the Chinese company that legally ‘owned’ the Mountain sued, a judge said 
the Wusakile Youth could mine while the case is ongoing, and the case was put on hold 
for years.24 In practice, Rami gets every other truck of ore. The other half is split up by 
the ‘community’, organized through the Commander. They are divided into groups of 15 
men or 15 women. Each group is allowed to fill two trucks once a week or every other 
 
23 Interview with Black Mountain workers, 2016. 
24 After I left Zambia, the Black Mountain was taken away from the Jerabo post-elections. It must have 
been a scandal given all the campaigning done for the PF. They had a bit of an uprising, and last I heard 
they had regained control. 
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week. On days when a group is not filling trucks, the dig and pick through the Black 
Mountain on the other side men (women told me they did not do this, unlike what 
Mususa found in Luanshya). There are multiple sites: the trucks operate in one area 
which people called the ‘bedroom’ and picking is done in other areas, such as the ‘sitting 
room’25. This could be considered a symbiotic relationship. Rami provides the mining 
license, heavy machinery, and business-legitimacy; the Jerabo network provides security 
and organizes potentially violent workers; and the community provides the labor and 
socio-political legitimacy. It is, says the Commander, all about livelihoods for the 
community. “Being heroes in the community [but now also] who has got the most 
money”.26 It is highly beneficial, especially to those at the top. 
Violence, Danger, and Disagreements 
 
 The ambiguity of the Black Mountain does not stop at who owns it. It also 
encompasses the identities of those who work on it day to day. On the one hand, the story 
of the Black Mountain is about community empowerment. Heroes. People working to 
feed their families. On the other the lawlessness always seeps in. I asked the second focus 
group what they would be doing if they did not work on the Black Mountain, if say, the 
PF did not win the next election and the Mountain was taken from them: “Jele kwisula 
[the prisons would be full! Laughter in the background] People will start indulging in 
criminal activities like stealing. So whatever you see you will steal. You will find clothes 
on the line, and you will get them and run, just to get the money. You will find someone 
 
25 Focus Group 2 with Black Mountain workers, 2016. 
26 Interview with Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
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cooking a pot of relish [vegetables], you will steal the pot of relish…”27 There was 
widespread agreement. (Those who organized the trucking side of the business had other 
job aspirations. One friend of mine wanted to get a PhD and become a professor. We had 
a long conversation about research methods and teaching. Another wanted a government 
contract for an unrelated business venture. They did not ever live in Wusakile. Instead, 
they were previously middle-level mineworkers who had been laid off in the recent past 
and had the connections with the more financially flush side of the business.) 
“There is no law on the mountain” Peter told me. 28 29 Mbimbi continues, “it is 
uncivilized.”30  My appearance prompted several people to identify themselves as 
“peacekeepers” among the workers. I heard stories of stabbings and beatings. One group 
told me that being beaten was a rite of passage. If you needed money badly enough, you 
would go to pick at the Mountain and be beaten, day after day, until one day, people just 
stopped. That’s how to start.31 Others, of course, would say that the perception that 
Jerabo were violent was overblown. Zambia, after all, has not known war and is a 
peaceful country. One insider captured the ambivalence: “[Money from the Black 
Mountain], it’s going to empower the communities. Which they do. They’re not the 
greatest guys, [the Jerabo.] They rape. They do all kinds of shit. But they do send kids to 
school. They do a lot of that stuff. Not stand up people I must say”.32 
 
27 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
28 Interview with Black Mountain Worker, 2016. 
29 Others, however, do recount rules and say there is a system set up with peacekeeprs and generally 
accepted practices. 
30 Interview with Black Mountain Worker, 2016. 
31 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
32 Interview with Black Mountain insider, 2016. 
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Disagreements often break out over payments, trucks, and labor. Supposedly the 
trucks rotate. One is filled for Rami, then for a male community group, then a female 
community group, and then back to Rami and so on (others said Rami got half the trucks, 
so it would go Rami-men and then Rami-women).  However, the community complains 
that at times they are left without trucks while Rami is filling all of the trucks. Smaller-
scale workers complained to me, saying the government thought that all the Wusakile 
Youth were organized into a cooperative and getting access to trucks “but meanwhile this 
has not happened” and many are left only digging. Some complain that even when they 
pay for trucks themselves, they are not paid on time. While some are dissatisfied with the 
timing and amounts of payments, they also rely on Rami for his license and many 
workers are too afraid of Rami to fight the arrangement. There is money to be made, and 
they are at least making some of it. 
Image 35: A cement post in which Chambishi claims ownership over the Black Mountain and a campaign sticker 
for the President is placed on top. Many say the President gave the community the Mountain 
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 But Rami’s people also spoke about disagreements at the Black Mountain 
impacting their work. The Jerabo leadership’s role is to organize the community, and 
when leadership fights break out33, it can be too dangerous for Rami’s people to go to the 
Mountain at all. The trucking part of the operation can thus close down for months during 
a community leadership vacuum or a disagreement with a Commander, who they pay 
well. “We both have each other by the balls” said someone from Rami’s side of things. 
 One of the roles of (at least some of) the workers on the Black Mountain was 
campaigning for the PF. Campaigning, to them, does not mean going door to door and 
talking about the issues, but rather projecting power and dominance over anyone who 
might support an opponent. Because workers feel like the President gave them the 
 
33 This happened frequently after the death of the previous Commander (only months before my research 
began). 
Image 36: The fist is a political signal for the PF. 
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Mountain—and is keeping the Chinese company out—they support the ruling party. They 
fly a PF flag at the Mountain (see image 29) and, in a political act, glued a poster of the 
President over a stone saying Chambishi owned the Black Mountain (see image 42). 
Even while taking a picture, several workers flashed the PF hand sign, a fist (see image 
42). I was invited to go on a campaigning trip (I declined partially for safety reasons and 
partially due to scheduling) but I did ask what campaigning meant. “It means we 
intimidate,” said the Commander. They weren’t often actually violent, he says, they just 
appear like they could be violent (news of violent PF cadres does make one wonder what 
happens while campaigning). Still, their work on the Black Mountain gives them not only 
an identity of miner and financial empowerment, but a political identity and connection to 
the high-powered movers and shakers in the country. 
Violence is not the only danger on the Mountain. It fights back. In addition to 
being buried alive, the substance of the Mountain is irritating, and workers say it has 
“acid” and maybe “chemicals” on it. “When this Black Mountain was first given [to us], 
Mr. Youngson34 told us ‘you should be careful, there are chemicals that they dumped on 
this mountain.’ So he put lime on them. So whenever you see a place where there’s lime, 
you should stay away”. 35 His friend added, “That’s also why they haven’t given us the 
other Mountain, the one behind this one. Because the chemicals there are on top”.36 Dust, 
too is a problem. Workers complain about catching the flu easily and getting itchy eyes. 
 
34 Real name as he is well known and had passed away before I was there. 
35 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
36 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
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The Mountain is Not for Sale 
The Black Mountain is seen by most as a dangerous place not only because of the 
work being done but the people involved. Some of these resource fights are rather small-
scale skirmishes, which I will discuss later. But the fight over the Black Mountain itself is 
also a fight about who should own and benefit from Zambian resources.  
A video uploaded to YouTube illustrates this better than words and I encourage 
my readers to listen.37 In the video, the Commander wears a black face mask and waves 
around a sledgehammer (see image 37). “We are ready to die over the mountain” he 
yells, to laughter in the background. A man yells out “so you are same, same, like Boko 
Haram, eh?” The Commander continues, the sledgehammer raised above his head, 
Commander:  No, our government has already empowered us. We won’t 
be intimidated [there are whistles and laughter in the 
background.] Our President has empowered us. 
Man 1: They want to bring in Chinese, what’s your view? 
Commander:  Let them go to China. 
Man 1: And Lebanese? 
Commander:  Let him go to Lebanon. 
Man 2: They are talking about giving the Mountain to the Chinese, 
what do you say about it? 
 
37 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAzcyFNp38U “Chile Zambia claims of the Black Mountain in 
Wusakile” 
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Commander: Is it in China? No, it’s in Wusakile. Wusakile, Kitwe. They 
[The Chinese] can’t even come to us. We have shot them 
before. 
 
They continue, with the Commander again mentioning that the President gave them the  
Mountain and waving the sledgehammer, which is for “anyone who comes to intimidate 
us.” In the background, a man says, “don’t undermine the power of stupid people in large 
numbers.” And the Commander, to laughter, finishes by saying, “we are willing to die 
over the Mountain.” This sense of ownership pervades the operation. In my focus group 
with the small-scale artisanal miners who picked through the material, they said, “This 
Mountain is not for sale”.38  
 
38 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
Image 37: The Commander of the Black Mountain saying "we will die for the 
Mountain" 
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Knowing how to re-mine 
Part of this feeling of ownership comes from knowing the Mountain. Small-scale, 
artisanal workers have immense knowledge about the material in the Mountain, gained 
from experience and generational teaching: “Twalifishiba fyonse [we know 
everything]”.39 Workers I spoke with claimed they know how valuable each piece is by 
sight, feel, and weight in their hand. They claim to be able to sense the percentage of 
copper (or other material) contained in the rock.40 Dan digs through his sack, “this one 
has got a high percentage. This one may have 40 or 50”.41 In addition to copper, there are 
 
39 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
40 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
41 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
 
Image 38: Showing me material with a high percentage of copper 
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other substances. “White chrome” and a “purple chrome” is highly valued by the 
scrapyards around town.42 Mambala, they say, is just waste rock, not valuable. 
They also know the ‘geology’ of the Mountain, for lack of a better word. They tell 
me different parts of the dump were in use at different times, and knowing this history 
helps them find the most valuable sections to work in. Lower down has older, more 
valuable material but it is significantly more dangerous to dig tunnels inwards from the 
base of the Mountain. Some areas have a white powder: “even the powder, it has got a 
percentage,” they tell me.43 Two areas appear to more like ‘soil’—one has soil with “six  
percent” copper the other with “twelve percent”.44 The Mountain has veins of copper that 
run diagonally, similar to how it might appear underground. This is because of how 
 
42 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
43 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
44 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016.  
Image 39: A bag of material from re-miners digging through the Mountain. 
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material was dumped out of the trucks: the heavier, more copper-rich materials would fall 
further down when dumped. When a worker hits on a vein, the digging starts. 
Workers start their day by searching around until they find the right ‘material.’ 
“When searching we dig a hole, just by instinct. You may find that you have dug that 
hole and nothing comes of it. Again, the following day, you dig in the same ditch. And by 
God’s grace you’ll find that you have the material”.45 Digging is done more safely by 
creating “benches” (see image 40 of a ‘bench’ in Kabwe’s Black Mountain). This 
“bench” helps mitigate against caving. The second group explains benching to me: 
Sometimes there will be copper for about 10 meters down but for about 1 
meter on top, it is just waste. So for those people who are in need of quick 
money, they will just dig and then go under. For us to bench we remove that 
one meter of rubbish out in a normal way and start digging to reach [a more 
solid section underneath which] the material can be found.46 
 
45 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
46 Focus Group 2 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
Image 40: A bench. See how unprofitable material above solid rock is removed, and digging commences below the 
more solid rock 
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When I saw a bench in person, it looks like waste material was excavated down to a layer 
that had melded together like stone, and then workers dug underneath the ‘stone’ layer, 
creating a tunnel. This knowledge—from daily experience of digging—they plan to pass 
down to their children. The Mountain, huge as it is, seems inexhaustible, “even my kids 
will benefit from this”. 
 
Image 41: Close up of a bench. I was asked not to take photos of people digging, so I did not. When working, someone 
would crawl underneath this bench to dig for valuable material. 
* * * 
Rather than marginalization, these Black Mountain workers are proud of their 
work, of their ability to take control of ‘their’ Mountain, and of their new identity as 
‘miners.’ At times they do not even think of the Black Mountain as waste: “What we just 
know is that we are making money. You could say it is trash when you are not selling it. 
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But now, since we are selling it, it is not trash. Even the Chinese people by this”.47 48 The 
Black Mountain is not only on the ‘edge’ of the city—between houses and KCM and 
Mopani mines—but also on the ‘edge’ of legality, corruption, and Zambian identity. It is 
a place where the underground has been quite literally turned into a mountain: where 
stolen copper can be smelted into legally exported goods, where ex-prisoners become 
valued businessmen, where waste and danger become a way to sustain livelihoods. 
If ruination is an ongoing process, a means of bringing the past forward, and 
haunting the connections between past and present, then workers at the Black Mountain 
are constantly operating within a ruin. Their work continually brings forth not only their 
connections to miners of the past, but also the national nostalgia over the mining identity. 
Those working with only their “manpower” may be embodying a marginalized, 
precarious worker in the new global economy but are simultaneously connected with a 
new, more ambiguous politics.  
 
 
47 Focus Group 1 with Black Mountain Workers, 2016. 
48 Interestingly, the first focus group had quite a debate over whether the Black Mountain was waste. When 
I asked why the main mine Nkana did not just take it back, they said that it was because the Black 
Mountain was a “dumping area. They don’t care about it because they have already dumped it. They have 
already taken what is valuable from there and the rest is the waste”. It is not that mine buying it back. 
Instead “the people who buy are Chinese [naming several companies]” (Focus Group 1 with Black 
Mountain Workers, 2016). 
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Chapter 6: ‘Senta is better than acid that is gas’: Embodied knowledge 
and the politics of refusal in Kankoyo, Mufulira 
 
 
We believe the one who has power. He is the one who gets to write the story. So when you study history, 
you must ask yourself, Whose story am I missing? Whose voice was suppressed so that this voice could 
come forth? Once you have figured that out, you must find that story too. From there you get a clearer, yet 
still imperfect, picture. 




It starts in the eyes.  
 
 
Choma, a woman in her mid-40s who has lived in Kankoyo for decades, tells me she can 
sense the onset of Mopani’s emissions. “When the senta is released, it temporarily blinds 
your eyes and you cannot see properly. Then, in your mouth, you get a very bitter taste. 
Sometimes you cannot even breathe unless you cover your mouth and nostrils with a wet 
piece of cloth”1. It is so bad, she says, that you cannot escape it. When you run into your 
house and “lock doors and windows, senta will still get in”2. It follows you. “Even in 
your house, you still feel the effects of senta”3. In a women’s pressure group, formed by 
community members in Kankoyo to hold Mopani to account for their environmental 
destruction, Nana says she has found an even earlier warning system: “when you just see 
the children coming home from playing football. Running”.4 The field is adjacent to the 
plant, so playing children—desperate to see the football—are hit first. 
After itchy eyes, residents recount more serious health issues. Coughing. 
Vomiting. Collapse. Death. Almost every person in each of my randomized focus groups 
 
1 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
2 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
3 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
4 Kankoyo’s Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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recounted a time when their personal health was affected by air pollution from the 
Mopani Mine. Rashes, coughing fits, long-term respiratory issues such as asthma, or 
feeling faint are common and experienced widely and residents are well aware that these 
experiences are common. “Here in Kankoyo,” says Choma, “all of us are sick people”.5  
Kape nods in agreement. “When the sulfur is emitted from the plant,” she says, 
“even here, where we are seated, we could not sit. Some of us only manage to wake up in 
the hospitals after being affected by sulfur dioxide”.6 She speaks from experience. In 
2014 a stronger-than-average emissions event led to a riot in Kankoyo. Several 
community members are reported to have died that day from the emissions and many 
others were “rushed to the hospital”.7 Kape herself says she fainted that day: “My 
husband started crying. He thought I was dead. I don’t even know who took my child 
[who was with me].”8 Later, during the riot, the Kitwe Mobile Police Unit arrived and 
started firing tear gas. Gas on gas in this toxic township. 
* * * 
In the previous chapters I argued that Mopani and the government attempt to 
evade responsibility for their mine pollution by manufacturing ignorance amongst local 
residents (see chapters 2 and 3) and that their tactics amount to ‘letting [residents] 
wait’—forcing them to endure and sustain their livelihoods amidst toxicity (see chapters 
4 and 5). In these next two chapters (6 and 7), I revisit the two most polluted townships in 
Mufulira—Kankoyo and Butondo—where there are few undisputed facts about what is 
 
5 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
6 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
7 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
8 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
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happening. Everything is contested. Residents are fighting to prove that excessive 
pollution even exists, let alone who is liable or when, exactly, these emissions occurred. 
To do so, they conduct research, make inferences, and compare experiences to create an 
embodied knowledge, a way of knowing and claiming expertise through a sustained 
connection between bodies and place.  
In this chapter, I develop the concept of embodied knowledge by advancing three 
ways in which it is produced. First, I look at how residents in Kankoyo know through 
sensing (a play on the ‘citizen sensing’ literature, see Gabrys et al. 2016). Pollution is 
felt. Tasted. Residents here have a bodily sense about its severity, timing, and dangers. 
Their bodies are the “low-cost and accessible” technologies (ibid:1) used to monitor the 
environment.  
 Second, embodied knowledge is emplaced: it is a knowledge firmly rooted in the 
kinds of things you learn about a place from being there day in and day out. This is 
knowledge gained through negotiating surroundings over time. It is inference, deduction, 
and imagination. It is knowledge captured by having the time to experiment—and the 
time to feel an acute cough become chronic. This follows from Donna Haraway’s field-
defining work on “situated knowledge”, where she argues that all knowledge is partial 
and embodied (1988), and geographers who have since taken up her work (Neely and 
Nguse 2015; Nightingale 2003). 
Third, embodied knowledge is recounted. It is knowledge that arises when people 
with this sensed, emplaced experience recount with each other the happenings, events, or 
even day-to-day, mundane endurances that make up life here. Residents talk about their 
suspicions. They warn others about the water, describe episodes of severe contamination, 
 191 
and recollect their confrontations with Mopani managers and government representatives. 
The idea of recounted knowledge takes up work on community knowledges through story 
(Cameron 2008, 2015; Povinelli 2015), rumor (Ghosh 2008; Giles-Vernick and Rupp 
2006; Onneweer 2014; White 2000) and narrative knowledge (Cruikshank 2000; Lejano 
et al. 2013)—yet without conforming to a binary between stories that can be mined for 
facts versus those which tell a more meaningful truth. 
In the last part of the chapter I examine how residents establish themselves as 
experts. This is done by mobilizing embodied knowledge through a politics of refusal 
(Katz 2017; Reddy 2017; Simpson 2014). They refuse to be considered ignorant and in 
this refusal they also turn away from the ways in which the regulatory apparatus and its 
apparent “gaze from nowhere” (Haraway 1988) is legitimized. That is, admitting they 
may not ‘know’ in the way that Mopani and the government demand, they similarly 
refuse the notion that they do ‘not know’ and that the mine does (that the mine’s story is 
objective)—and, even, that ‘knowing’ comes solely from instruments, calculations, and 
the kinds of powerful networks a multinational corporation has access to. Residents flip 
the script. They change the “language of contention” Roseberry 1994) from scientific 
expertise dependent on technology to which access is limited or heavily controlled into a 
knowledge dependent upon emplacement: I know because I am here and you are not. 
Residents claim that only by living in the township can one truly know what is 
happening. Their bodies—and the embodied knowledge they create through them—bear 
witness to the limits of scientific evidence in this case. 
Of course, residents do not dispute the idea of empirical evidence or the use of 
technological instruments to monitor pollution. Indeed, residents covertly collect data 
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from visiting journalists who say Mopani’s emissions exceed limits and call upon their 
political representatives to find out what is in the new, bluish air emissions. What they do 
dispute is the way in which scientific evidence has been deployed in interested, biased, or 
corrupted ways by the mine and the government. This science cannot be trusted. It 
obfuscates. It lacks transparency. And even when its tools are taken up by well-meaning 
outside researchers, it struggles to do what is needed: to locate cause and effect in a way 
that makes a material difference in their lives.9 Residents I spoke with argued that 
numbers and instruments could be corrupted while lived experience won’t lie.  
The residents’ recountings that I relate throughout this chapter come out of 
encounters, engagements, and entanglements between myself, a white PhD student from 
the United States; Mwelwe Musosha, a Zambian degree holder who greatly assisted this 
research and who works in local environmental organizations; government 
representatives, civil society leaders and mine sector insiders; and—most significantly—
residents themselves, who (as a local NGO leader put it) “are so informed about the 
environment and the pollution [that] if they talk about it [with you] it is more or less like 
you are talking to a scientist”.10 These engagements have surely been shaped by the 
positions of all of us who gathered in living rooms across the city. Recognizing my own 
position (see chapter 1), my goal is not to exoticize the communities who welcomed us 
into their homes or to ‘otherize’ the kind of knowledge they wield, but instead to write 
 
9 Even in countries with strong environmental laws and well-funded legal and environmental justice groups 
it would be difficult to, for example, legally prove that chronic conditions such as asthma arose because of 
pollution after 2002 instead of before. An environmental lawyer in Zambia told me these kinds of cases are 
notoriously difficult to prove and therefore that a lawsuit might not be the most effective way for residents 
to challenge Mopani. 
10 Interview with Mulamba, NGO leader, 2016. 
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from “a space of betweenness to produce something new” (Katz 1996:496) all while 
fostering “the goal [of] better accounts of the world” (Haraway 1988:590). 
Sensed, Emplaced, Recounted: A sketch of the (em)body 
 
 My use of the term sensed to help define embodied knowledge plays on the 
“citizen sensing” literature emerging itself out of a healthy interaction within 
environmental justice-oriented citizen science more broadly (Gabrys, 2014, 2017; Gabrys 
et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016; Pritchard and Gabrys, 2016;). Jennifer Gabrys and her 
colleagues define citizen sensing as using “low-cost and accessible digital technologies to 
monitor environments” and contribute to new data collection practices (Gabrys et al. 
2016:1). They challenge the tendency for “regulators, scientists and polluters … to 
discredit citizen data due to concerns about the monitoring instruments used, the data 
protocols followed, and the supposed introduction of ‘bias’ that is seen to skew 
monitoring results” (ibid:2). They argue that even if and when these citizen sensing 
methods and technologies “fall outside of the usual practices of legitimation and 
validation that characterise scientific data” they may, indeed, be “just good enough” to 
raise concerns that prompt further, more “scientific” study (ibid).  
Gabrys and her team worked with citizens using these ‘low-cost and accessible’11 
technologies to monitor air pollution nearby fracking operations in Pennsylvania. 
Together they created a toolkit for analyzing and visualizing local air quality data. Their 
goal was to create a “data story”, which would “situate environmental sensor data in its 
lived material conditions” of everyday life in polluted environs (ibid). Throughout this 
 
11 Though, they were working in marginalized communities in the United States and what is accessible to 
low-income citizens in Pennsylvania are not (yet?) accessible to low-income residents in Mufulira. 
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chapter I play with this concept of “citizen sensing” by looking at how residents 
themselves—their bodies—are the accessible technologies through which they ‘sense.’ 
Unlike Gabrys et al., who rely on digital technologies for citizen sensing, I suggest here 
that the body itself is the low-cost sensor. I argue residents’ sensory data—itchy eyes, 
coughing, rashes, asthma, visually seeing pollution coming out of a stack—should also 
create a ‘data story’ that is ‘just good enough’ to be taken seriously by regulators, 
lawyers, and Mopani. 
 ‘Emplaced’ gets at the idea that all bodies are situated in a place, and that the 
knowledge we create comes not only from sensory experiences but out of interactions 
with these places. Haraway insists on the “embodiedness of all vision” and argues that 
objectivity comes only from acknowledging that you hold a partial perspective 
(1988:581). While admitting that the “standpoints of the subjugated are not ‘innocent’ 
positions” they are nonetheless preferred because they are most likely to be “on to the 
god trick” of “being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively” (ibid:584). That is, 
local embodied knowledge both knows itself as partial and knows that “totalizing 
versions of claims to scientific authority” are also partial (ibid). Through her call to 
situate knowledge she “argu[es] for the view from a body, always a complex, 
contradictory, structuring, and structured body, versus the view from above, from 
nowhere, from simplicity” (ibid: 589). This chapter takes up these views from the body in 
seeking to understand how residents experience their environments. 
 Finally, even critical approaches to citizen science often limit our understanding 
of environmental knowledge to data-driven methods of accumulating facts—which could 
be sensed or emplaced. This makes it difficult to work with communities who might also 
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utilize stories, rumors, proofs, and imaginative deductions that do not (always) conform 
to these standards yet are still telling truth. To grapple with this, I include in ‘embodied 
knowledge’ knowledge arising from recountings. 
My approach to understanding recounting starts from research in anthropology, 
environmental history, and geography on how community stories and rumors are often 
true and something to learn from, even if their extrapolated details are not fact (Cameron 
2015; Cruikshank 1998, 2005; Giles-Vernick and Rupp 2006; Kosek 2006; Povinelli 
2015; White 2000). These scholars argue stories are true within and because of their 
context, overall meaning, or purpose. For example, Cruikshank argues that a major 
shortcoming in anthropology concerning local oral narratives is “the idea that truthful 
knowledge can somehow be ‘captured’” from oral histories (Cruikshank, 2005:73). They 
are not, Cruikshank argues, “collectible texts” to mine historical data from—they are true 
within and because of the context and variability of the story (ibid:73). Similarly, Giles-
Vernick and Rupp (2006:60) argue that scholars may not want to enumerate from the late 
1990s stories from central Africa of gorilla attacks, but instead they should examine how 
these stories together tell a truth about control over natural resources and locals’ conflict 
with natural management strategies that protected gorillas over humans. 
 Luise White analyzes the purpose, meaning, and truth of rumors while examining 
vampire stories in eastern and central Africa. Vampire stories, quickly, were told during 
the late colonial period and formed a “genre” (White 2000:92).  While the stories differ in 
details according to location, the teller, and the time, the general tale is that white 
colonizers kidnapped Africans in order to drain their blood, often to cure some unknown 
disease. These stories often strike outsiders as fantastical and patently false. As White 
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(ibid:53) acknowledges, she found herself wondering “what, in any form, could be 
reliable about a vampire story?”12 
 Indeed, the very fact that she calls these vampire stories “rumors” and “gossip”—
terms recently “lump[ed] together… to create a category of unreliable oral information” 
(ibid:56)—reveals her uneasiness with their questionable veracity. However, White 
struggles with this terminology as well, carefully using the word rumor with caution, 
admitting, “it is a very poor term with which to discuss stories that the storytellers think 
of as true” (ibid:58). At one point, she recounts a story of her and her research assistant 
“hectoring” an interviewee “to admit that vampires did not exist”—surely, people 
couldn’t really believe vampire stories (ibid:13). He responded, “they existed as stories”, 
seeing “true and false [as] historical and cultural constructions” (ibid). Truth, for this 
interviewee, was not about “absolutes” but was the “product of lived experience, of 
thought and reflection, of hard evidence” (ibid). In this way, White argues people 
“construct and repeat stories that carry the values and meanings that most forcibly get 
their points across … [and] explain what happened” (ibid).13 To find the truth in rumors 
and story14—and embodied knowledge—then, we need to stop trying to ‘mine’ truth or 
 
12 Yet she also argues that “asking, let alone deciphering, what a rumor is about suggests that a rumor is 
about one thing. Such a question takes rich texts of half-truths and local knowledges and makes them linear 
and simplified” (White 2005: 245). 
13 She goes on further to say, “Misunderstandings or not, these stories presented grim ideas about 
knowledge, expertise, and therapeutic and political power … I think there are many obvious reasons why 
Africans might have thought that colonial powers took precious substances from African bodies, and I 
doubt if Africans needed to see or hear of a specific medical procedure to imagine that white people would 
hang them upside down and drain their blood. I think bloodsucking by public employees is a fairly obvious 
metaphor for state-sponsored extractions” (White, 2000:15). 
14 Rumors are seen as true—to those hearing and passing along the rumor—often because they seem to be 
plausible (White, 2000) or “reasonable conjectures” (Lee 2009, 2017). While they may not be a good 
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verify facts. Instead, we must ask different types of questions: why they are so 
widespread? Why they are believed? What is the underlying context for them? What do 
they explain? How do they ‘seek truth’ if not certify it? And, what does the knowledge 
say about those who embody it? 
However, these approaches to story and rumor also tend to reinforce the idea that 
many stories are only true in a deeper social sense. 15 The word ‘story’ itself often evokes 
the idea of fiction, allegory, myths, morality tales, or metaphor. This implies that specific 
elements of stories—a river being transgender, Africans being drained of blood, or gorilla 
attacks—are not factually true. Here I use recounted because I find the term allows for a 
messy, embodied in-between. People both recount events that are ‘factually’ true and 
those which ‘carry the values and meanings that most forcibly explain what happened’. 
They are grounded in facts and also true due to their effects. As will be seen, many 
instances of embodied knowledge in Kankoyo and Butondo are likely factually accurate. 
Yet the additional existence of elements that are more suspect, I argue, should not take 
away—and should even add—to our understanding of what is happening in Mufulira. 
Mopani’s Account 
Mopani claims that pollution is becoming a non-issue in Mufulira. Yet many 
people, including Mufulira residents, NGO representatives, and government officials are 
suspicious of Mopani’s self-reported data and overall claim that they are not polluting 
above allowable standards. However, as discussed in chapter 3, there are limited, if any, 
resources to confirm or invalidate their claims within the prescribed ‘regulatory 
 
historical source for “what happened” rumors do uncover “what people believed could have happened in 
the past and could happen in the future” (ibid: 181). 
15 But not always of course!  
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apparatus’. Mopani’s first acid plant became operational around 2012. With it, Mopani 
claimed they captured 50% of the SO2 emitted from the smelter. By 2015, the second 
acid plant went operational and Mopani now argues it captures 97%16 of the SO2 from 
their smelter operations. With this capture they manufacture lucrative sulfuric acid that is 
shipped around the country in large trucks. They also argue their upgraded smelter is 
better for the environment because it is new and came from a “first world country”. 17 
However, a little digging complicates this story. The Isasmelt technology was chosen 
because it emitted stronger offgases. It was developed in Isa, Australia, and the Glencore-
owned mine there fought being shut down by the Australian government for years due to 
environmental reports that it emitted high levels of heavy metals, including lead. (This 
 
16 See chapter 3 for a breakdown of what these figures actually represent—conversion efficiencies rather 
than SO2 capture.  
17 Interview with Kennedy, Mopani insider, 2016.  
 
Image 42: Sulfuric acid being transported from Mopani Mine 
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mine, too, defends its environmental record and calls the lead poisoning of local 
Australian children “natural”.18) At Mopani, one mining insider called emissions after the 
smelter upgrade “an infinitesimal amount, really”19 while another said they only released 
“fugitive fumes” or except when there was an accidental equipment breakdown.20 21 The 
number of acid trucks being driven through town (see image 44) and across Zambia 
appears to corroborate their claims. Indeed, government representatives and ZEMA 
inspectors cite the acid trucks as reason to believe air quality has improved substantially 
in Kankoyo. Clearly, it seems, acid is going into the trucks and not the air.  
 However, this accounting is vehemently disputed by the residents of Kankoyo. 
They do not dispute the acid trucks driving around (many are concerned they may tip 
over and spill due to the large potholes the area). But, residents argue, not only is air 
 
18 The Independent article on the Mount Isa Mine (where the IsaSmelt technology was produced and started 
operating in the 1980s) said, “During 2007-08 its Mount Isa operations emitted 289 tonnes of [pollutants]. 
Scientists conclude that heavy metals in local soils come from smelter emissions and the enormous 
uncapped slagheaps. An eminent American professor of environmental toxicology, Russell Flegal, found 
higher concentrations of lead in [Mount Isa’s] soils than in notoriously polluted mining towns in China and 
Romania… According to Ed Turley, [Xtrata’s] environmental manager, Xstrata's 15 air quality monitors 
are ‘the most intensive monitoring system in Australia’. But asked where the lead in children's blood is 
coming from if not the mine, Gordon Teague, head of its Air Quality Control Centre, replies: ‘Airborne 
from the [mining] lease.’” (Marks, 2 November 2009). 
19 Interview with Banda, Mopani insider, 2016. 
20 Interview with Kennedy, Mopani insider, 2016. 
21 Community members are aware that Mopani tells people outside Zambia that there is no longer pollution. 
In my third focus group Mwansa recounted, “Even last time [month?] there was a group of white people 
who came. They ended up coming to my place after they were disturbed by the rains. They came to my 
place to start the interviews. They even took some pictures here. After they visited, they started taking 
pictures of certain gardens which had plants that turned from green to yellow, as in the leaves. They said 
that when the company goes back to their country, they have announced that they have fixed the problem of 
senta here. So they took some pictures from this garden and they asked us about it… Just last week, what 
was the day when that senta was released? I think it was last week” (Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016). 
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pollution ongoing, the situation is actually worse now than it was before the smelter 
upgrade and addition of acid plants. 
In disputing Mopani’s accounts, residents use embodied knowledge for more than 
documenting instances of pollution. They also argue experience has taught them that 
nothing is being done because of corruption and a political environment exclusively 
focused on attracting foreign investment through negligent oversight of international 
mining firms like Glencore, which has a majority share in Mopani. In an environment 
where “there are no facts”22 about the environment, Mufulira residents have generated an 
embodied, experiential knowledge about pollution that they say proves their case. 
“Senta is better than acid that is gas” 
 
In Kankoyo, residents appear well aware that the timing of contamination matters 
in terms of who is responsible. In all of my Kankoyo focus group residents agreed that air 
emissions are worse now (2016) than during the ZCCM era. In fact, members of the 
 
22 Interview with Nawa, Mopani industry, 2016. 
Image 43: “Early in the morning when we come out of our house, we can hardly see the sun because of the senta” 
(Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016). 
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Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group said that most residents actually blamed the acid 
plants on the worsening emissions. Rather than having the expected impact of lessening 
sulfur dioxide emissions, residents cite this timeframe as when a more dangerous, less 
visible but as yet unknown pollutant started being emitted from the mine. Several focus 
groups mentioned this new substance.23 
Call it senta. Gas.24 Pure acid. 25 Or a mixture of acids and the “combination of a 
lot of particulates or substances” that fall to the ground. “They mix these things and emit 
them at once” says Bright.26 In the second focus group, John said, “now, they [Mopani] 
are mixing the senta with acid. [“Yes” in background] Actual acid. The air that we are 
breathing is filled with acid”.27 Chibuye is a Kankoyo resident and former mineworker 
(he had been laid off only a few months prior) who still has many contacts inside 
Mopani. He said this new gas is dangerous:  
There is a minor error here [when] they say that pollution has ended. Quite 
alright, there’s a change. If it is not emitted all is well. But when it is emitted, 
the emissions have changed.  
 
 
23 Nobody at the mines or in the government would go on record to state exactly why this could be. 
Speculations—each of these also brought up by several workers inside Mopani, local government, and/or 
regulatory agencies—include Mopani’s new smelter, the Isasmelt, releasing stronger offgases including 
sulfur trioxide; radiation due to processing uranium-enriched copper ore from the Lumwana uranium mine; 
or Mopani using undisclosed methods to process slag metals such as cobalt, silver, and gold—for which 
they do not have a license or EIA to process. But, in their original EIA for the Mufulira Mine Mopani did 
get a license to import cyanide despite it not commonly being used to process copper. One mining insider 
said that a bluish emission often happens when processing cobalt. Despite numerous contacts, the Mopani 
CEO turned down my request for a meeting and because of this Mopani workers would only speak 
anonymously and, in turn, I can only then speak in ‘speculation’. 
24 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
25 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
26 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
27 Kankoyo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
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How the emissions have changed is this: senta, which was [emitted in the 
past], it was different from this thing which we have now: gas. Gas is 
harmful for health, very harmful. Senta is better. Because I’ve been in the 
mines, specifically the smelter. Senta is better than acid that is gas. Because 
[now] it is like a tear gas or a bomb. That is how it is now. That is what has 
changed. These guys have changed things because they are doing business 
that involves acid. They are capturing senta but the chemicals they are using 
to make the acid are very strong, such that people’s health is being affected, 
especially children. Children have persistent coughs now. This is the truth. 
Things have changed, even though they capture the first senta, the gas that 
they make [and release] is worse than what was initially there”.28 
 
Residents say the new emissions look different, that they feel worse, and that it causes 
more long-term destruction to their Township than the old kind of senta ever did. Nana 
deduced that this emission is new because “in the past, the way it was when senta was 
emitted, the air in the area would seem bluish or white… But now, we cannot see it, 
though we can feel it. Just like teargas. Once you breathe it in [squeal!]”.29  
The different effects on people’s bodies are almost immediate, many say. Oscar, 
who previously worked in the mines said, “I don’t know what material they are using for 
smelting or refining [anymore] but [at] this time I think they are using much stronger 
chemicals. You find that whenever they discharge the excess thing, whenever they 
release the excess, you find that people cough and some will even cough to death”.30 In a 
different group, Bright said “So the senta which was polluting a long time ago is different 
than this. Because this one is a combination of acids and other substances. So the 
 
28 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
29 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group , 2016. 
30 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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situation is really bad. So if they were to emit, people like you who do not come here on a 
daily basis, you would be shedding tears”.31  
Christine in the Women’s Pressure Group concludes that the new emissions must 
have started in 2006, around the same time the acid plant went online. She recounted, 
“one day when we got near the acid plant, it felt like there were showers of rain but in the 
actual sense it was the acid. They don't even worry about lives. They don't care that there 
are children here”.32 After this experience, Christine says, she went to Mopani’s gates, 
asking some current mineworkers what it was. “They call it gas… Mopani [workers] 
themselves said it is gas… That’s how we started knowing that things have changed 
now.”33 In the fourth focus group residents had a conversation recounting their 
experiences with the new emissions having solid substances or particulate matter being 
emitted into the air from the mine (what Mopani might consider ‘dust’): 
- There were black shiny things [flying objects]. 
- They are shiny particles, like copper [yes] 
- They are shiny and a lot of them come out, you can even find them in water 
- Once it is emitted from there you can see on your skin that something has 
fallen on it. 
- They even sparkle, they are little solids 
- So [after experiencing this] we organized some monies and when we collected 
the particles [we] put them in a plastic and we took them to counselor [in 
Mufulira’s city center]. But we didn’t get any help [identifying them].34 
 
 
31 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
32 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
33 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
34 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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When they tried to figure out exactly what the particles were by going through the 
‘proper’ more official channels, they got nowhere. In the meantime, some residents have 
taken to calling the falling particles from the air ‘slag’ because they think it looks like the 
substance in the slag heaps adjacent to Kankoyo. 
Plantspeak  
The general inability to grow plants has long been a talking point in Kankoyo. For 
decades senta has “scorched plants”35 and only allowed sulfur-resistant trees and bushes 
to grow (see image 48). Annie, a grandmother who has lived in Kankoyo since her 
husband worked at the mine under ZCCM ownership, says “there are no gardens. You 
can't grow any vegetables here because of senta. They are scorched. You can't even plant 
 
35 Taken from a quote in the Kankoyo Focus Group 2, but this was also a more general claim and people in 
multiple focus groups used this language. 
 
Image 44: Slag heap outside of Kankoyo 
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flowers at home, nor can you grow any form of vegetables because they get burnt by the 
senta”.36 Bright echoed her, “Senta has terribly destroyed our environment. We can no 
longer cultivate, nor plant flowers as our surroundings are contaminated with senta”.37 In 
fact, she says, these small plants are an indicator of harmful emissions. “We only know 
this [that there is harmful pollution] through the small plants that we try to plant, like 
kalembula [pumpkin leaves] and rape. When we plant, it will not shoot. It will dry up. 
And we are able to know from that the soil has been contaminated”.38  
This matters because not being able to cultivate basic greens like sweet potato 
leaves increases residents’ economic vulnerability. Bright explains that “our livelihood, 
our daily sustenance” is at stake: “You can't even plant small basic plants like kalembula 
 
36 Kankoyo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
37 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
38 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
Image 45: This needled bush is the only hedge that will grow in Kankoyo according to residents. Image 46: Barren and in the shadow of Mopani 
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… In areas without contamination they are able to cultivate these small plants. Here, it's a 
different case. If you don't have money to buy vegetables, you sleep with hunger”.39 In 
addition to daily sustenance, Bright says, having a garden would allow women to sell at 
the market and buy basic necessities for their families. 
Because senta has been polluting Kankoyo, scorching vegetation for decades, 
residents gather emplaced knowledge to prove their current inability to grow plants is due 
to new, worse senta emissions and is not a legacy soil issue resulting from ZCCM’s past. 
For example, some point to visible changes in the soil after emissions events. Eve pointed 
to her yard and said “even the soil is affected. Sometimes when senta is released the soil 
will have dark [black] spots” afterwards.40 John, a former mineworker who still lives in 
 
39 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
40 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
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Kankoyo, says he knows the new senta is worse because even plants that he used to be 
able to grow in Kankoyo’s polluted soils are now dying. He claims, “they constructed the 
acid plant to reduce the effects of senta but it is worse now. It is still being emitted. We 
can’t even grow vegetables or flowers. Even the ulongosonga [a sulfur-resistant tree] 
can’t grow in my yard anymore”.41 Bright, who is new to the area having moved from 
Kitwe, said at first she did not believe neighbors when they recounted such things. So, 
she tried an experiment: 
Here the plants do not grow. Whenever I try to plant kalembula, people here 
tell me ‘no, the environment here does not support that because it has been 
contaminated’.  
 
At one point, I did not believe people here until I did a test myself. I went 
somewhere and got some flowers. I got two plastic containers, and in one 
container I filled it with the soil around the mine and in the other container 
I filled it with soil from the bush, where the senta is not strong. I then planted 
the flowers in that container which had soil free from contamination, and 
after some time the flowers shooted [sprouted]. I did the same with the other 
container and discovered that they could not shoot, they ended up drying 
out. That's when I knew the soil around the mine was badly contaminated.42 
  
Upon hearing this recounting, Charity’s neighbor Mwansa tells me that she travels “miles 
away to go and collect other soil free from contamination” but that “even if you bring in 
soil [from another area], whenever they release senta into to the atmosphere, it [the new 
soil] gets contaminated. So then we have to go again and collect other soil”.43 In multiple 
 
41 Kankoyo Focus Group 2. In the same group Beauty, a long-time Kankoyo resident, agreed saying 
“during ZCCM things were better. It was not until the foreigners took over the running of the mines [that it 
became worse]. During ZCCM ties, even though senta was being emitted it was far better than what we are 
experiencing now” 
42 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
43 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
Image 47: Experimenting with planting in containers containing contaminated and uncontaminated soil. 
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focus groups residents talked about anticipating when bad emissions events would 
happen so they could bring their container plants indoors so as not to contaminate the soil 
or scorch the plant. 
 Christine in the Women’s Pressure Group said that Mopani once unsuccessfully 
tried to mobilize this type of emplaced knowledge. The group walked with me to where 
Mopani planted several trees, now completely barren (see image 50). “Because of us 
talking about this issue [to the media], Mopani decided to plant trees. They planted trees 
somewhere there [pointing] so that they could try to prove that there was no acid. But the 
trees didn’t grow. They dried up. Mopani planted the trees, and the trees did not grow. So 
they know that there is a problem here”.44 Esther also recounted this story, saying that 
Mopani “demonstrated” there was no longer pollution by planting the trees but instead 
 
44 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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provided further evidence to residents that the pollution is still happening. Chansa, a 
community environmental leader who lives in Kankoyo, told me: 
If you go [to Kankoyo] you will be surprised, it is [like] a desert [because 
nothing grows].  We had a meeting with Mopani one time. They were refusing 
[what we are saying] and said, ‘no we have stopped polluting so you can plant 
whatever you want to plant and it will grow.’ Do you know what we did? We 
said, ‘no this is simple. Mopani is a big company.  Can you contract a company 
to plant some trees close to the plant?’ They planted about over 500 plants.  They 
all got damaged.  Three months later they came to recheck and they didn't find 
anything [the plants all died]. There were no leaves.  They left and they haven't 
brought back their answer.45 
 
45 Interview with Chansa, local community-based organization leader, 2016. 




Image 49: Residents recounted a time when Mopani tried to grow trees here to prove to the community they were no 
longer polluting--but all the trees died due to air emissions. 
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* * * 
Through emplacement, residents also gather information by seeing the non-living 
materials around them corrode and crack over time. Residents say that because iron 
roofing sheets corrode more quickly now than they did in the ZCCM era, they need more 
frequent replacement: “If you noticed the roofing sheets on the houses, all of them are 
ruined, yalibola [they are rotten]”.46 They also look at the effects of senta on their house 
paint and the increasing the number of cracks threatening ruin. Since this has gotten 
worse and more frequent since Mopani took over operations they argue the damage is 
new, not a result of legacy pollution: 
The houses we are staying in, they are not in good condition. We are only 
living in them, just for the grace of god we are living in them… The roofs 
are worn out due to senta. The walls are dilapidated because of senta. Even 
 
46 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
 
Image 50: Note the dilapidated roofing sheets on the houses leading up to the mine. 
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the workers, they have respiratory diseases because of senta. The mines 
have mostly destroyed the houses due to senta.47  
 
In talking about their emplaced knowledge, residents redefine words like 
‘experiment’ and ‘research’. In the women’s pressure group, the offered me an emplaced 
experiment: “You can buy iron roofing sheets today—new ones—[they] cannot even last 
for a month. You can do that as an experiment and see what happens”.48 Chibuya, a 
former mineworker who had recently been laid off, talks about the research he has done 
to support residents’ claims. He says,  
Actually I have a photo of a house [calls child to bring camera]. If you look 
at the way the roof on this house was, it was bad as a result of this air 
pollution.  
 
What happens is that during the rain season, I think they have some sensors 
there [at mine]. Once they see that there is rain they just release it 
automatically, the sulfur dioxide. Then when that mixes with the rain, the 
rain will not be real rain. It will be more like sulfuric acid. And when it 
drops on the soil, like others have mentioned, it [the soil] becomes acidic.  
 
47 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
48 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
Image 51: Some houses were damaged so badly that an NGO came in to give people with collapsed 
houses tents—“imagine living in that small tent with your whole family and all your belongings and 
property!” – Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group. 
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I also do my own research as I live in this compound… I move around. I 
look around, at how other people are staying. I especially look at the houses 
where they are coming from.49 
 
He goes on to say that the community is suffering because they cannot figure out who is 
responsible. In the past, ZCCM helped people maintain their houses. Mwansa remembers 
“ZCCM would go in the neighborhoods, donate iron sheets for those houses that were 
 
49 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
 
Image 52: Roofing sheets corroded due to senta 
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badly affected. Because they knew it was their responsibility due to the senta that they 
were emitting… But with Mopani, they are not concerned about that”.50 Now, Chibuye 
says, “The cost is just too much for individuals living in the compounds. I don’t know 
who is supposed to bear the cost: is it the government, the mines, or the individual? We 
don’t know what is happening”.51 Residents feel they should not be responsible for 
repairs that are only necessary because of Mopani’s pollution, but say both Mopani and 
the government are absolving themselves of the liability. 
* * * 
 
After describing some of the emplaced knowledge that comes from seeing roofing 
sheets corrode, or experimenting with growing plants in containers with soil from outside 
 
50 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016.  
51 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
Image 53: Kapika reflects on the bodily impacts of senta emissions 
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the area, residents speculate about what this means for how the pollution must be 
impacting their health and wellbeing in ways they can’t see or yet feel. For example, 
while walking out of my meeting with the Women’s Pressure Group, Kapika showed me 
an affliction that he links to senta emissions due to timing and asked, rhetorically, if his 
lungs had black spots like the leaves.  
 
After our focus group, Eve brought me to see her attempts at growing container 
plants in her yard. She pointed to a plant she said took years grow (see image 56). “Even 
plants like avocado and mango plants [which are resistant to sulfur and therefore were the 
main trees residents could grow during the ZCCM era] get burnt by this senta… Their 
leaves are burnt such that they can only change to yellow. Now can you imagine what 
Image 54: Eve says this plant took two years to grow. 
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that can do in the human body?”.52 Earlier Eve had pointed to the metal roofing sheets we 
sat underneath (see image 57): “Look—even the roofing materials are corroded. Can you 




 These simple deductions or imaginings are a way for residents to recount their 
emplaced knowledge and acknowledge their fears. But residents also sense and 
experience the health consequences of Mopani’s pollution every day. Most residents 
could remember and recount several specific incidents of severe pollution and note that it 
 
52 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
53 Kankoyo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
Image 55: Our focus group was held under iron roofing sheets. Residents said the corrosion was due to 
senta and acid rain. 
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feels different than how it felt under ZCCM or even the early 2000s. In the third focus 
group, Charity talked about one such incident in detail:  
At the clinic, the oxygen machines were brought out in advance and 
additional doctors were deployed because it was said that the senta which 
was going to be emitted that day would be very bad. A person who was 
brought to the clinic would be put on oxygen. When we heard about this we 
all vacated our places and went into town because we were scared about 
senta…  
 
Most of us who grew up in this area, we have never had that kind of 
experience, like we faced that day. [When they told us the senta would be 
released] we thought it was going to be normal, like what we undergo every 
day. This was not the case. It must have been a bad situation for them to 
deploy more doctors and oxygen machines… The senta which they emitted, 
it was really bad. You could not even sit on your chair”.54 
 
In the Women’s Pressure Group, Prosper said of the new emissions:  
Those who are affected die quickly. I also remember a day when it also 
affected me and I tried to go somewhere away from here because I couldn’t 
feel the fresh air [I was suffocating]. I felt like I was put in an enclosed space 
but there was no air. I searched for fresh air but couldn’t find it, I ran a long 
distance just hoping to find air to be able to breathe.55  
 
In the background as she recounted her experience another woman murmured, “that is 
what happened to me too”.56 
 In the second focus group, Longwe made the point that young children are 
particularly at risk living in Kankoyo. “If the senta is emitted babies like my child here 
 
54 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
55 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
56 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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who has asthma are badly affected”.57 Others around her nodded and added their personal 
experiences: 
- When the senta is emitted it gives me a problem because I experience chest 
problems [can't breathe properly]. Each and every time I have to go and see the 
doctor. 
- A lot of people have been affected in that way. 
- I’m affected also. 
- Icifuba tacipwa—the coughing problems that we have here are perpetual. 
They don't end. Especially in children. All the time we feel bad in our 
chests.58 
 
In the fourth focus group, Oscar recounted an incident from “this past year, 2015.”59 He 
says, “there was very bad acid released. We engaged a private person to come and test 
and check the readings of sulfur dioxide, [to see] what was causing us to get sick easily. 
Some who are on TB treatment when they just inhale the air you find that the TB 
medication does not work for them. Like for my first born child [here]. When they 
release the child will have skin rash and blood sometime would come out of the rash”60 
Blood coming from rashes was surprisingly one of the more widespread experiences next 
to coughing and asthma. 
Re-countings 
 
Incidences of death in the community were frequently recounted events—
recounted to me, within the community, and to outsiders including government, mining 
industry representatives and media. Community members said deaths due to air emissions 
were a new happening, one they do not remember occurring during the ZCCM era. 
 
57 Kankoyo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
58 Kankoyo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
59 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
60 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
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Mwansa said, “from the time that they [Mopani] started their operations, a lot of people 
have died because of senta… The air which [they] emitted killed a lot of people after 
some time.”61 The Women’s Pressure Group said they wanted to take me to see a 
neighbor to hear directly from her what happened to her father except “umutima 
walikalipa [her heart is still hurt].” Instead, Christine recounted that once, during an 
emissions event, 
Her father had just arrived from Mansa to visit her.  
 
And they live closer to the plant—they live [on] this side—so it began to affect 
them a lot in the house. [It affected them so much] that they decided to take him 
from there and take him to Katanshi [a nearby Township] until the gas lessened.  
 
But they didn’t get far.  
 
The gas was released again and it was difficult for him to move [even] a short 
distance. They struggle to get him to Katanshi and when they reached Katanshi, 
they stopped at someone’s stoop to rest. There they were asked what was wrong. 
They said the acid was too strong in Kankoyo and because the father was failing to 
breathe they brought him there to escape it. The people at the house told them to 
rush to the hospital. When they got to the hospital, he didn’t even spend one night 




Their recounting continues with Prosper now jumping in: “Once people here heard [of 
this happening] they were upset. We all knew what had killed him was the gas. They tried 
to demonstrate. We as a pressure group wanted to parade the coffin in demonstration but 
the police stopped us.”63 
 
61 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
62 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
63 Kankoyo Women's Pressure Group, 2016. 
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This death is sadly not the only one I heard about. The most notorious death due 
to air emissions was, as previously discussed, when the District Commissioner died after 
attending a Kankoyo church during an emissions event in December 2013-January 2014. 
Ironically, she was rumored to be someone in the pocket of Mopani, always on the side of 
the investor. But when talking about DC Mithi, Bright recounted that two others in the 
community passed away due to the same emissions event. Others, she says, have died 
during other emissions events. “So there are a lot of people that we can count who have 
died because of the same senta. From the time that Mopani came, these things have been 
increasing. [It was not like this in the] ZCCM [era]”.64 Charity interjected that just 
recently, “there was a baby who was brought home two months ago [after birth], [and] 
the company had polluted the area. And the baby died because of the issue of senta”.65  
People around the community are very aware of senta-related deaths because they 
often result in a community-wide outcry and threats of protest. News spreads quickly, 
with residents recounting with each other the circumstances and their suspicions about a 
death. Local government officials often also come to mourn the deaths of prominent 
Kankoyo community members and hear residents’ reports. To me, residents argued that 
these deaths prove that emission are worse because they have long coped with senta 
emissions and are “used” to regular senta and their bodies are now reacting differently—
with death being an extreme example. Mwansa says that “The senta [released] during 
ZCCM, at least that amount, we are used to it [we could cope]”.66 This history of 
 
64 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
65 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
66 Kankoyo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
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exposure, some residents say, has made them stronger, more able to survive than visitors. 
(However, some also noted serious long-term respiratory and other issues. For example, 
Bright said, “when the sulfur dioxide is emitted in the air it worsens their health which 
leads to death. [It is not always that] someone will just wake up and die. It keeps 
affecting them slowly”.67) In the women’s pressure group, Prosper explained “people 
who stay in this area were used to the senta but those from outside were not... Now 
there's no difference between those who are from this area or from outside, you'll still get 
affected in the same way. No one can accept experiencing this because it is very 
harmful”.68    
* * * 
Another ‘genre’ (White, 2000) of recounting in Kankoyo is about corruption. The 
color of the envelopes change—they may be white or brown—but the underlying feeling 
is the same: people must be making money off of their suffering, or getting paid to hide 
what is happening. Doctors, government representatives, NGO leaders, and even 
community members themselves have faced suspicions. 
Community members told me that when Mithi died, her family demanded a 
doctor outside of Mufulira do the autopsy due to suspected corruption.69 Her family had 
the means to sue Mopani for wrongful death. (At the time of research the court case had 
not been decided and neither the community nor I knew it was ongoing. Mopani is 
appealing the court ruling that emissions were a significant contribution to her death). 
 
67 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. 
68 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
69 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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Those with fewer connections appear to be left out. The women in the Pressure Group 
wondered what would happen to their families, who could not afford to demand 
international experts or unbiased autopsies.  
Even for the living, residents say, doctors are unwilling to go on the record saying 
that chronic health conditions such as respiratory ailments, asthma, and skin rashes are 
due to emissions. But privately, residents recount, these same doctors will tell residents to 
move from Kankoyo because of the pollution. In the Women’s Pressure Group we also 
discussed the possibility that doctors were unwilling to risk their jobs to state the truth: 
- Chances are that local doctors withhold some of the test results. For example 
the way we are seated here if they release sulfur dioxide and someone collapses 
and we take that person to the clinic at the end of the day the doctor will say 
it’s not due to the sulfur dioxide. So the doctors don’t give us the correct test 
results. 
- They don’t tell us the truth! 
- Even families of people who collapse are not told true results. After the senta 
comes out and someone collapse how can we not know that the senta caused 
this? But the doctors say it was something else. 
- People from the Government know these things, they just don’t say it.70 
 
N’gona, a community activist and NGO leader said the government (who runs many of 
the health clinics not funded by Mopani) has doctors keep people in the dark to prevent 
protests:  
Each hospital here knows about people who have died from gas poisoning.  
But on the death certificate they cannot write gas poisoning because they 
fear this will implicate the company, Mopani.  Mopani will [then] end up 
implicating the government because [the government] is a minor 
shareholder who has an interest in the [local] company.71  So they will 
 
70 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 




implicate a different cause [for example, saying] it is a natural cause. So 
how do you use that kind of information to enforce your advocacy? You 
can't use it.72 
 
It is not only doctors. Government regulators such as ZEMA are often accused of 
corruption. The Women’s Pressure Group said that “if there was a way we would trap the 
emissions as evidence. [In the background: ‘it is in the wind’.] They know exactly what 
happens here but they are just being clever about it, you see? They are all just corrupt 
including ZEMA… Mopani pays money to the government, that is why they have 
neglected us… We have had people from ZEMA here. Even though they don’t live here 
they come at times, so they know the situation that we are facing. But they can do 
nothing because, we suspect, they have been given money.”73 ZEMA officials I spoke to, 
for the record, say they do believe there is corruption within the agency but that it 
happens “at higher levels” (even some of the highest leaders at ZEMA pointed to still 
higher levels).74 When I followed up with N’gona and asked about all of these 
accusations, saying that it sounded almost like a conspiracy, he said,  
That’s it. You are right, you are right. It is. It is a standing order, for lack of 
a better word. And that conspiracy starts from the day of negotiation of sale 
of the company [when the government sold ZCCM to private investors with 
secret Development Agreements. They said] ‘You will be protected against 
anything. You will be.’ So they agreed. 
 
It’s just a phone call [Mopani makes to the government, saying] ‘There is a 
complaint from the people. Can you please pick it up?’ So instead of the 
company being in the booth to answer questions, it will be the government. 
Because that’s what they have agreed to in black and white. So it’s an open 
 
72 Interview with N’gona, a NGO leader in Mufulira, 2016. 
73 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
74 Soko, ZEMA, 2016. 
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secret… It is highly confidential… Now to date, from 2001, we are still 
protecting the company.75 
 
N’gona here is referring to the Development Agreements that allow Mopani to operate 
the mine under different environmental laws, ones that—as we have seen in previous 
chapters—are still kept secret. It is possible, though unlikely, for Mopani to emit SO2 
significantly above legal limits and worldwide standards and also meet their DA 
timelines. N’gona argues that whenever the community complains, Mopani calls upon the 
government to quell any action, holding the government hostage to the broad strokes of 
their agreement.76 Not getting into the specifics could also be to the government’s 
advantage, as they would have to delineate the lenient conditions of sale. 
Many residents are also suspicious of NGOs and even community leaders 
themselves who may be paid off by the mines. NGOs with headquarters in Lusaka and 
internationally are most commonly accused by the community of making money off of 
their suffering. Malumba, who works in this sector, says some NGOs “are more or less 
just using the community to fundraise. Anybody, if you told them about the Kankoyo 
problem, I think any donor would fund you to do that activity. So they feel like NGOs are 
also mining their community” for NGO salaries and operating costs.77 Because of these 
general sentiments, most residents did not want to speak with me until they heard that I 
was a student doing a project for school. Even though they knew (and I told them several 
 
75 N’gona, NGO leader in Mufulira, 2016. 
76 The recent government take-over of the Konkola Coppper Mine in Chingola due to supposed abdication 
of their agreements (based on their employment record, tax avoidance, and environmental calamities) poses 
the possibility that Mopani could still be held to account. 
77 Interview with Malumba, national NGO leader, 2016. These NGOs, people recount, rarely if ever do any 
actual work in Mufulira. They may hold a few community meetings or workshops and use the funding for 
overhead. 
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times) that there would be no material gain for speaking with me, it seemed preferable to 
speak with no future promise rather than risk, yet again, a broken promise. 
In addition to residents feeling ‘mined’ when NGOs come in making promises 
that were never even meant to be fulfilled, they also suspect particular NGO leaders of 
being bought off by Mopani after starting to work in the community. N’gona says, “In 
fact, [Mopani does not corrupt local community-based organizations, but] the people who 
they actually corrupt are the NGOs from Lusaka.  If a person like [redacted] is making 
too much noise, he is publishing stories in the paper, they will call him and say ‘can you 
come and do this work for us? Do this environmental assessment for us since you seem to 
understand this community very very well.’ And that will shut him up. Next time he 
won’t say anything about Mopani”.78 I spoke to several NGO representatives accused of 
corruption, and all vehemently denied ever being paid off by Mopani. One, the 
anonymous person accused above, said he had never taken any money from Mopani, 
even for meeting supplies, even though I had seen a check written out to him from 
Mopani and Mopani leader head giving him a title within the company.  
The Women’s Pressure Group and other Community-Based Organizations in 
Mufulira have worked to overcome suspicions of corruption from the larger Kankoyo 
community. “In fact” says Mulamba, “what Mopani is doing, they are playing a game of 
divide and rule”.79 He continues saying “Some of those suspicions, they are just weird. 
Because [the] community just thinks that this group is funded [but] they might not even 
 
78 Interview with N’gona, NGO leader in Mufulira, 2016. 
79 Interview with Mulamba, national NGO leader, 2016. 
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know how little money they have. They just have this perception if they see them with 
white people in the community, they think that you have actually [given] money to them, 
[that] they are eating that money. So it is really a chaotic situation”.80 Those in the 
women’s pressure group are well aware of these suspicions from the community.81 But in 
the end, they say, they can’t be corrupt because they still live here—and so do their 
families. Corruption—of evidence and politics—leads residents to argue that their 
embodied knowledge—this knowledge they have gained through sensing, emplacement 
and recounting—makes them more legitimate experts regarding Kankoyo’s environment. 
Returning to Haraway and the notion of situated knowledge, their partial perspective 
‘from below’ is preferable because they are in on the god trick. Residents admit they have 
a partial knowledge but argue that it is vastly more objective than knowledge claims—
like 97% reduction of emissions—that arise ‘from nowhere.’ 
The proof is in the wind 
 
 Without experience, people will argue, knowledge is able to be corrupted and 
skewed. The fact that mine executives and government regulators don’t live in Kankoyo 
and are not directly impacted by the pollution is one reason residents believe they can be 
corrupted. In the Women’s Pressure Group, they discussed the data released by the mine, 
 
80 Interview with Mulamba, national NGO leader, 2016. 
81 In fact, they left another community-based group because they felt that taking small amounts of money 
from Mopani was corrupt. “What would happen sometimes is that if we got the general offices upset about 
the situation, they would give us water and food… [even if] they give me a 200 [kwacha, about 20 US 
dollars at the time], could I construct a house with that money? I could spend that 200 kwacha within a 
short period of time but I would continue suffering here. Even my children would be suffering with me. So 
it’s better that I don’t get that 200 kwacha and instead push them to do the right thing, the thing they are 
supposed to do” (Kankoyo Pressure Group, 2016).  
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prioritizing the knowledge that comes from lived experience over the numbers submitted 
to ZEMA by Mopani: 
- When we went to the general offices [we talked about emissions]. They 
explained to us that what is being emitted now is—what percentage is that? 
Three percent. 
- They have reduced the percentage. 
- They have reduced the percentage when making records. They should be 
speaking the truth. It’s a lie, they should be speaking the truth. 
 
- It is like these people are not telling the truth because they do not live here. 
You should listen to the people who live here. When there are emissions it 
would be better if you were also around so that we can prove what we are 
staying. Even ZEMA, they are just the same as these Mopani guys. They 
are all thieves. 
- Yes, if ZEMA had offices in Mufulira or if they had relatives living here 
they would be better placed to know the truth. The truth is the truth and it 
should not be hidden. That is why we will not develop in Zambia, because 
we hide the truth due to corruption.” 82 
 
The Women’s Pressure Group also recounted a severe pollution instance during 
which they spoke to the new, post-Mithi District Commissioner. Prior to this the 
DC and other government representatives had been telling them that “senta is no 
longer emitted… [so they told the new DC] Ok, Let's go so that you actually see 
for yourself that it is being emitted… the DC came around 21 or 22 [9 or 10 pm]. 
We stood with him near these bars [pointing]. I’m telling you, we had serious acid 
emissions. The DC [redacted] himself proved that yes, this is actually acid”.83 The 
proof, even for the DC, they said, was in experiencing the pollution. 
 
82 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
83 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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 Sadly, in at least some of the incidents that got the attention of the DC, the 
DC appeared to refute the residents. In an article from the Sunday Post after a 
Kankoyo riot in 2014 was said to have caused “a pregnant woman, two children, 
and four other people [to] have suffocated after inhaling heavy sulfur dioxide 
emissions that were released by the mine”, the DC is quoted as saying, “The 
residents alleged that there were heavy sulfur emissions but I went to Kankoyo 
myself and did not see anything… After investigations we will release a 
comprehensive report”.84 It appears that a temporary experience was no match for 
the economic-political forces backing the powerful mine industry. 
Throughout their accounts of life in Kankoyo, residents continually cite their 
embodied knowledge as gaining them expertise, legitimacy, and proof. In the face of 
Mopani and the government’s focus on expertise through scientific education and the 
production of numbers the residents simply do not believe, residents argue that in order to 
truly know what is happening you must experience it yourself. In the Kankoyo Women’s 
Pressure Group, I asked whether Mopani or the government are requiring a kind of proof 
that residents do not have in order to contest Mopani’s claims. Christine said, “Yes, that’s 
true. They want [scientific evidence and numbers]. But we cannot give them the proof 
because it’s blown away [the senta or gas is in the air]. Unless they [would] come and 
live here. If they camped here, that’s when they will find out the truth…” Esther 
interjected, “That's when they will know” and Nana finished, “We can’t give them the 
proof. How can we? Because they don’t live here”.85 
 
84 Phiri and Kapembwa. (August 17 2014). “Kankoyo Residents Riot.” In The Post Newspaper. 
85 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. 
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Through the creation of embodied knowledge residents overturn traditional ideas 
of expertise and legitimacy. They argue expertise comes from lived experience rather 
than advanced schooling, access to equipment, or connections to international labs and 
specialists. And while this form of knowledge rarely wins legal battles around the world, 
their bodies and embodied knowledge bear witness to the limits of scientific evidence and 
fact in Kankoyo. They cause us to question Mopani’s claim that they have solved the 
problem of senta and that with the acid plants they know longer pollute. Residents use 
their sensed, emplaced, and recounted knowledge to directly challenge the accuracy of 
Mopani’s self-reported emissions data and offer embodied knowledge as one that is less 
corruptible than the kind of ‘scientific’ evidence the regulatory apparatus requires. 
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Chapter 7: Contesting claims with embodied knowledge at Mopani’s 
Mufulira heap leach 
 
 
History, in short, was the annals of the bully on the playground. 




 “Let me just start with the ditch.”1 Malobo is a woman in her 40s and is part of a 
locally organized Committee of Butondo, Mufulira residents who regularly met with 
Mopani over the issue of acid mist. We were sitting together in her backyard, Mopani’s 
heap leach looming over our conversation. She wanted to start her recounting in 2007, the 
first visible impact of the operation, less than a football field away and visible over her 
fence. She tells me that Butondo residents were never notified that acidic leachate would 
be spraying mere meters from their houses. They were only notified about the blasting2 
after the project was underway. She continues,  
When they started we didn’t know there would be all these things like acid 
and so forth. When they first started they were blowing dynamite. At around 
15 hours [3pm] they would ring something [a bell or gong] and we would 
all go 100 meters away from our houses. They told us to secure all 
breakables like TVs.  
 
When they were done [with the ditch and started heap leaching] we all just 
began to complain [amongst ourselves].  
 
We would wake up with sour [sensitive/numb] teeth like we had been eating 
raw mango. Our teeth would be so sour we would fail to eat anything. Our 
eyes were sore, children had rashes, and people began to have nose bleeds. 
And when we chatted as neighbors each person would complain about the 
same thing. So we came to the conclusion that what was causing these 
 
1 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
2 Presumably an area was cleared for the heap leach using explosives. 
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things was the new mining operation. That is how we started to push for 
things to change.3  
 
Unlike in Kankoyo, where residents have to distinguish between new and legacy 
contamination all while fighting the common perception that air emissions are no longer 
an issue, the heap leach operation adjacent to the Butondo community is new to Mopani 
management of the mine. Thus, Mopani cannot fall back on the claim that it “has always 
been there”.4 Residents can also clearly distinguish between their health prior to the start 
of the heap leach and after. And there are—or should be—no secret Development 
Agreements still yet to be leaked. Yet despite this apparently greater simplicity, Butondo 
residents are battling the abstract regulatory apparatus, seeking compensation, healthcare, 
and relocation from Mopani. In doing so, they are finding the limits of ‘citizen science’ 
and community-based environmental monitoring. In this chapter, I highlight their battles, 
showing how residents continually countered Mopani’s claims with their own embodied 
knowledge.  
 Here, like in Kankoyo, residents are not disputing the idea of science more 
generally nor are they setting up embodied knowledge as incompatible with ‘data.’ They 
are instead arguing that this science—this abstract regulatory apparatus—is firmly 
wedded to power and is therefore unable to be just or accurate. Indeed, residents in 
Butondo’s Committee participated in citizen science projects monitoring air pollution and 
are pleading for the official results of the DMMU’s public health report on the impacts of 
 
3 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
4 Kankoyo Women’s Pressure Group, 2016. They said this was a response about senta from Mopani 
management when they went to complain at Mopani’s headquarters in Kitwe. 
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acid mist in the community. But through their experiences working within the regulatory 
apparatus, they also claim Mopani’s proffered enumerations are “just lies” and that the 
equipment they are using to monitor acid mist “had been tampered with.”5 Residents 
throughout Butondo use their embodied knowledge (of sense, emplacement, and 
recounting) to argue acid mist pollution often continues unabated at night (“they release it 
at 23 hours [11pm] [‘While you are asleep’] until dawn! When they see that people are 
awakening [they stop]”6) and claim they are still suffering from the long-term impacts of 
exposure.  
Through this chapter I argue the significance of embodied knowledge is its 
‘minoritarian’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986) ability to muddle the idea of legitimacy and 
what it means to know. Mopani and the government posture with technical-legal 
language, obscure through numbers, and police who can be considered an expert. In 
doing so, they attempt to create a “major” or “orthodox” (Bourdieu 1972) storyline—
what I called in chapter 3 an abstract regulatory apparatus—for determining fact. 
Accompanying this, they denounce everything else as bias, rumormongering, or ignorant. 
Embodied knowledge, however, does not conform to their apparatus as certain forms of 
citizen science might. It unsettles it. It refuses domestication. It demands engagement and 
encounter. It reveals Mopani and the government’s ‘staging’ for what it is (a fiction) 
instead of what it attempts to be (a framework for creating an objective truth). Despite all 
of its potential promise, this chapter shows that residents are continually dismissed, and 
their embodied knowledge repeatedly disregarded. I argue the obstacles these residents 
 
5 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
6 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
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face demonstrates a need to reevaluate how legitimacy is determined regarding 
knowledge claims about our environments. 
 Like the previous chapter, this too is based upon engagements and entanglements. 
One set of engagements I focus on are the Multi-Stakeholder meetings held from 
February 2012 onwards7 between the Butondo residents’ Committee, Mopani 
representatives, NGO leaders, and local government officials. Because I was not part of 
these meetings, I utilize a meticulous set of minutes taken during them. I am indebted to 
Citizens for a Better Environment for preserving them and allowing me access. These 
minutes have allowed us to see the ways Mopani treats embodied knowledge in practice, 
and the ways communities take it up to fight for their right to a healthy environment. In 
discussing the aftermath of these Multi-Stakeholder Meetings I rely on interviews and 
focus groups. This includes focus groups with Butondo residents who were not a part of 
the Multi-Stakeholder meetings and those who were. Because the meetings are a public 
record, I have not given pseudonyms for anyone who is quoted within the minutes 
themselves. Participants in focus groups and interviews with me remain anonymous. 
Mopani’s Heap Leaching 
 
In layman’s terms, heap leaching consists of digging a hole and then piling 
together huge mounds of ground-up ore. These heaps are then sprayed with highly acidic 
leachate—including the sulfuric acid manufactured at Mopani’s acid plants. This leachate 
trickles through the mound and is “impregnated” by the copper. Now impregnated, the 
 
7 My focus here is on the meetings from 2012-2013 due to the involvement and record keeping of CBE. 
Residents I spoke with in 2016 said some meetings have sporadically continued after that time but nothing 
has changed because now [2016] “we have waited and waited and they said no ba Mopani has been what 
and what because of the economy” (Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016). 
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heap is drained, and the solution is pumped from the bottom of the mound to be further 
refined in the smelter and refinery.  
Mopani argues this is a safe and cheap form of leaching that occurs worldwide.8 
While claiming they never polluted above allowable limits, they also say they followed 
ZEMA requirements to add additional environmental fail-safes to their heap leaches after 
citizen complaints rose to the level of Vice President Guy Scott and his Disaster 
Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU) started investigating. Mopani maintains that 
 
8 The Chief Executive Officer of Mopani, Danny Callow, wrote a “Press Statement on the operations of 
Mufulira West mining and heap leach project” appeared in local papers on March 2, 2012 in which Mopani 
said that it is “a common process that has been used for many years around the world in countries from the 
United States, to Australia, Peru, and Chile.” They further state they underwent a “rigorous environmental 
process” (an EPB is not) and that “results of [their] monitoring have always been within the limits agreed 
with the government.” 
 
Image 56: Butondo houses in front of Mopani's heap leach operation (note the absence of tarps and tall trees as 
barriers) 
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after a brief, days-long shut down by the government in 2012 they changed the leachate 
irrigation method to drip irrigation instead of spray irrigation, lay tarps over the heaps, 
and installed devices that would “warn the operator to shut down the acid irrigation 
process when the wind is blowing in the direction of the community”.9 With these 
additional safeguards they argue there is even less risk of acid mist blowing into the 
Butondo Township.  
Meanwhile, Butondo residents claim that the heaps were constructed too close to 
their houses (mere meters, see images 58 and 59) and that—especially during high winds 
but quite regularly—the acid mist is carried in the air to their yards and even inside their 
houses. They argue their health and wellbeing was severely affected by the acid mist, 
especially when the irrigation was a spray and the heaps were uncovered. These mist 
 
9 Significantly, this is one of the only times that Mopani admits this system is not “automatic” but is instead 
a warning system and its efficacy is therefore based upon an operator heeding the warning and shutting 
down the irrigation process. 
Image 57: Picture from the heap leach with Butondo houses in the background. This was taken during or 
prior to 2009. Anonymous Source. 
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particles are larger droplets, not vaporized or in gaseous form, different from the senta 
affecting the nearby Kankoyo Township and should not be monitored with the same type 
of equipment. When they escape the heap leaching circuit, carried by a heavy wind or 
even floating on a light breeze, this acidic leachate can cause problems in the nearby 
environment and for human health. 
I looked for the gaps and silences in Mopani’s publicly available information. 
Curiously, in their public Environmental Project Brief (EPB) to extend the heap leach, 
Mopani switched the direction of their proposed extension and moved the heap further 
away from the community. They also only included aggregated environmental data 
proving long-term air quality compliance from after 2013—even though the heap 
leaching operation started years prior and most of the claims of environmental negligence 
are from the 2008-2012 period. All data reported to ZEMA that I saw shows Mopani 
below the national standard—but this is all it says (there are no more exact 
Image 58: Mopani's heap leach with sprinkler system. Anonymous source. 
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measurements; the readings simply read “less than 1”).10 The data ZEMA has access to 
was self-reported by Mopani (although they may also have the results of community 
monitoring discussed below). Government officials reported that Mopani’s self-reports 
were within legal limits, though many remained personally skeptical.  
This leaves residents and the city fighting a multinational mining corporation with 
little to no trustworthy data about the environment. Through their day-to-day life adjacent 
to the heap, Butondo residents have acquired immense embodied knowledge they are 
using in their attempts to refute Mopani’s claims. I conclude that as scholars we should 
lament the reality that despite the embodied knowledge mobilized during their 
contestations with the mine, Butondo residents have been silenced and left to wait. 
Life beside the heap 
 
Community action against Mopani started with residents developing an embodied 
knowledge of the toxic effects of heap leaching. Recounting with each other their sensed 
and emplaced knowledge, they realized they were all experiencing similar maladies and 
linked their start to the time the acid mist started spraying from the heap leach. The links 
were easy, residents say, because the spraying was so obvious and the bodily impacts so 
immediate. “It sprays… the acid sprays just like water, that’s how it sprays”.11  
They could see it, “smell it”12 and immediately sense its impacts on their bodies 
and health. “The air is full of acid, we just breathe acid air and as a result we suffer with 
 
10 Unlike in Kankoyo, where Mopani admits at times to exceeding the national limits but argues it is still 
following the agreed upon timeline from the Development Agreements 
11 Butondo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
12 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
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incessant coughs, eye problems”.13 Residents described “dental problems”14, “chest 
discomfort” and rib pain 15. “Asthma.”16 “Blurry vision”. 17 “Small growths in our 
eyes”18.  Even “blindness” and “death”.19 They recounted “colds and coughs that would 
just not heal despite being X-rayed [presumably for TB or infections] and all sorts of tests 
being done”.20 At the police camp, women recounted that “one could be sat in their home 
and the next minute your eyes suddenly become bloodshot. And you are all puzzled at 
what exactly is causing your eyes to get bloodshot. The acid moves and reaches here”.21 
In the third focus group, Mapalo said she feels “stabbing pains” when the acid falls 
“similar to a rainfall drizzle” and then causes an “itchy skin” for hours.22 
 Throughout my focus groups, complaints of sensitive teeth or teeth falling out, 
coughing up blood, bloodshot eyes, rashes, abnormal growths, and unusual bleeding were 
common. Malobo talked a little about the medical issues she had seen in the community: 
“We have so many [medical] cases. In fact we have even lost some of our colleagues 
here, concerning the acid mist. There are so many diseases we have encountered for 
example coughing, sore eyes, teeth bleeding, even stomach ache. So many related 
diseases”.23 Her neighbor Mwale pointed to a growth near her eye, “if you look at my 
 
13 Butondo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
14 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
15 Butondo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
16 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016. 
17 Butondo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
18 Butondo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
19 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
20 Butundo Focus Group 1, 2016. 
21 Butondo Focus Group 2, 2016 
22 Butondo Focus Group 3, 2016. 
23 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
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eyes you will see this thing. That is not how I am [I was not born with this]. It just started 
[growing] because of the emissions. And I am not the only one to experience this. Even 
the girl from there [pointing] and another from that house, they have it.”24 Joyce 
recounted a particularly harrowing experience when her neighbor called upon her in the 
middle of the night: 
There was a time a lady from that house just had to call us to show what 
was happening with her child…. Her child’s chest was congested, you 
know, and in the middle of the night [she] began to snore heavily. When 
you lifted her up, she bled. The girl was standing and blood was just 
there”.25 
 
After incidents like this, residents started to find ways to mitigate the effects of the acid 
mist in their everyday life, but nothing was foolproof. Mwale says, “Sometime back it 
used to be so bad [at night] that you just had to wake up and just sit, you couldn’t sleep. 
We have had to cover our air vents in the house [‘yes all these, all these are covered in 
our homes’], in order to prevent the air from outside getting in during the night.”26 Others 
said they put a wet cloth over their eyes or tried to buy milk, which they said helped settle 
their stomachs.  
 What also happened, though, is neighbors started recounting. “We telephone each 
other when we notice things” says Malobo. From neighborly conversations about their 
worsening health, a group was formed. They tasked themselves with getting out the word 
about what was happening in Butondo so they could force a solution from Mopani. 
Malobo says that at first, the Committee did not even know where to start. They had 
 
24 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
25 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
26 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
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never done environmental advocacy work before and had no outside support. Their first 
trip was to Mopani’s headquarters in Kitwe and then the main police station at the edge 
of town to request permission to protest—"but nothing happened”.27 The group then went 
to newspaper and radio offices in Mufulira and Kitwe, getting media attention. Reporters 
started writing articles in national newspapers, representatives of the community went on 
the radio, and they hosted a local TV station that reported on their plight. Seeing this 
press, several environmental NGOs, including Citizens for a Better Environment28, 
helped organize regular Multi-Stakeholder Meetings between Mopani, the Committee of 
Butondo residents, and local government officials (ZEMA was continually invited but 
declined participation because they felt participating was outside the scope of their role as 
a regulator).29  
The first multi-stakeholder meeting 
 
 The first Multi-Stakeholder meeting took place on February 9th, 2012, after 
reports from the community sparked a visit from Vice President Guy Scott and an 
ongoing investigation by the DMMU and the MPH.30 By the time these Multi-
Stakeholder Meetings started Mopani had already been shut down by ZEMA and had put 
 
27 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
28 Full disclosure: Citizens for a Better Environment was one of several of my affiliations while there, and 
one of my research assistants also worked at CBE. I had office space with CBE and access to some of their 
public records but did not have much contact with CBE as an organization overall because they were 
focused on the upcoming presidential election. In a couple focus groups CBE came up and I was explicit 
about not working for CBE so they could be free to talk. While outspoken about the negative impacts of the 
mine, some of their funding also comes from consultations with the industry and producing environmental 
audits for the government. This speaks to the ambiguity of these issues: even NGOs need to be careful 
about what they say for fear of losing their livelihoods. 
29 Other NGOs including Southern Africa Resource Watch were also included for a time. 
30 This report is Appendix B 
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the additional environmental measures in place. Mr. Mambo Chooye, a Mopani 
Representative overseeing the heap leach project, opened the meeting with an overview 
of the science of the operation and claimed that Mopani was already—and had always 
been—“operating [the heap leach] in accordance with the international standards as well 
as the statutory limits”.31 
 
Image 59: Residents say the acid also eats away at things like this satellite dish. 
The first meeting consisted of community representatives speaking directly to 
Mopani about their experiences and the embodied knowledge they had gained from living 
in the shadow of Mopani’s heap leach. In the next two pages I recount at length some of 
their submissions32 because I think it is important to hear what residents directly said to 
 
31 Mambo, Mopani representative at the Butondo Multi-stakeholder Committee, February 9, 2012. 
32 I do not have the space to recount these in full, so they are edited (they are word for word but cut out 
sections for length). 
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Mopani—their experiences and the situated arguments they made to counteract Mopani’s 
claims—and the blithe way Mopani representatives responded. 
* * * 
Mr. Kafwembe Mwaba33 
 
Mr. Mwaba began by stating that his house was only 10 meters away from the fence 
separating the Plant from the community. 
 
He acknowledged that while the current status as presented by MCM could be true 
in terms of complying with the statutory and international levels of emissions,34 at 
the time the project commenced emissions were way above the said limits. “We 
have continued to suffer from sicknesses such as leg pains, headaches, liver 
problems, chest problems, eye problems and many others.”  
 
Mr. Mwaba questioned the MCM presentation on heap leaching being done in other 
countries. He said that this example was not relevant on account that MCM did not 
indicate the location of the Heap Leach Pad in relation to residential areas. He said 
it is possible that the Heap Leach process in other countries takes place far away 
from where the communities were residing.  He concluded by saying that MCM 
was providing milk to its employees but the communities were not economically 
able to buy milk for themselves.35  
 
Musonda Michael36 
Mr. Musonda began by stating that he used to work for MCM but was declared 
medically not fit to work in the mining environment. 
 
 
33 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugral Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
34 In this first meeting many were hopeful. As seen throughout the rest of the minutes, residents argued 
Mopani’s changes did not do enough to reduce the health impacts of Mopani’s heap leaching operation. 
35 The role of milk in community debates about pollution could easily span another chapter. In every city, 
residents said milk would help their bodies suffer the impacts of pollution. This may have come from the 
fact that ZCCM gave their workers milk. In the end, people evoke this idea that they should be given milk 
to also show the injustice of what is happening: that they could be suffering so, in poverty, while the mines 
make so much profit. 
36 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugral Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
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Mr. Musonda submitted that the doctors had advised him not to work in 
environments that were polluted with Sulfur Dioxide, Acid Mist and Dust. He then 
requested MCM to facilitate a health check-up for people in Section E and possibly 
extend the same gesture to all Butondo residents.  He reminded MCM that a King 
is only a King when he has subjects and there could only be production when there 
are healthy people.  
 
Mr. Musonda further questioned how a weak acid as presented by MCM could 
dissolve a rock.  
 
He further used a Bemba proverb saying, “Abo abekala munshi ya cimuti ca 
mpundu ebomfwa eko shilepona” (Translated: Those who sit under the Mpundu 
Tree are the ones who feel the fall of the fruit). 
 
Mrs. Agness Nkonde37 
Mrs. Nkonde began by acknowledging that they had heard MCMs Presentation and 
what they were doing. However, she said that when a group of residents of Butondo, 
including herself were taken for a site visit at the Heap Leach operations, they did 
not see the new facilities that MCM said they had put in place in their presentation. 
“We have a lot of illnesses as a community: headaches, stomach pains, teeth 
problems coughs and many others” Mrs Nkonde said.  She appealed to MCM to 
provide medical services to all Butondo residents who were affected by acid mist.  
 
Mrs. Nkonde further said that their houses were open to MCM management and 
government officials to go and spend a night there and appreciate what the 
community was going through during night time.” 
 
“If acid has power to destroy DSTV dishes, what about the HDEP lining? Can it 
fail to destroy it?” She asked.  
 
After the community leaders spoke, the meeting consisted of an outpouring from 
residents—in section E, but also outside of it—challenging Mopani’s account and 
directly confronting their “lies.”38 Joyce Sichone also “extended an invitation to ZEMA 
 
37 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
38 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
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and MCM to go and spend a night in her home so that they experience what she was 
going through… she appealed to ZEMA not to give MCM the license until the regulatory 
agency got the truth about what was happening”.39 Ruth Sikanyika “wondered whether 
ZEMA had permitted MCM to kill them. [She] said that the community could not just 
start talking about acid when it was not there. Please MSD and ZEMA, speak for us, we 
are human beings.”40 James Mwenya directed his comments to ZEMA. He said ZEMA 
should “always consider people’s lives” when deciding whether to approve a mining 
project.41 Prudence Kapambwe supported her neighbors’ calls for medical care but said it 
should not be done by Mopani’s doctors “because she feared that the results could be 
tampered with. She further alleged that MCM was a very corrupt company.”42 Rachael 
Samukaya said her Grade Five child went blind because of the acid mist. Tiza Chiumi 
tried to appeal to Mopani using their own mission statement, which says that they will 
“respect the environment.” 43 Chiumi wanted Mopani to “come down to the community 
to understand the problems on the ground.”44 
As seen above, the leaders of the Committee and Butondo residents refused 
Mopani’s account that they were in compliance with statutory limits by presenting their 
 
39 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
40 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
41 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
42 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
43 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
44 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
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embodied knowledge of the impacts of acid mist on their own bodies. In doing so, they 
challenged Mopani’s claim that this kind of heap leach operation happens elsewhere, 
asking whether it happened mere 10 meters from residential houses in other countries. 
They backed up their own sensory experiences by citing reports from doctors saying the 
environment was not healthy. They appealed for medical services. They made 
imaginative inferences between DSTV dishes and the insides of their body. And they 
invited Mopani to come spend a night. 
 Mopani’s representative, George Mayeya, reacted to their statements by mostly 
reiterating the fact that they met regulatory standards. Mayeya handed off responsibility 
to ZEMA, saying that prior to starting the heap leach operation they “implemented 
consultations with relevant regulatory bodies” and any questions about legal requirements 
Image 60: Residents say these cracks in their houses resulted from blasting and heap leach operations. 
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should be directed to ZEMA. He also appealed to the regulatory apparatus, saying that 
“the company had a lot of regulatory bodies that were inspecting the operations”, 
implying these inspections and regulatory bodies were not relying heavily on self-
reported data from Mopani. The company, he assured everyone was meeting “globally 
acceptable standards”, though he did not define what these were.45 And finally, he said 
“in his view” the community were not suffering from real bodily ailments, but an 
“information gap”.46 Throughout the meeting he twice more reiterated the “need to bridge 
the knowledge gap” rather than acknowledging the bodily suffering of the community.47  
 Then a ZEMA representative spoke. As a regulator, Mr. Sichula said that Mopani 
did not have to consult the community prior to starting the heap leach operation because 
they prepared an “EPB” instead of an “EIA”. And EPB, he says does not require public 
consultation and is “done when not much impact [is] expected”.48 Finally, he admitted he 
was unaware of the issues the community raised, but said he would update his managers. 
He ended, though, by saying that “he had been receiving reports which have shown that 
the heap leach operations were within the set limits”.49 After this inaugural meeting, 
 
45 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. As stated elsewhere, the ‘global’ standards 
were based on workplace safety, and would not be considered globally acceptable for residental 
neighborhoods. 
46 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
47 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
48 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
49 Excerpts from “Minutes for the Butondo Section E Acid-Mist Petition Stakeholder Inaugural Meeting” 
located at Bufuke Hall, Butondo Township. 9th February, 2012. 
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ZEMA representatives stopped going to the Multi-Stakeholder meetings, saying it would 
be in conflict with their role as a regulator. 
 In this meeting we see the community using embodied knowledge to contend with 
both the regulatory apparatus and the idea that the heap leach was not causing harm to 
their health. We also see those who control the regulatory apparatus—Mopani and the 
government—ignore their recountings and instead focus on the fact that the abstract 
regulatory apparatus was working as planned. The apparatus allowed Mopani to skip 
informing the community because someone deemed the project would have limited 
impact on nearby residents, due to Mopani’s claims that heap leaches operate worldwide. 
It also allowed Mopani to self-report their environmental data—which was only ever 
questioned by residents, never by Mopani representatives or the government through 
ZEMA. ZEMA skipping future meetings shows the reliance they place on Mopani’s self-
reported data over residents’ recoutings. And finally, the abstract regulatory apparatus 
allowed Mopani to argue that residents simply had a ‘knowledge gap’. They simply did 
not know enough about technology, heap leaching, regulations, or the environment to be 
taken seriously.  
After the meeting Mopani released a press statement that ran as a full-page ad in 
the Times of Zambia. In it, they said they held a meeting with the community to describe 
their heap leach operation, including the “more stringent measures implemented over and 
above the approved requirements to further reduce any possible environmental risks.”50 
And, finally, they summarized the submissions from the community by saying “members 
 
50 Danny Callow, Mopani Press Statement. In the Times of Zambia, 14 February 2012. 
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of the community highlighted the need to provide information regularly in order to bridge 
information gaps and create mutual understanding.” Through their subsequent meetings, 
Mopani representatives returned to this idea—that residents were not experts and that 
they were in need of knowledge and mine tours so they could understand that Mopani 
was meeting ‘international standards’ that were never defined.51 But as we shall see in 
these meetings, residents continually fought back, never allowing capture by the abstract 
regulatory apparatus and continually inviting those listening to come and experience for 
themselves. 
Contesting technical facts with embodied knowledge 
 
 Throughout the Multi-Stakeholder meetings, Mopani representatives continue to 
promote the idea that residents do not know enough—about mining, pollution, regulatory 
standards, or their own health—and must, then, learn from the experts. Through these 
meetings they continually attempted to bring Committee members within the regulatory 
apparatus—and residents continued to refuse, their own experiences highlighting the 
“fiction” (Stengers 2000:83) that the regulatory apparatus was objective. Several months 
after this first meeting, on June 8, 2012, Mopani brought the established Committee of 
Butondo residents to the heap leach site so they could verify Mopani’s claims and learn 
more about the heap leaching process. Mr. Mambo showed the residents an interlocking 
system, and automatic valve system, tarps covering certain sections of the heap, an acid-
 
51 1 mg/m3 of acid mist is not an international standard for air quality near an acid mist heap leach. The 
Mine Safety Department recommended this as a standard for occupational limits for workers with a 10-
hour work day. 
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mist barrier near raffinate ponds, and that they had planted trees to shield the community 
from acid.  
Residents were not swayed. Mrs. Agnus Nkonde immediately told Mopani that “it 
is like the automated valve system is not working” because the acid mist was only getting 
worse. Nkonde’s neighbor, Alificha Phiri interjected that maybe it “only works when 
they (MCM) know we are coming.” 52 Chooye, a Mopani representative, replied that it 
was working. Another Committee member, Mr. Muyoka, wondered if the automated 
valve system failed when there was a “sudden change of wind.” 53 Chooye replied it had a 
20% buffer. Mr. Steels Mwaba asked to see data on acid mist levels from before and after 
these measures went into effect. A Mopani representative only responded “MCM had 
been operating within government stated limits even at the point when the leach plant 
was shut down… He emphasized that the reading cannot be manipulated.” 54 Residents 
wondered if the equipment maybe broke down. Mopani said no. 
 The residents were then required to walk around the operation and sign off that 
they had verified the existence of the safeguards mentioned above. After the site visit was 
another meeting in which residents asked Mopani representatives to account for their 
suffering while Mopani said little more than they met the standards.55 Once, when 
someone on the Committee brought up a particularly “excessive acid emission” on a 
 
52 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
53 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
54 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
55 One resident asked how Mopani could explain the foul smell if they were not emitting acid and Mopani 
simply responded that “MCM does not have a regulatory standard for foul smell. What we measure is the 
content of acid in the air.” When asked about this, they recited ZEMA’s standards not their own data. From 
the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
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specific day Mopani simply said that records showed the pumps were closed and so 
excessive emission was not possible.56 
This back and forth kept going until at one point Mrs. Nkonde broke down and 
asked Mopani if they would “consider positioning a Christian in the control room, for 
such a person would be able to tell the truth. Otherwise, she said, the acid mist readings 
could be easily manipulated.” 57 Another Committee member suggested that a community 
member should be present for each of the readings to ensure they were not manipulated.  
At the end of the meeting, however, the ZEMA representative said he felt like he 
was “getting mixed feelings from the community” and that after seeing the heap leach 
operation it was “a situation that needs some studying.”58 Mopani simply “urged the 
Committee to ask for the Health Survey Results” that have never appeared from the 
DMMU and Department of Public Health. 59 At every meeting Committee members 
asked about the status of this report. The government has still not released it. 
* * * 
The next month, the community again raised complaints about the acid mist 
impacts worsening “both during the day and the night.”60 They also noted that there were 
no tarps covering the “phase 2” of the heap leach even though they were required.61 
Chooye, as always, said everything was within limits, the interlocking system was still in 
 
56 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
57 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
58 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
59 From the “Report on the Site Visit of Mufulira-West Heap Leach”, 8 June, 2012. 
60 Minutes from “The 6th Butondo Multi-Stakeholders Committee Meeting” 6th July, 2012. 
61 Minutes from “The 6th Butondo Multi-Stakeholders Committee Meeting” 6th July, 2012. 
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place, and the process shut down when the wind blew towards the community. The 
second phase of the system, he said, would get tarps in four months when Mopani was 
done filling the heaps. The community said four months was too long and “wondered 
whether MCM regarded stacking of ore to be more important than the lives of people.”62  
But after this back and forth, getting nowhere, the Committee suddenly switched 
tactics. They went back to recounting their experiences living with pollution every day. 
Mrs. Fiorah said her kids were in danger.63 Mr. Mwaba said his wife and child had been 
coughing—and added “his house was open for people to come and verify his claims.”64 
They wanted to know why they were still suffering if the acid mist readings were below 
 
62 Minutes from “The 6th Butondo Multi-Stakeholders Committee Meeting” 6th July, 2012. 
63 Minutes from “The 6th Butondo Multi-Stakeholders Committee Meeting” 6th July, 2012. 
64 Minutes from “The 6th Butondo Multi-Stakeholders Committee Meeting” 6th July, 2012. 
 
Image 61: Note the lack of tarps in 2016. 
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the standards, as Mopani claimed. The Mopani representative responded by “explain[ing] 




After a few months of meetings like this, Mopani bought testing equipment for 
independent monitoring of air quality and handed it to the Mufulira city to work with 
Committee members (despite, of course, the idea that “certain technical aspects” of 
environment, pollution, and public health were “beyond comprehension of lay 
community people”66). The Committee members, new technology in hand, went out to 
monitor the pollution. Doing so, they participated in a community-based citizen science 
project that ultimately failed to move them forward. 
 The first place they monitored was the Police Camp. The results were below 
1mg/m3. 67 This continues, at several other locations until “Mr. Muyoka and Mrs. Nkonde 
stated that they could not understand the outcome because even when the tent from the 
leach pad was a little bit open and high levels of acid mist in the atmosphere… the 
readings were still below 1 mg/m3.” After this first monitoring exercise the Committee 
started to doubt the abstract regulatory apparatus that relied on this piece of equipment. 
Mrs. Nkonde suggested that they test the machine, even going so far as to “allow MCM 
to discharge more than they usually do so as to see if the machine would read above 1 
 
65 Minutes from “The 6th Butondo Multi-Stakeholders Committee Meeting” 6th July, 2012. 
66 Minutes from “The 8th Butondo Mult-Stakeholder Committee Meeting”  
67 Minutes of the 9th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting, 9th November, 2012. 
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mg/m3. These results, she said, make the community uncomfortable with the machine—
later this discomfort turned to outright mistrust. 68 
 
After several more weeks of their monitoring never registering any changes and 
always showing a level of pollution ‘unreadable’ to the machine and therefore under the 
national limit, residents accused the mine of giving them faulty equipment.69 By the 8th 
 
68 Minutes of the 9th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting, 9th November, 2012. 
69 In fact, the media, NGOs, and community members were worried about getting faulty equipment even 
before they did any testing. Distrustful of Mopani’s proffered data, they were equally suspicious of 
equipment paid for and delivered by Mopani. 
Image 62: Community monitoring results 
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committee meeting Committee members said that if the results were within the set 
standards, and the community was still affected, “this means something is wrong with the 
set standards”.70 Months later this was reiterated when Nkonde said that if the readings 
were indeed below 1mg/m3 “then it will be appropriate for the authorities to reduce 
further the threshold on the permissible amount of acid mist to be released into the 
atmosphere [because] the community is being adversely affected.”71 
At the 10th Multi-Stakeholder Meeting the Committee asked to take their 
monitoring equipment to the heap leaches so they could “test the equipment in the plant 
by exposing it to high acid mist levels and seeing how the readings would come out.”72 
This request was denied because, Mr. Matebele from Mopani said, the equipment was 
new and therefore “accurate and had no faults.” 73 On several occasions the Committee 
asked to be able to take the equipment to the Copperbelt University to test it in a closed 
room that clearly had levels of acid higher than 1 mg/m3. Mopani again denied this 
request—they had control over the equipment since they had purchased it—saying that 
this sort of test would “void the warranty” of the equipment.74 Entire meetings, in fact, 
were spent on Committee members asking to be able to see if the machine could even 
read anything besides “<1” with the end result being that the community was never able 
to test the equipment or bring it to an area with high levels of acid mist.75 76 Mopani 
 
70 Minutes from the 8th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 5 October, 2012. 
71 “Minutes from the 12th Committee Meeting,” 12th February, 2013. 
72 Minutes from “10th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 30th November, 2012. 
73 Minutes from “10th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 30th November, 2012. 
74 Minutes from “11th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 28th December, 2012. 
75 Minutes from “11th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 28th December, 2012. 
76 “Minutes from the 12th Committee Meeting,” 12th February, 2013. 
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typically responded to complaints by teaching residents more about technology, mining, 
and repeating their empty platitude of global standards. 
 Years later, now meeting with me, Committee members spoke of their frustrations 
during these exercises. They felt Mopani knew they were illegally polluting and gave 
them faulty equipment to cover it up. Chansa recalled that, “The Mopani people do know 
for sure that they do pollute but they can’t just say yes to that. Which is why they didn’t 
want us to take the machine to CBU.”77 Malobo continues, recounting that at the 
meetings “Sometimes there would even be confusion … because we were telling them 
the readings were tampered with, that there was no way that they can have the same 
readings each month. But for them, they said those were the correct readings according to 
international standards. So there was some confusion in the meetings when it came to 
results.”78  
Recounting these citizen science monitoring sessions, the Committee again fell 
back on embodied knowledge as unsettling the claims of the machine. Even the 
government, they say, were surprised because “each time we came from taking the 
readings we would come back with very bad headaches, the kind you feel from deep 
inside.79 Chilufya brought up that another person who came along for the monitoring who 
“always said he would feel ill every time we did measurements together. He said he 
would fail to sleep that night [because he wasn’t used to this air]. We used to measure 
from maybe three different spots each time and sometimes the mist would even spray on 
 
77 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
78 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
79 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
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us. The reading would still be the same, even if you were taking it so close to their 
raffinate pond. That is how we began suspect that the machine was tampered with 
because there is no way”. 80 (Government representatives who were involved in this 
recounted their experience differently, though Kalenga started discussing the issue by 
reminding me that “with this you have to remember, you can’t bite the finger that feeds 
you.”81 Kalenga recounted, “I went there myself. I went there physically. They were 
asking  ‘Are you smelling the acid?  I was not able.  Maybe my nostrils are not as sharp 
as theirs, I don't know. […] it was not even toxic.” 82) In a way, the Committee was 
calibrating the monitoring gadget; they were calibrating it off of their embodied sense of 
how bad the pollution was at any given time they tested. They knew the device had been 
tampered with because it was not corresponding to what they already knew about the acid 
mist. But because they could not officially test for acid in the air in a way that mattered 
for their lives—in a way that would change Mopani’s response, be convincing to a 
regulator, or prove their point within the abstract regulatory apparatus—they eventually 
gave up. 
 Disillusion over the readings and Mopani’s back-and-forth about testing led to 
them refusing continued participation in the project: 
- The Mopani people got a machine to measure the mist but to our 
surprise… you will see that the results from the machine is always the 
same figure. It is always the same figure, whether the mist is more or 
less the figure is the same. So we said no, this is abnormal there is no 
way you can measure the mist and always have the same figure. It can’t 
be like that. 
 
80 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
81 Interview with Kalenga, leader in the local government, 2016. 
82 Interview with Kalenga, leader in the local government, 2016. 
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- At one time we thought maybe the machine had been tampered with 
because the results those guys were giving us they are the ones we were 
also getting. So we were wondering that how come every time we 
measure the machine gives us the same figure? 
- It was the Mopani people who bought that machine so we don’t know if 
it was giving us the correct readings. 
- At one time we told them to take the machine to CBU so it can be tested 
there but Mopani refused. So that is how we stopped measuring because 
we saw that we were wasting our time 
- Yes, that is when we stopped. 
- So that is how we told them that we wouldn’t continue measuring, that 
they could carry on if they wanted. So, the machine is at the Council 
Offices.”83 
 
This refusal made an impact. During the next meeting Ms. Kasonde, a government 
representative, repeated that the community stopped the monitoring exercise because of 
the machine issue but that she felt they should continue to participate in the monitoring 
project.84 At this, the female Committee members even refused to speak during the 
meeting, a silent protest because “they felt things were not moving and they were 
basically wasting time participating in the discussions.”85 After several months of the 
Committee refusing to continue their monitoring until the equipment was used in a 
known high-acid mist situation so they could verify that it was possible for the machine 
to show higher readings, Mopani said the equipment “developed a fault” and would be 
sent to the manufacturers.86 Looking back, the Committee says, “we just saw that we 
were not achieving anything. We were just getting headaches for nothing”.87  
 
83 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
84 Minutes from “11th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 28th December, 2012. 
85 Minutes from “11th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 28th December, 2012. 
86 Minutes from the 12th meeting 





Another regular happening during the Multi-Stakeholder meetings was Mopani 
continually telling residents to wait for the DMMU and DPH report on the health impacts 
of acid mist because this would be the type of “scientific” 88 evidence they would 
consider. When Mr. Mwaba brought up the fact that several members of the community 
were experiencing severe nose bleeding, he also said that he “banked on the findings of 
the Health Survey Report” but in the meantime requested an ambulance be provided for 
people bleeding severely.89 Mopani said that “there is no scientific proof linking the nose 
bleeding to acid mist emissions”. A government representative from the Department of 
Public Health told Mwaba to wait for the report from “the experts” because “nose 
bleeding could be caused by a number of conditions.” In the next meeting, Mr. Mwaba 
came prepared to fight back. He “correct[ed] Mr. Matebele in regard to the scientific 
proof linking bleeding to acid mists. Mr. Mwaba stated that there was a link between 
bleeding and acid mists [and] asked Mr. Matebele to research more on the internet if he 
felt otherwise.” 90  This led him to ask whether Mopani was taking any of the 
community’s concerns seriously, whether they were “were perceived as genuine by 
MCM.” 91 As spokesperson for Mopani, Mr. Kalunga responded that “MCM listens to 
these complaints and investigates them scientifically to ascertain the issues raised”.92 As 
more issues came up in subsequent meetings regarding health and well-being, Mopani’s 
 
88 “Minutes from the 12th Committee Meeting,” 12th February, 2013. 
89 Minutes from the 8th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 5 October, 2012. 
90 Minutes of the 9th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting, 9th November, 2012. 
91 Minutes of the 9th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting, 9th November, 2012. 
92 Minutes of the 9th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting, 9th November, 2012. 
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line stayed the same. “Mr. Chooye [representing Mopani] stated that the Health Survey 
Report will give a clear picture of what is at hand. Hence, he added, it is in the best 
interest of everyone to wait for the release of the report”.93 Just wait for the experts. 
Knowing now what is in the report, some of the government and Mopani 
representatives must have had an inkling the report would never be released. At one point 
the Committee asked if they could undertake a new public health survey since the 
government’s one was taking too long to come out. One government representative said 
this would be a “parallel check-up [that] would be tantamount to insubordination”.94 (It is 
also unclear whether any such study would be accepted as legitimate. When I asked 
Kalenga, a leader in local government, about rumors that an external NGO had come in 
and found the acid mist to exceed the limits, Kalenga had also heard these rumors but 
said if anyone did this testing, they did not go through the proper channels and thus 
should be disregarded.95 N’gona confirmed this rumor, recounting 
[About Mopani’s equipment] So it appears to us that the readings were sort 
of prefixed… There is an organization, Advocacy on Human Development. 
They brought in a researcher who had their own readings. And the readings 
were actually alarming.  So, it is the same environment. We have got the 
prefix reading [from Mopani saying] everything is okay. And here's the 
foreign reading, at that [same] time saying that this is actually beyond and 
way above the limits.96 
 
 
93 “Minutes from the 12th Committee Meeting,” 12th February, 2013. 
94 Government representative of the District Health Management Team at the Butondo Multi-stakeholder 
Committee, Aug 28, 2012. 
95 ‘Proper channels’ would involve including the local government, ZEMA, and Mopani in the testing, and 
testing at scheduled testing dates and times. Environmental NGOs throughout Zambia do this and get 
company representatives to sign off on the samples—but this of course gives the companies several days’ 
notice for any testing. 
96 Interview with N’gona, NGO leader, 2016. 
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I gave Kalenga more details, but he was unswayed. He continues, “I can’t just trust 
somebody who brings [different] results… I would ask that person, ‘let us go together 
and find a control test. Let’s even test in an area where you don’t have the emissions. So 
that we see. Because sometimes, some people, you know. They manipulate the 
gadgets.”97) When I asked Kalenga, who was a part of the team involved in producing the 
report, what he thought it might say, he reiterated that “the mines are feeding this 
country, so sometimes you pin them and you are just pinning yourself… So the project. 
Yes, I was a part of the team… but even me, who was a part of it, I don’t know [what is 
in it]. [Me: so it has been stopped by the government?] We don’t know why, we don’t 
know. The government, they know. We are under oath, so we don’t know.”98 When I 
asked Kalenga if he thought the report would even make a difference if it did come out, 
he said, “personally, I think it is not possible. It might not even come out.”99 
Within a few meetings, Mopani even started telling residents to stop talking about 
ailments from acid mist unless they had “scientific proof”—via this report that was not 
released—that linked illness to the heap leaching operations. 100 Just like tobacco 
companies, sugar lobbyists, and climate change deniers, Mopani and the government kept 
deferring to the need for further ‘scientific’ studies. They implied residents had not 
proven their claims in the ‘correct’ way. In other words, they asked the community to 
accept the limits of the regulatory apparatus. Proof outside the regulatory apparatus—
 
97 Interview with Kalenga, local government leader, 2016. 
98 Interview with Kalenga, local government leader, 2016. 
99 Interview with Kalenga, local government leader, 2016. 
100 However, in this same meeting Committee members were also told that the readings of 1mg/m3 meant 
that the acid mist was “scientifically not harmful to humans” (although this is not true). 
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whether it be through experience, meetings with doctors, or running a completely new 
scientific study with outside public health experts—would not be considered.  
For their part, the Committee did their due diligence, but the report has never been 
released by the government. The Committee followed up in every meeting and asked all 
of their local politicians, including the DC and their MP, to release the report. Two 
members of the Committee even travelled all the way to the capital, in Lusaka, sleeping 
in bus stations, to meet with Vice President Guy Scott and ask him about the report. They 
recounted that he sent them to the DMMU, which told them to wait for a month and it 
would be “immediately” released. (It was not; they are still waiting for the government to 
release it.) As with the monitoring equipment that they could never get checked for 
tampering, the Committee eventually felt stymied. To me, they say they still feel the 
government releasing the report would be useful. Through talking with doctors during the 
process and hearing rumors from those who have seen the report but were quieted, the 
Committee fully believes that the report would prove their account ‘scientifically.’ But in 
the end, with no report in sight, they discontinued these regular meetings because “Even 
though we really wanted to discuss was the results… we kept on going in circles because 
without the results we couldn’t do anything. It was like we were playing a game”.101 
 Up to the time I was there in 2016, the Butondo Committee was still meeting 
regularly amongst themselves, just no longer with Mopani or local government 
representatives. They were still petitioning local leaders to listen to what they experience, 
and they were “chasing the Mopani people [because] we want them to relocate us from 
 
101 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
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here”.102 Still, they say, they are forced to wait. “It’s the same thing” Malobo says, “they 
do nothing.” Christine agrees, “they say the same thing, ‘we will look into those issues.’ 
Up to now we have been going there, sitting for hours waiting for them to answer us but 
up to now nothing has happened.” Some in the Committee say Mopani and the 
government think they can get away with this because they see Butondo residents as 
ignorant. At the end of the day, they say, “We used argue [with Mopani] every day and 
their reasoning was that they were using International Standards and we were just 
ordinary people”.103 While their embodied knowledge may reveal the weaknesses and 
cracks in Mopani’s account, they are still hindered due to perceived illegitimacy.  
However, some things are slowly changing for the better. As a result of these 
meetings, the Committee secured contacts with people inside Mopani. Now when large 
quantities of acid mist are released from the plant Butondo residents go to members of 
the Committee who call their Mopani contact. When Mopani switches off the irrigation, 
the effects are immediate. “Then once we call, we feel better. I don’t know if they just 
open the pipe to release [the acid] and then when I call it is closed. I don’t know.” They 
do know that if they call to let Mopani know the community is threatening a protest then 
“within 30 minutes the air will be clear. I don’t know what they do.” The mere fact that 
Mopani knows what can be done and waits for the Committee to call should perturb. 
 
* * * 
 
 
102 Focus Group with the Butondo Committee, 2016. 
103 Focus Group with Butondo Committee, 2016. 
 263 
Their accounts should challenge us.  
 
There is something desperately wrong with how we produce “accounts of the world”104 
when these accounts silence, ignore, or delegitimize their voices. When they matter105 
less than a reading on a gadget. 
 
These engagements between the Committee, Mopani, and the Zambian government 
should be unsettling. They reveal that the “god trick”106 and other tactics of knowing 
through silencing are alive and well, strategies still taken up by those in power against the 
extraordinary people willing to stand up and say, simply, “consider the fact that we are 






104 The ‘we’ I am talking about here is ‘we’ as scholars embedded in institutions that participate in the 
making of abstract knowledge apparatuses. Taken from Donna Haraway, when she says that the goal of 
knowledge creation should be to produce “better accounts of the world” (1988: 584). 
105 With the idea that something matters more if it is able to effect change. 
106 Haraway, 1988. 
107 Minutes from “10th Butondo Multi-Stakeholder Committee Meeting” on 30th November, 2012. 
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Chapter 8: “In the dark”: A conclusion 
 
I was always in the dark. While I was conducting my primary dissertation 
research in Zambia from 2015-2016, Zambia was experiencing electricity shortages that 
put the entire country on a load shedding program at least eight hours a day. To keep 
things seeming fair, the load shedding schedule was split: every other day you would 
have no power in the morning, from 6 am until either 2 or 4pm; the alternate days you 
would have no power from 4pm until midnight. This meant I spent about half of my 
evenings in Zambia quite literally in the dark. More figuratively, this dissertation is about 
time spent waiting in the dark—how darkness is constructed, how it is endured, and the 
possibilities for alternative forms of light to arise from its midst.  
The crux of this dissertation has been twofold: first, to develop an understanding 
of how ignorance is manufactured and manipulated so that powerful actors can evade 
responsibility for their environmental and human destruction; and second, to work 
through how to think about, understand, legitimize, and see the value in one kind of 
‘minor’ knowledge, which I have termed embodied knowledge. 
 I have shown how Mopani and the government have manufactured ignorance 
(Proctor and Schiebinger 2008; Slater 2019) through creating an abstract regulatory 
apparatus—a way of seeing and understanding toxicity and pollution that demands 
people use certain modes of measurement and ask only the questions they are ‘allowed’ 
to ask. This is important because the way the government and mining operations have set 
up this abstract regulatory apparatus—which they say is the only legitimate, legal way to 
know about the environment—requires that residents have equipment that they cannot 
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afford (or rely on gifted equipment residents suspect was tampered with), classifies 
outsiders who may help as biased, and places the government as the sole ‘unbiased’ 
source for environmental knowledge. Its power is in silencing its critics (Kirsch 2014; 
Stengers 2000). It frames knowledge in a way that simultaneously, and necessarily, 
excludes. 
This power has left residents in toxic Townships waiting (Auyero, 2012) and 
enduring (Povinelli, 2011). This is a seemingly endless waiting, one of despair and 
without expectation—“we will just die with it”.1 This dissertation examined the lived 
experience of waiting, asking how waiting is experienced and what happens in the 
meantime. My goal has been to understand waiting as a time of potentiality instead of a 
perpetual state—a place out of which one might create a new type of knowledge that 
highlights the abstract regulatory apparatus for what it is: an intentionally structured, 
manipulative fiction. Scholars such as Simone (2008) argue that at times waiting can be 
strategic, purposeful, a time of “setting traps’ and opening up ‘spaces for maneuver” 
(ibid: 98). This dissertation continues his intervention on waiting as a time of possibility, 
but in a different vein. I do not argue that waiting itself is intentionally strategic—
residents would of course prefer not to wait in the toxic meantime—but rather that 
waiting makes demands for time and space, and this can then be mobilized to create a 
form of knowledge that would otherwise not be possible. 
Understanding waiting amidst toxicity as a space-time of possibility, the concept 
of embodied knowledge flips the abstract regulatory apparatus’ script: legitimacy and 
 
1 Kankoyo Focus Group 4, 2016. In Kabwe, someone in my focus group also said they would “live with the 
lead and die with the lead” (Chowa Focus Group 2, 2016). 
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expertise come through a lived experience that so-called ‘experts’ with technical tools, 
degrees, and a more abstract understanding of toxicity could never really understand. 
Rather than mining “facts” out of this embodied knowledge (White 2000) by 
putting it into a citizen science or citizen sensing (Gabrys 2016) framework, I have 
sought instead to understand what people are trying to explain through describing their 
sensory, emplaced, and recounted knowledge. To argue residents should be doing citizen 
science or citizen monitoring, I argue, would entirely miss the point. This would only 
make residents subservient to the abstract regulatory apparatus that Mopani and the 
Zambian government have created and reified, an apparatus that bases legitimacy on 
readings from (potentially faulty, inaccessible) technical instruments; averages 
calculations over days, months, or years; and relies on percentages of unknown numbers. 
This dissertation shows two communities in Mufulira fighting back by creating 
knowledge they can control. They expose the abstract regulatory apparatus as a fiction by 
gaining knowledge entirely outside of it. 
Policy Implications 
 
While the main portions of this dissertation have been theoretical and academic, I 
would be remiss not to offer any practical policy implications that could be useful for 
ZEMA, nonprofit organizations, or community groups within and outside of Zambia. 
First, due to lack of capacity, self-reported data is relied upon around the world 
(even in the United States). Regulatory agencies (ZEMA and MSD) should conduct more 
(or any) surprise audits of the mines. Unlike the current practice, where environmental 
audits are scheduled in advance—and even when they are a ‘surprise’ staff are notified 
when inspectors arrive—these should be done in secret, at times Mopani is not aware, 
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and at all times of the day, including at night. Based on the data I saw, Mopani only had 
to report averaged data—instead they should have to also submit their raw data, so these 
audits can be used to verify or disprove their accounts. In addition, they should have to 
submit the highest levels of emissions during certain periods, as these often matter more 
than averages (Kirsch 2014). Finally, fines should have more teeth—they should be at 
minimum commensurable with the kind of financial investments that would be needed to 
actually meet environmental standards. And, any fines collected should go towards 
regulatory agency funding for equipment, community training, remediation, and more 
inspectors—but not increasing salaries or bonuses. This could also help with the chronic 
lack of capacity in ZEMA and the MSD, helping with their high turnover rates and 
insufficient monitoring equipment. 
Second, communities should be involved—as experts—in inspections and 
environmental regulation. The Environmental Management Act allowed for something 
called “honorary inspectors”, though this portion of the policy has not been implemented. 
In addition to granting honorary inspectors the legitimacy to take air, water, and soil 
quality samples, a community inspection system – of ‘community inspectors’ – could be 
set up to alert authorities of the mine’s practices. I heard a few reports of something like 
this happening informally—residents in Kankoyo given the number of a ZEMA inspector 
to make a complaint more directly—but the residents involved argued that turnover 
within ZEMA was so rapid that by the time they called the inspector, someone new was 
on the line and they had to “explain everything all over again” and somehow prove their 
case. There is an environmental complaints log for the region, but inspectors are not 
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required to immediately follow up on complaints—just follow up within a matter of days 
or weeks.  
In an industry where emissions events that kill people can last mere minutes or 
hours, this is entirely inadequate. Right now, government data is needed both to fine or 
sanction the mine but also for community members to make civil claims against the mine 
for health issues (or agricultural-economic issues) stemming from emissions events. 
Community inspectors could be given the authority to provide evidence for court or 
regulatory purposes. Anyone who argues this is biased should seriously evaluate why 
Mopani is then allowed to self-report all environmental data. How is this self-reported 
data considered unbiased when ZEMA often does not even have working air quality 
monitors to corroborate? 
Third, a large portion of ZCCM-IH profits should be tied to remediating areas 
contaminated by historic ZCCM operations. (Of course, in addition, ZCCM-IH should 
have a greater share in the mines so that Zambians could benefit from their country’s 
natural resources; and ideally tax laws would be enacted to prevent transfer pricing, 
which is when local companies sell copper at a loss to sister companies owned in tax-
sheltered countries. This way ZCCM-IH could actually reap a benefit from holding 
shares in the current mines.) In Kabwe, instead of continual education campaigns that 
focus on individualizing responsibility for exposure, community groups could be 
resourced to dig into the history of lead contamination and seek out answers to why their 
communities have so much lead contamination. Who was making operational decisions 
that increased lead contamination? What is the role of Anglo-American Corporation in 
this? Civil society and community organizations would do well to push back against the 
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assertion that the extent of lead contamination in Kabwe Townships like Chowa, 
Kasanda, and Makululu is natural. 
Finally, as Peter Sinkamba, head of Citizens for a Better Environment and the 
Green Party President has argued, little can be done while copper is still holding the 
country hostage. While mining now takes an ever-lower percentage of the national GDP 
and employs fewer Zambians every day due to efficiencies and automation, copper 
exports still have a disproportionate influence on Zambia’s foreign exchange rate, as it is 
one of the country’s few exports. Efforts at holding the mining industry accountable will 
always be susceptible to corruption when the party in power needs copper exports to 
continue to keep the exchange rate steady—something they rely heavily on because of 
their high imports. National development plans should take into account the need for not 
only a more diversified economy but also other major sources of exports. 
Limits & Future Potential 
 
In a country with a smattering of mining towns, I surely left out the wrong ones. 
Given the scholarly focus on China-Africa relations (Lee 2017) I could have easily 
examined a Chinese state-run mine in Luanshya. A comparison between mines with a 
deep history on the Copperbelt and the newer mines in the Northwestern Province, like 
First Quantum’s Kansanshi Mine (Negi 2014), could have also been fruitful. Reports 
from the uranium mine in Lumwana (supposedly in part owned by the U.S. Bush family) 
alarm me—I heard rumors that radioactive uranium was being stored in unguarded 
warehouses until the Zambian government could work out export and transit laws for 
radioactive material.  
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In particular, the fact that the situation with Konkola Copper Mines in Chingola, 
owned by the multinational Vedanta, has been left out of the dissertation is both 
necessary and a travesty. While I was there residents were embroiled in an international 
court battle still (in 2019) being litigated in London. Because of this government and 
mineworkers were much less willing to talk and I just could not get the interviews I 
needed to make full inclusion work. As one mine industry insider told me, “what they are 
doing is criminal” and regarding both financial and environmental crimes, they go way 
beyond what Mopani does, according to him. There are reports that KCM purposefully 
runs itself low on lime (to neutralize acidic effluent going into the river) to save on 
money. This has resulted in severe pollution events that kill river life, hospitalize 
residents, and slowly debilitate. There is long-term water pollution in rural areas just 
outside Chingola proper, but KCM, like Mopani, uses the abstract regulatory apparatus. 
After the court case makes its way through the London courts and there are no more 
appeals, what happened there needs to be scrutinized. My hope is that this dissertation 
can inspire more investigation and that this marks the beginning of an ongoing 
conversation rather than its end.  
In addition, while conducting my research I hoped that I would be able to tell a 
broader story of how environmental knowledge was developed in Zambia during a time 
of nationalized mining, and how environmental knowledge changed with privatization of 
the industry. It is a fascinating story, but one that diverged from the main theoretical 
arguments of the dissertation. I have tiptoed around the issue here, but had I been more 
explicit and devoted an entire chapter to it, I would have liked to question the assumption 
that capitalism is uniquely destructive of the environment. Clearly the story of Kabwe 
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shows that environmental knowledge in a one-party state—even a putatively socialist 
state—can be just as suspect as environmental knowledge in an era of rampant 
globalization, neo-colonialism, and privatization.  
 
* * * 
 
Rebellion. In May 2019 the President of Zambia announced the government 
would be divorcing from Vedanta Resources, a multinational mining corporation 
headquartered in India with ownership over 70% of the Kankoyo Copper Mine in 
Chingola. In the announcement, President Lungu said he would not be blackmailed and 
manipulated: “We have been taken for a ride by mining investors for a long time”.  
The legality of his move is questionable. Most in the global community have said 
it is illegal. Some say it is to benefit the PF ‘mafias’ like the Jerabo. Others say it is to sell 
the mine cheaply to a different foreign company and make money from the bribes. Some 
argue it is because Vedanta started closing down some shafts. President Lungu’s move 
militates against the global financial order, resulting in pushback and conspiracy.  
Vedanta’s CEO went to meet with President Lungu personally, but evidently got 
nowhere. The government argued that Vedanta operated “under the cover of ambiguity 
and mostly under cover of secrecy” regarding its tax dodging, hiring, and environmental 
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record. The covers have lifted, Lungu says, and the government can see that Vedanta 
defaulted on their Development Agreement. Too little in taxes. Too much pollution.2 
 Vedanta took the government to court in South Africa. They argued they had 
fulfilled the commitments of the Development Agreements and the move was “an abuse 
of the legal process”. The Zambian government said Vedanta had breached 
environmental and tax laws. They also wanted this to be a warning to the other mines, 
specifically Mopani. In South Africa, the judge ruled in favor of KCM. 
 




2 I am not commenting here on whether this was a good move or whether there is no corruption involved. 
Reports so far seem to indicate that the government has bungled the management of the mine day-to-day—
Chingola residents went days without water because of contamination—though this could be a result of 
transition. At minimum, I will argue Zambia should benefit significantly more from their natural resources 
than they do and not suffer environmental atrocities like those seen in these pages. In general, I support the 
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Appendix A: Methods 
 
Interviews 
Data collection for this dissertation included 102 open-ended, semi-structured 
interviews lasting between one and three hours. Participants were purposively sampled 
with identification via relevant job title and then a snowball sampling technique was used 
to identify additional relevant respondents. Whenever potentially damaging data was 
leaked or shown to me, I made sure to also interview others with knowledge of the data, 
to further ensure anonymity. All of these formal interviews were audio recorded for 
transcription. Because my interviews are anonymous, I want to give the reader some 
understanding of the scope of research. A scalar diversity of my informants was 
intentional. Their expertise ranged from local, neighborhood-level players to international 
specialists.  
Government 
Within government, I interviewed key local representatives, including councilors and 
when I could Members of Parliament and District Commissioners. I also interviewed 
many within the city governments, people working in areas of health, community, 
environment, urban planning, agriculture, forestry, and more. I also interviewed several 
people at national-level agencies (lawyers, inspectors, communications, heads) including 
at ZEMA, the MSD, ZCCM-IH and METS, the Ministry of Mines, and the Ministry of 
Health. 
Mining Industry 
I never got official permission to interview people at Mopani or former managers of 
ZCCM-Kabwe. I did, however, interview many mining insiders at the specific mines in 
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question—including current and former Mopani workers, and former ZCCM employees. 
I will not say more to keep their anonymity. Included in ‘mining industry’ are interviews 
conducted with insiders on the Black Mountain in Kitwe, and those with involvement in 
the privatization of the mines. 
Civil society 
Finally, I interviewed many who worked at local and national civil society organizations, 
both Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs). These interviewees were chosen due to their direct involvement with advocacy 
for the rights of residents living in polluted environments. This includes—but is not 
limited to—organizations such as Citizens for a Better Environment, Amnesty 
International, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Southern African 
Resource Watch, Catholic Center for Justice and Peace, Environment Africa, and the 
World Bank. 
Focus Groups 
In addition to interviews, I conducted 29 semi-structured resident focus groups 
with a total of over 200 participants in industrially polluted neighborhoods of three cities: 
Mufulira, Kabwe, and Kitwe. Focus groups were conducted by me with research 
assistants. Mwelwe Musosha, Stallone Chishimba, Nkatazo Lungu, and Bright Munali 
aided with introductions, consent, and language—but they also asked questions, 
conversed about their own work and understandings regarding mining and the 
environment, and provided intellectual companionship as we learned what was 
happening. Most focus groups were in the local language of Bemba or a mixture of 
Bemba and English (with my research assistant helping translate in the moment when 
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necessary as I had a barely rudimentary understanding of Bemba) and were 
professionally translated and transcribed afterwards. To ensure the inclusion of female 
voices (because most, but not all, interviews were with men), many focus groups were 
single-gender and female-only, although in each city there was male participation in 
focus groups as well. In Kitwe and Kabwe I conducted one male-only focus group. 
Mufulira Kabwe Kitwe 
Kankoyo 4 Chowa - women 3 Wusakili 3 




2 Makululu 3 Twatasha & 
Beyond 
2 
  Re-miners (men) 2 Re-miners 3 
 
Table 2: Focus Groups 
 
Neighborhood focus groups (see table 2) were put together following a modified 
random sampling technique. Because I wanted participants to know each other—so they 
could prompt discussion of stories, rumors, and recountings they had—I randomly 
selected a Township house (using a random number generator) and asked the female (or 
male, if it was a male group) head of the household to invite immediate neighbors for a 
discussion of the “environment, the way you live, and your surroundings.” This was done 
on-the-spot, with people calling over neighbors within hearing distance of the house—
ensuring participants were not selected due to their involvement with environmental 
issues. In Mufulira residents told me about two community activist groups, the Kankoyo 
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Women’s Pressure Group and the Butondo Committee. I conducted additional focus 
groups with them separately. In the end, 21 of my focus groups were “neighborhood 
resident” focus groups and were thus organized through random sampling. Three focus 
groups were conducted with a community activist group for the neighborhood (2 in 
Mufulira and 1 in Twatasha, Kitwe). Five focus groups were with workers at tailings re-
mining sites (they were often workers as well as residents of Townships) with four of 
them composed of male re-miners of tailings (2 in Kitwe and 2 in Kabwe) and 1 
specifically with women who worked on re-mining operations at the Black Mountain. 
Focus groups generally lasted about an hour and included around 8 participants. 
They were held either in resident’s houses or yards and often included mobile segments 
where we would walk to sites discussed in the focus group—houses that were cracked, 
plants burnt, empty and struggling gardens, water collection spots, or contaminated areas 
where children played. At the beginning of each focus group, I informed the participants 
that I was a student conducting research on the environment in the area and gained verbal 
consent from each participant. During focus groups I asked open-ended questions and 
made sure to allow for debate, open contradictions, and emotional responses.  
Each focus group started with the overarching question: “what do you think of 
your environment here in your neighborhood?” Pollution was not brought up by me or 
research assistants until residents mentioned it—typically as their immediate response to 
my opening question. From there, we delved into deeper questions concerning what 
knowledge people had about the pollution around them, what stories and rumors people 
heard and told—and, of course, who in their minds is to blame and what is to be done.  
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Mine Visits 
I took tours of several mines. This included an underground tour of shafts at 
Mopani in Kitwe. I saw some processing operations at Sable Zinc and got a tour of what 
is left of ZCCM-Kabwe’s old mine grounds. At Bwana Makubwa I saw their 
decommissioning plans and walked their grounds, learning about best practices in mine 
decommission. At Kansanshi I saw most of their operations (and got a full tour), 
including a baby giraffe that had been flown in so that their expat workers could go on 
‘safari’—and because their decommissioning plan at that time included the idea of 
turning the mine pit into a lake and starting a wildlife preserve.  
 
Data collection 
Finally, I embarked on an ambitious data collection program that was constantly 
thwarted. In my investigation I analyzed documents acquired several government sources 
including: ZEMA, the MSD, ZCCM-IH archive, the National Archives, and the 
Parliamentary Library, the Zambian Environmental Management Agency, the Mine 
Safety Department. I also acquired data from NGOs, CBOs, and media. In addition, many 
of my documents were anonymously leaked from expert sources. Types of data included: 
- Government, business, and community reports 
- Non-governmental organization reports 
- Meeting minutes from NGO-CBO-Mine-Government meetings 
- communication and documentation between relevant mines and government 
agencies (for example, emails and other communications I was shown) 
- Environmental Impact Assessments 
- Environmental Project Briefs 
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- Academic and scientific research and testing results 
- Bi-annual reports to ZEMA (some) 
- newspaper articles (in particular, I collected every report on mining and 
environment from The Post newspaper from the years 2010 - 2014) 
- Data from media sources including investigative journalists, and local radio 
broadcasts on the state of the environment 
Note on exclusions 
 
My research plan and implementation included a focus on Kitwe. The focus on 
Kitwe in this dissertation is the Black Mountain, but my research program extended 
beyond and was included above. 
In Chingola—where Konkola Copper Mines owned by Vedanta Resources is 
wreaking havoc on the environment—residents were embroiled in an international court 
battle still (in 2019) being litigated in London. Because of this government and 
mineworkers were much less willing to talk and I just could not get the interviews I 
needed to make full inclusion work. I only ever managed to get a partial story of what has 
been happening in Chingola, so this has been left out of the dissertation and overview of 
methods completely. Still, I met with several local government representatives, non-profit 
leaders, and residents. Their stories provided good contextual background for the general 
landscape of social-environmental impacts of mining in the region at large and the 
politically messy nature of environmental regulation. 
Another considered site was the “new Copperbelt” of the Northwestern Province. 
NWP is the site of First Quantum’s (FQM) Kansanshi mine in Solwezi, another FQM 
mine in the town of Kalumbila called Sentinel, and a uranium mine in Lumwana operated 
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by Barrick Gold. I visited FQM’s Kansanshi Mine in 2015 during my pre-dissertation 
work. I toured the site and examined potential environmental issues, including the oft 
complained about vehicle exhaust and dust from trucks exporting material. Additionally, 
rumors of radioactive uranium being stockpiled without guards or many regulations in 
Lumwana were intriguing and I wish I could have visited to learn more. However, the 
mines in NWP did not have the history my original project—on the changing ways 
people understood environments and pollution from colonial, to national, to privatized 
eras—called for. More future research should be done on how mines without a toxic 
legacy could have a different relationship between environment, industry, and the people 
living alongside them. 
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